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I M T R 0 D U C T I 0 II 
Of all the political developments in the Asian 
subcontinents in the recent past,the Soviet int^rrvontion 
in Afghanistan was an inportant occurrence, Afghanistan 
has been a politicaly sensitive area since long. Therefore 
it is one of the burning topics of today. It is for this 
reason, I huve selected this topic for my dissertation, v/hich 
has to be submitted in the partial fulfilment of the 
requirerajnts for the av/ard of the degree of Master of Librai'y 
Science, 
The present work consists of two parts. The first is 
the descriptive part in which all the aspects arisinc out 
of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan have been discussed. 
Part two consists of a list of periodicals,a list of 
subject headings under v/hich the entries in a bibliography 
have been arranged,the main bibliography and an alphabetical 
index. 
Scope and Sources of Compilation 
The bibliography includes 254 entries v/hich are not 
comprehensive but are fairly representative of the subject, 
Whiie starting v;ith this venture, a general survey of the 
// 
literature available in important libraries viz.Maulana 
Azad Library,Aligarh,Sapru House Library,Delhi and Delhi 
University Library,v/as made. Help v;as also sought from 
some indexing and abstracting services. Out of the fairly 
large number of periodicals covering the field,only 
important ones were selected for the purpose, h list of 
these periodicals consulted has been given in the begining 
of this chapter. 
Standards followed 
As far as possible the Indian standards recommended 
for bibliographical referenceC I S: 2331-1963 ) have been 
follov/ed. The abbreviations use<^  for months etc, have been 
listed somev/here in the v;ork. 
Abstracts 
The entries in a bibliography contains abstracts 
giving the essential information about the article 
documented. An important feature of this bibliography is 
that I have given informative abstracts rather than 
indicative and I feel a needy researcher need not to consult 
the original articles in the periodicals. I hope those 
using the bibliography v/ill find them useful. 
Ill 
Arranoements 
Efforts have been made to arrange the entries unciex-
co-extensive subject headings. For this purpose a 
Gonprehensive list of subject headings is compiled 
which is given as chapter 2 of part 2, 
The entries are serially numbered and the follovving 
items of information are contained in the various entries, 
(a 
(b 
(c 
(d 
(e 
(f 
(g 
C^h 
( i 
(J 
( k 
( 1 
(m 
( n 
(o 
( D 
S e r i a l number 
J^ame of au thor /au thors 
A f u l l stopC.) 
T i t l e of con t r ibu t ion including s u b t i t l e and 
a l t e r n a t i v e t i t l e ^ i f any, 
A f u l l stopC.) 
Title of periodical. This has to be underlined, 
a full stop(,) 
volume number 
A comma(,) 
issue number 
A semi colon(;) 
year 
A comma(,) 
month 
A semi colonC;) 
Inclusive pages of the article 
IV 
Specimen entry: 
SAWHNEY (R G ) . Insurgency: No decisive impact, 
'yJorld Focus. 5,4; 1984,April; 10-12. 
Alphabetical Index 
Bibliography contains an exhaustive author,title 
and subject index in one alphabetical sequence. A nuinber 
of see references have been provided to facilitate the 
consultation of the bibliography and to meet the needs 
of various approaches, I hope it v/ill augment the utility 
of the bibliography. 
PART ONE 
Introduction 
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INTRODUCTION 
AFGHAN PROBLi:JM 
vjhat i s Afghan problem? 
<K 
The Afghan problem is in fact the story of i country that 
acted as a pawn in the game of chess between the tv/o super 
pov/ers - U.S.A and U.aJS.R. Afghanistan had for lone been an 
unknown territory for many of the people of the world, but after 
the Soviet intervention on the Christmas Eve of 1979 made it a 
very important region and became a burning topic for the press 
all over the world. Here I propose to examine what the impli-
cations of Soviet action could be, hov; the world has reacted to 
it, the countermoves of U.S.A. or the West has made or can make. 
Background of Afghan problem 
The world has seen two models of Soviet intervention in the 
affairs of her Muslim neighbours. The first is the Iranian 
model which involves indirect intervention. The Soviet Union 
in this mode of intervention extends all help to the progressive 
and revolutionary masses of people, supported by all diplomatic 
and strategic favours and thus prepares the nation for a total 
revolution. The second model is the Afghanistan model. In 
Afghanistan, Soviet Russia sent her armed forces at the invita-
tion of the local government, rounded up the anti-Soviet elements 
in a planned and strategic way and established a government 
loyal to her. Both these models are a part of the international 
Communist movement and have been v/orked out to meet out the 
national intersts of Soviet Union, 
History of Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan 
The story of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan goes back 
to the Twenties/ but a rapid sequence of events started from 
1977, By that time Afghanistan had become quite dependent on 
Russia, HOSCOV7 had extenaed too much of economic and military 
assistance to her. Mohd, Daoud Khan, then president of ^ ifgha-
nistan annoyed Soviet Union by trying to balance the Soviet aid 
with aid from U.S.A. and some other countries and thus to main-
tain a non-aligned status. During his visit to i'loscov/, Mohd. 
Daoud made it clear that Moscow had no right to interfare with 
his policies as he was the president of an independent nation. 
This hostility of Daoud to Russia resulted into the Afghan x'e-
volution of April 1978 which was backed by Communist forces and 
which resulted into the ultimate fall of Daoud, The revolution 
was led by group of civilians, v/ho had v/orked hard to overthrow 
the autocratic tribal t-lohammad Zai regime and was supported by 
senior army and air-force officers, who had been trained in the 
Soviet Union. 
The April 1978 Revolution brought into power a Marxist 
Leninist regime. At that time th-re were two Marxist parties 
in Afghanistan, The first one was Khalq headed by Tarraki and 
the other was Babrak Karmal s "Parcham", The Soviet Union 
tries its best to unite the two parties, Tarraki had become 
niimber one and was popular as the great national and revolu-
tionary figure of Afghanistan, so he was elected the president. 
Babrak Karmal/ the leader of Parcham was elected Vice President. 
Amin, the strongman of Khalq, was appointed the deputy Prime 
Minister and was given Foreign Affairs, The two Communist 
groups Khalq and Parcham got almost equal representation in the 
government. As it was a military coup and military had been 
politicised, three militarymen were also included in the Cabinet. 
With the establishment of Tarraki Government a new era of 
cooperation between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union started. 
The two countries signed a number of agreements. Thousands of 
Soviet advisers were spread over the country. The number of 
these advisers during Daoud regime was not more than 2 000, but 
after the April 19 78 revolution, it rose upto 7000, These 
Soviet-men held top positions in administration and army of 
Afghanistan. About 40 percent of these Soviet advisers were the 
trained KGB personnels. Thus for the first time Russia succeeded 
to v/ork-out its strategic ambitions in accordance with her in-
terests. After the April Revolution, the two countries started 
closer cultural, economic, scientific and military cooperation. 
The U.S.S.R, extended aid of over 120 million and a Treaty of 
Peace^ Friendship and cooperation v^ras signed in December 1978. 
The Tarraki Government invited diplomatic representatives from 
East Germany and Cuba and expelled South Korian Embassy. This 
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action was clear indication about the deep rooted relationship 
between Tarraki Government and the Soviet block which led the 
jsjestern observers to believe that the April coup was inspirea 
and sponsored by the Soviet Union. 
After assuming power Tarraki Govt, announced a number of 
bocial, economic- and political reforms, though most of them 
remained unimplemented. Land reforms, equal status v/omen with 
the man and the change of national flag around a sense of ais-
gust among the people who thought these reforms to be against 
their religion. The:;e reforms faced total resistance v/hen the 
mullhas propagated that the choice before the people v/as bet-
ween the holy "Koran" and the "Communist Manifesto". 
Soon the Afghan rulers were divided, Tarraki and Amin 
treated Babrak and his men with contempt and the position of 
the Parchamis was that of unwanted fellovi^ s in the Govt. The 
two sides began to quarrel too often and too openly. Ultimately 
Babrak decided to strike with the help of Col. Abdul Quadir who 
refused to join hands with Babrak. Soon Babrak was exposed and 
both Tarraki and Amin wanted to imprison the Parcham leaders, 
but at the intervention of Russia Five of the Parcham leaders 
were posted as ambassadors in different countries. Col. Abdul 
Quadir was arrested in August 1978. Quadir confessed that he 
was involved in a plot to hatched by Babrak to over throw Tarraki, 
The same confessions were made by two Parcham ministers - Major 
Mohammad Rafi and Sultan All Keshtmand still in the cabinet. 
Soon after the confessions/ the five ambassadors belong-
ing to Parcham were dismissed and asked to return home. But 
none of them came back. On 8th of July 1978 the Parcham leaders 
were expelled from the P.D.P.A. Amin thousands of his critics 
to, jail. Amin by that time had become so powerful that even 
Tarraki began to fear him. That is why when Amin asked Tarraki 
to handover the prime Ministership to him, he could not deny 
and thus on 27th March, 1979 Amin was appointed Prime Minister 
of Afghanistan, The economy of the country became worse. The 
prices went out of control. Every thing had gone up by 25 per-
cent . The people v/aited the things to get better for eight 
months but for their utter disgust there was no improvement in 
their lot. The discontent among the people took the shape of 
insurgency, iivery day a bridge or two were blown up, cutting 
the means of communications. It v;as not a struggle between the 
haves and have-nots, but a struggle between the oro-communist 
government and anti-communist society. People v;anted/pursue 
their ovm beliefs, their way of living, howsoever conservative 
it might be. 
The first province to revolt was Nooristan in December 1973. 
Soon the spirit of revolt spread in other provinces too and r.ine 
of the 28 provinces of Afghanistan followed the examole of i^ooris-
tan, Mascow advised Tarraki to go slow on reforms but in rain. 
The Tarraki government v/as going too fast with reforms, v/ithout 
preparing the people for such changes and thus alienated the 
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people on March 19/19 79 occured the Herat event when in 
that province thirty Russian advisers and their families were 
murdered and their bodies were cut down in pieces. 
The Soviet Invasion 
The Herat Massacre was an example of the spontaneous 
anger of the Afghan people against pro-Communist regime, The 
Afghan soldiers refused to fight the rebels in the city and 
after four or five days the Russian soldiers came,bombarded 
and machine-gunned the city and killed or wounded at least 
10000 people. 
Such brutal was Soviet revenge against the local 
population of the city. The fighting went on in pakhtia,Kunar 
and Herat provinces between the government forces and 
so-called rebell groups. 
On 23 June,1979 three Russian advisers and seven 
pro-Taraki soldiers were killed by the anti government 
demonstrators. On 6 August,1979 anti-Taraki forces tried to 
stage a coup at Bala-Hissar Fort,near Kabul, Planes and Tanks 
manned by Russians had to be used to face the chellange. The 
coup resulted into the death of hundreds of Afghan soldiers. 
The incidents of Herat and Bala-Hissar made it clear 
to the Soviet Union that Afghan forces were not stronc enough 
to control the insurgency and therefore Moscow decided to 
intervene in a big way. Gen.Pavlovsky,commander-in-chief of 
Soviet Land Forces was sent to Afghanistan, He stayed there 
for two months alongwith a group of army commanders and drev; 
up the plans for the entry of Soviet troops, 
Mascow also realisecj that the present set-up of 
government with Amin as the Prime Minister could not cope 
with the situation, Babrak Karmal was a dependable person. 
He could temper the rigidity of communism with leniency. 
With this view Russian leaders suggested Taraki to care out 
Amin, A plan vms made accordingly to kill or capture Amin 
in room of people's palace. All the eight bodyguards who 
accompanied Amin were killed,but he escaped, Amin was nov/ 
convinced about Taraki's plot to eliminate him. As a counter 
move he sent his trusted men to the presidential palace. One 
of them threw a handgranade into Taraki's room. Wounded 
Taraki was rushed to the hosoital v;here despite best 
medical aid, he died the same night of 14th September,1979, 
Amin nov7 became most pov/erful and v/as declared as the 
Chairman of the Revolutionary Council that is President 
and Secretary General of P.JJ.P.A, central cornn-iit cee. 
Amin tried his best to win the favour of the 
Afghan people by playing on their national feelings. But 
the people could not forget that Amin was also a man of 
Russia like Taraki and he also was being guided and 
assisted by the same Russian advisers. Amin chargea the 
Soviet ambassador Mr.PuZanov for taking interest in the 
internal affairs of Afghanistan and demandea his recall. 
The Soviet leaders shovjed the signs of reconciliation by 
calling back puZanov and appointing a new ambassador v/ith 
a Muslim name. This made Amin believe that Russia had 
accepted him. On some other occasions too Russia made a 
shov/ of her cordial relations v/ith Amin. But this was only 
a shoi-/. The Russians v;ere just waiting for the right time 
to send its troops to remove Amin,install Babrak and crush 
the insurgency. 
Time came when v/orld attention v/as focused on Iran, 
Americans had been/hostages in that country. It had 
created a serious crisis there. The west was celebrating 
the Christmas, The U,S,S,R, took the advantage of the time 
and the Russian forces walked in Afghanistan secretly. 
The holy Christmas day heard the noice of the Russian 
9 
airerafts carrying Soviet troops and arms and 27th of December 
witnessed the March of Russian tanks and troops through the 
streets and bazars of Kabul firing at the buildings just to 
v/arn the people against any daring step or confrontation. 3y 
the evening of the day Russian troops had captured all the 
important buildings without any resistance* A short-lived 
resistance was there at the Kabul radio-station. The resisting 
forces at the radio station surrendered v/ithin half- an hour. 
On 27th of December after taking his lunch, Amin felt 
drowsy. He suspected that he had been poisoned. He expressed 
this suspicion before his son Rehman who disclosed this fact 
before Gen. Mohammad Yaqub, chief of General Staff, As soon as 
the Russian troops arrived, Amin's guards opened fire on them. 
The guards fought bravely for many hours, but ultimately they 
surrendered before the fire power of the Russian troops. Amin 
was hit by bullets, but it is believed that he had died before 
the shooting begun. Such was the end of Amin* Amin's two sons 
were also killed* His wife and one of his daughter escaped. 
The other daughter was wounded and treated by the Russian doc-
tors. 
Amin was also a communist and pro-Russian ruler of Afghanis-
tan, It was he who once remarked, "on two points we are ahead 
of other socialist countries in our ties with the Soviet Union: 
First no other socialist country has such a long border with 
the Soviet Union as Afghanistan. Second, no other socialist 
country has such a long standing friendship background with the 
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Soviet Union as Afghanistan. Then why did the Russians send 
their forces to kill him? The answer is that Amin has become 
very ruthless. He got hundreds of people butchered daily in 
difrerent parts of Afghanistan. It had become evident that 
Amin v/ould not last long. Russia could not take the risk which 
of overthrowing of Amin by some anti-Soviet group. In that case 
there was possibility of the installation an anti-Marxist govern-
ment, Russia had no time to wait. Mascow, therefore managed 
to receive an invitation from Babrak to send its forces and so 
Babrak v;as installed. 
Modernisation was the main aspect of Babrak's policy, out 
he was not to be too- fast with his reforms like Taraki and Amin. 
Islam was to have its rightful place in his regime. But people 
could not accept him too as he v/as also a man of Russia like 
Amin and Taraki and Russia in the eyes of nationalist, Afghans 
were invaders and anti-Islamic, 
IKTKRiSIATIQMAL REACTION 
Role of U.S.A. 
The Soviet action came as a shock to the world. The United 
States and its European allies were thrilled by the news of this 
action. President Carter expressed surprise at the Soviet move. 
He cut short his Christmas holiday in Camp David and on 28 Decem-
ber flew back to Washington to discuss the crisis with his poli-
tical and military advisers. He took it as a personal defeat 
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in the hands of Russia. The Soviat action was termed as the 
start of Cold »^ ar II between the tv^ o super powers. Garter 
called Breznev on hot line to protest against"Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan. The reply of Brezhvev was that Russia had acted 
as the invitation of the local governrnant of Afghanistan, 
America did not accept this explanation and Carter considered 
it false, ^"^e alledged that Mascow has violated the accepted 
international rules of strategic behaviour. The surprise 
expressed by Carter shov/s the great failure of Carter's 
advisers on foreign policy and also of C.I.A, to foresee the 
strategic machanics of their main adversary and the iiatentions 
of Russia towards political and strategic developm;int on her 
border neighbours. United States is too much engaged to bring up 
world opinion against Soviet intervention. As a measure of 
strong reaction#Carter ordered to stop the supply of food grains 
to Russia,announced that U.S.A. would not take part in the 
Mascow Olympic Games and directed that no high technology ot 
other strategic items be sold to the Soviet Union till further 
notice. Counterrtoves of-these nature were of no effect. Non-
supply of half day meal could do no harm to a super power like 
Russia. Keeping in viev/ the explosive political and strategic 
situation,it may be said that participation or non-participation 
in sports and ganes v;as meaningless. U.S.S.R.is believed to be 
for superior in high technology and overall strategy,The third 
measure of non-supply of high technology and strategic items 
also lost its meaning. 
12 
President Garter specifically warmed the Soviet ^nion 
that any further move by the Soviet Union to reach the Persian 
Gulf would mean war. He added that in case of any intervention 
of Pvussia in the internal affairs of Pakistan, Mascov/ would 
have to be confronted v/ith not only U.S. opposition but also 
of many other major countries. A total confrontation between 
the two super powers, on an overall basis would mean a total 
destruction in only thirteen minutes and a few seconds, those 
the possibility of such confrontation in the near future is 
being ruled out by the pandits of world strategy. Keeping in 
view the obvious strategic game between the two super powers 
it is suggested that U.N. should immediately intervene and past 
a large contingent of armed forces in the strait of Hormuz or 
the mouth of the Persian Gulf; and the contingent should con-
sist of the armed forces of the non-aligned nations. 
In view of the developments in Afghanistan and Iran, the 
U.S. strategic and prestigious involvement in the region will 
continue to be provoked by the U.S.S.R. with the viev/ that in 
the event of the escalation of the conflict it will prove 
counter-productive for the USSR, 
In bringing about the closure of the strait of Hormuz, the 
strategic interests of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are indentical. 
So the sense of insecurity, for commercial navigation, created 
as a result of armed operational exercises, may substantially 
affect the economy of Iran, and the interest of U.S. and U.S.S.R, 
are identical, which may particularly be in U.S. interests, that 
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a section of the Iranian population may not consider the 
current direct confrontation with the U.S. as a wise step and 
•may come out in opposition of the present policies of the 
Iranian government and may even question, to some extent, the 
wisdom in Ayatollah Khomeini's present attitude towards the 
U.S. However, this may prove counter productive to the U.S.S.R., 
since any compromise in Khomeini's position may bring into 
power, the faction of the revolutionaries which may, in need, 
send an invitation to the Krunlin to come and help the govt, 
and save the country from the imperialist designs. 
The blockade at the strait of Hormuz will adversely affect 
the economy of the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms - Kuwait, Bahrein, 
Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Oman also - and their need of security may 
drive them closer to the U.S., as the legacy of the British 
and their western - oriented attitude may possibly convince 
them to look for\'/ard to the western camp against the fast dis-
siminating revolutionary movement. As the Soviet Union is 
away from the strait of Hormuz, and if their diplomacy can 
successfully provoke and armed confrontation of any dimension, 
at the strait, resulting in the blockade of the strait, then 
that V7ill be probably the master success of their diplomacy, 
since in that case they will be in an advantageous position to 
put the blame on the U.S. for all the economic depression in the 
developed andtthe developing countries as a result of non supply 
of oil from the Persian Gulf. /Ihile the U.vS. may v/orry for its 
impact on west European countries, the Russians may be willing 
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to meet. The oil requirements of some of the west European 
countries through the continental railway. The nature and 
extent of the impact on Japan, India and the west European 
countries, as a result of non supply of oil, due to naval 
blockade at the strait of Hormuz is yet to be understood. The 
Russians, at this stage may find out some pressure points to 
bargain in rationalising the attitude of some of the affected 
countries. The U.S. administration policy analysts may be 
aware of these far reaching implications, and the caution exer-
cised by them, in their dealings with Iran may be an indication 
in support of it. The gradual U.S. strategic and prestigious 
involvement in the region needs greater amount of caution and 
restraint, for, any adventurous or hast;^  military operation may 
prove them costlier than their strategic involvement in south 
Vietnam. The nature and extent of British support to the cause 
is self-explanatory in view of her liinited resources to get 
strategically involved. 
The possible naval blockade at the strait of Hormuz may 
immediately follow, most probably may precede also, with a possi-
bly military defence pact among Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Qatar, Omana and Pakistan with the U.S., and the consequent 
western arms pile up in these stages may ultimately result in a 
war, which may suitably be termed as a localised war between 
the two super powers. The conception at this stage be totally 
ruled out. 
Some other countries of the Muslim v;orld may not afford to 
keeo themselves out of the fray for a longer time. "While the 
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two super power's covert activities may possibly try to bring 
in a regime, in those countries, favourable to them, in order 
to muster, as much as possible, support for their respective 
causes and may possibly be utilised to further their respective 
psychological propaganda and in collecting, whatever, strategic 
support among the Muslim population, while keeping the wave of 
Islamic fundamentalism intact. 
The wave of Islamic fundamentalism now sv/eeping the Isla-
mic countries, is of greater significance for the U.S.S.R, since 
she has more than 40 million Muslims in the antonomous Kazakh, 
Uzbek, Tadzhik, Kirghiz, Turkmen and Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist 
Republics. In her recent adventure in Afghanistan, the Tadzhik 
and Uzbek soldiers have probably figured prominently, which 
obviously indicates that the Russians consider their minorities 
as great 'potential assets' in exercising their influence in 
central Asia. The U.S.S.R, may potentially exploit, in her fa-
vour, both the political as well as the strategic implications 
of the wave of Islamic fundamentalism. 
The U.N, involvement in these develooments may be only of 
an academic nature and extent of super power strategic involve-
ment in the developments. While the General Assembly may wit-
ness, long, rhetoric,musical and conservatively worded speeches, 
particularly from the non-aligned group; the Security Gougicil 
may remain Lukewarm in arriving at any resolution in the face 
of veto by either of the two super powers. 
16 
India's role holds the vital strings of cipl6matic and 
strategic balances and imbalances. For the first time, after 
independence, India finds herself placed at a most important 
diplomatic and strategic threshold in exercising her influence, 
vrhich may have direct implications on diplomatic and strategic 
confrontation of the two super powers. But it is confiaently 
hoped that India will be able to face the challange, posed by 
the two super pov/ers, while keeping her policy of non-alignment 
intact. 
Role of U.K. 
Britain also condemned Soviet action vehementually. In 
reply to the British condemnation, a letter bearing an expla-
nation v/as sent to the British Prime Minister Mrs. Margret 
Thatcher. The letter said that Russia had intey>^ ened only at 
after an invitation from Kabul. But Mrs. Thatcher said that the 
explanation was childish and far away from truth. She accused 
U.S.A. that it had invaded Afghanistan and v/ith this allegation 
the British Govt, announced the cancellation of high-level minis-
terial, military, and cultural contacts v/i ch Russia. V'iith this 
the preferential credit agreement was also broke-on. 
Role of India 
India was perhaps the only country that neither condemned 
nor favoured the Soviet action in Afghanistan. India could never 
follov/ a hard line of action against the Soviet intervention as 
the Indian leaders did not want to annoy a faithful and trusted 
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friend like Russia v/ho had alv/ays supported our country at 
most critical moments. India at that time V7as having a 20 year 
treaty of friendship; out trade with Russia had x-eached upto 
£300 million per annum. Moreover the country v^?as being ruled 
by a care-taker government under the Prime Ministership of 
Ghaudhary Gharan Singh, In his heart of hearts Gharan Singh was 
against Soviet action but as he v/as sorrounded by pro-Soviet 
persons and he wanted to leave the matter to be dealt by the 
new government to come. But India being a non-aligned country 
could not keep mum. It v/as essential for the country to voice 
its reaction though in soft and guarded language. The Gharan 
Singh government issued a non-committed statement. The care-
taker government said that India v;as coramitted to the principles 
of non-alignment so it supported the right of Afghan people to 
determine their fate v/ithout any type of foreign interference. 
The caretaker government also expressed its hope that no country 
or external pov/er would take such steps that might make the 
situation worse. It hoped that normalsy v/ould be restored in 
Afghanistan in the near future, 
Lateron the caretaker Prime Minister felt the pulse of the 
nation and forced by the Indian public opinion the government 
had to take a firmer action. The Prime Minister summoned the 
Russian ambassador and told him clearly that India had its tradi-
tional and friendly relations v/ith Afghanistan, India valued 
these relations and therefore, v/as concerned at the substantial 
involvement of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and would like its 
18 
independence and non-alignment strengthen. 
Indian concern seems all the more justified when one 
analysis it from the geographical point of view. The Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan meant a super power taking a step 
closer to the borders of India, In the past there v/ere two 
countries Afghanistan and Pakistan between India and tne Soviet 
Union, Russian forces were now only at a small distance of 
750 kilometres and now there was only one country between India 
and the super power Russia, The history witnessed that there 
was a time when China was deemed to be a friend of our country 
but as soon as Tibet lost its status of a buffer state and 
v/ent into the hands of Chinese, China invaded India leaving. 
India to repent in all the times to come. There is no coubt 
that Russia has helped many times like a true friend, but hov/ 
can we forget the bitter lesson that a friend in the oast the 
China had taught us. 
Role of Pakistan 
Since the Herat Massacre 19th March 1979 and the counter 
massacre of Afghan by Russian soldiers thousands of civilians 
v/ere taking refuge accross the border in Pakistan, Russia alleged 
that the insurgents v;ere receiving arms from abroad. 
There v-/as much truth in the allegation. The rebels had 
contact with foreigners. Their main base v/as Pakistan. Pakis-
tan president Gen, Zia opened camps in Pakistan for the Afghan 
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refugees. Through these Afghan refugees he tried to preach 
the sermon of Islamic brotherhood. Many other Muslim coun-
tries also gave shelter and arranged training camps for the 
rebels. Some of the fanatic Muslim organisation in Pakistan 
encouraged the refugees to organise themselves as rebels and 
to fight against the un-Islamic rule and Communist reforms. 
The opposition leader Khan Wall Khan had well-intime' warned 
the Pakistan Govt, against the dire consequences of Zia's 
move. He said that Zia v/as playing with fire by organising 
the Afghan rebels. He was sure that the Russians would not 
sit idle and would hit back one day Zia and his government 
gave no ears to his warning and later on the world saw that 
the suspicion of Kiian W'ali Khan was right. 
Role of other Countries 
It was not only Pakistan that helped and supported the 
insurgents of Afghanistan. China and U.S.A. also involved 
themselves in the process. China, that has only a bit of its 
territory touching the Afghanistan Province of Badakshan, not 
only provided arms but also training to the refugees, camping 
in Pakistan. America decided to give all possible assistance 
to the insurgents indirectly through Pakistan v/ithout coniing 
into the open. Tehran with troubles of its ov;n could not cive 
much material help to the Afghan rebels though most of the 
Shias living in Iran had sympathies for Afghan people. 
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After Russian Invasion 
The confrontation betv^ een America and U.S.S.R, over 
Afghanistan carries for reaching effects. They are sure to get 
involved in a race of arms interfering more and more in the 
affairs of the Indian sub-continent. The Cold i/ar between 
Mascow and Washington is sure to disturb the developing eco-
nomy of Indian Mrs. Indira Gandhi, an opposition leader by 
that time, also criticised the Soviet action but in a mild v;ay. 
She said, "Vfe are against all foreign intervention. But people 
have been interfering in this area in one way or the other. 
The wbole area is getting so destabilised that it is quite a 
danger for us". Mrs. Gandhi's stance remained equivocal even 
after she became Prime Minister of India after elections. She 
found reasons for the Russian action. In her first interview 
with the American Broadcasting Company on 9th January she tried 
to justify the Soviet action. She said that the Soviet Union 
intervened because it was deeply worried by the developing 
friendship between the U.S.A. and China. She further asserted 
that Russia intervened at the invitation of Kabul. In an inter-
vievz with the French Radio station she alleged that America 
had also been acting in a similar way in the past and the pro-
cess of the destabilisation of the region was started by America, 
But she also said that Soviet intervention had brought a danger 
at the door steos of India. Mrs. Gandhi's attitude towards 
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Soviet intervention was influenced by many factors, che 
v;ould never like to displease a country that stood by her 
country firmly - whether it was a question of Kashmir or the 
Bangla Desh war. VJhen India and Pakistan went to war and 
93000 Pakistani troops v/ere about to surrender/ America sent 
her seventh fleet posing a direct threat to India's security. 
At that critical moment Russia came to help India and ulti-
mately America had to go back, India had to remember that 
Afghanistan was also a friend of Russian and that Russia had 
acted under a friendship treaty with v/hich it v;as bound v;ith 
Afghanistan, 
Mrs. Gandhi was of the viev; that Russia acted in Afghanis-
tan it had been v/orried by the American moves in iliddle Sast 
Asia. The Gamp David accord had increased the strength of 
U.S.A. and America had continuously been trying to poke its 
nose in the affairs of Iran and the Persian Gulf, All these 
developments v/ere sure to harm the interests of Soviet Union. 
Soviet Union v/as therefore bound to do something to protect her 
interests. 
The Western countries took the question of Soviet inter-
vention to the United Nations Security Council and the General 
Assembly on 4th January 1980, Forty three members of the U.N, 
demanded an immediate meeting of the council to discuss the 
developments in Afghanistan and its implications for interna-
tional peace and security. The Council discussed a resolution 
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by five non-aligned countries demanding an immediate with-
drav/al of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Thirteen members 
of the Council voted in favour of the resolution. Russia and 
East Germany voted against the resolution, Russia's negative 
veto killed the resolution. 
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COICLUS'ION 
To sum up it may be said that Russia intervened in 
Afghanistan because the Russian leaders said that a communist 
government fostered by them V7as facing a serious threat. The 
insurgency against the rigime had reached such a stage that 
the govt, had its control and at any time an anti-Soviet coun-
try could install its o\-/n men in the govt, Taraki who v/as 
loyal to Hascow had been murdered and Amin could not succeed 
to control insurgency and the people's anger and Soviet Union 
and Communism, The killings of Russian Advisers in Herat and 
other/of Afghanistan made it clear that Amin vj'as not the man 
who could serve the purpose of the Soviet Union. 
It was wrong to say that the Soviet action was a oart of 
Soviet strategy to control Middle East oil supplies or to reach 
Vfarm ','iater Ports, Actually Mascow's action v^ as inspired by a 
policy defensive in nature. In fact Soviet Union had been 
suffering from fear of encirclement, NATO and CLHTO were united 
v/ith a purpose to contain communism and thus to contain Soviet 
Union. Mikhail A, Suslov, a senior member of Communist Party 
of Soviet Union (CPSU) Politburo, explained the Soviet in the 
follov/ing v/ords: "The agression of China against Vietnam; the 
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WATO decision aimed at a new round in the arms race", the 
positioning of powerful American armed forces around Iran; 
the training and infiltration of armed rebel groups into 
democratic Afghanistan, forcing the government of that country 
to as3c the Soviet Union for help- all these are not isolated 
occurrences but links of one chain". Suslov went on: "As the 
Peking hegemonists threatened to 'punish' Vietnacn, so the 
United States has now begun to talk of 'punishing' Iran, and 
more recently, even the Soviet Union". 
The Soviet intervention has its far reaching implications 
of India, Pakistan, Iran, the Persian Gulf States and on the 
U.S.S.R, relations. In fact the operational mechanics of the 
•Brezhnev Doctrine' in the Asian Context have started a new 
era of Gold War. No conflict in these days is singular. The 
conflict of the super pov/ers is bound to involve the whole 
world. It is, therefore, essential for United 1-Iations to take 
necessary measures in time, Otherv;ise the possibility of the 
utter destruction of human race within thirteen minutes anc a 
fev/ seconds can not be ruled out. 
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 
AFGHAN PROBLEM 
1, AFGHAM H-.ALAGiiES. Eastern Economist 12, 17; 1979, Apr, 27; 
857-8. 
Describes that a year ago on April 27 1978, Afghanistan was 
proclaimed a democratic republic and a government v/as formed 
under the leadership of Hur 1'ioham.med Taralci, This governraent 
announced that it would work to reduce social and economic 
inequalities and extend democracy to all spheres of life. It 
pointed out that Pakistan had a policy of good neighbourliness 
and had not retaliated v/hen Afghanistan shelled Pakistani 
territory, nor when its air force violated Pakistan's air space, 
Afghanistan has blamed Iran too. The dispute between the 
Islamic government of Iran and present regime of Afghanistan 
took a formal diplomatic turn recently i-iYien. Afghanistan deman-
ded the removal of the Iranian consul general in Herat v;ithin 
48 hours. Accusations made by Afghanistan that Iran had staged 
a military attack involving some 7,000 people on west Afghanis-
tan v/as also denied by Iran. 
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2. AFGHAI;TSTAN ISSUE. Link 22^ 49; 1980^ Jul, 13; 9-11. 
Describes that the real issue is different. It is not 
one of an utterly unpo-oular government being kept in 
pov/er by Soviet forces but, basically/ one of a revolu-
tion being sought to be subverted from v/ithin and without. 
The issue had its true origin in foreign attempts at 
interf'Srence in the country's internal affairs long before 
any Soviet military assistance was sought by Kabul. The 
improvement in the situation such as it is, has been solely 
due to initiatives from the other side-primarily Afghanis-
tan and secondly the Soviet Union, 
Ai^LYSIS 
3. MEHTA (Jagat S) , Neutral Solution. Foreign Policy 47; 
1982; 139-53. 
On going crisis in Afghanistan is the result of misadven-
tures and misjudgments, compounded by internal mishandling 
and international misperceptions, Ko body anticipated the saur 
revolution of April 1978, in v/hich a coalition of the Khalq 
and Parcham Communist inclined parties over threv/ then 
president Mohammed Daud and proclaimed the Democratic 
Republic of Afghanistan, Author says that the modern 
Afghanistan v;as born in a struggle against conquest, and 
it has never lost that will to remain independent. He 
says that stability cannot be restored unless Afghanistan 
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is neutralized against great power competition, 
ARi-'IY MUTIK'Y 
4, FALLiERS. (Michael), Afghanistan's fourth army mutiny 
this year. Ceylon Daily Hews; 1979, Oct. 19, 
Afghan government forces used Soviet supplied helicopter 
gunships, fighter bombers and artillery to crush a re-
bellion at the head quaters of the army's seventh Infan-
try Division outside Kabul last v/eek. It v/as the bir:gest 
threat to the country's new leader Hafizullah Amin v;ho 
come to pov/er in a palace revolution v/hich toppled former 
President Koor Mohammad Taraki a month ago. The cause of 
the mutiny at Rishkoor v/as not knovm but insurgents in 
the area v/ere involved, 
ECONOMIC ASPECTS 
5, CHAKRAVARTTY (Sumit), Kabul's Flourishing economy. Link 
25, 14; 1982, Nov, 14; 22-30. 
Describes that the undeclared war against Afghanistan 
launched by U.S. and other iiroperialist powers through 
Pakistan does not show any sign of let up. And yet the 
city of Kabul continues to thrive v/ith normal v/ork pro-
ceeding unhampered in every sphare of life. There are more 
schools in Kabul today. Local citizens acclaim that 
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electricity has been extended to houses on mountain -
slops surrounding Kabul, These are regarded as some of 
the most welcome steps of Karmal government. Traders 
and merchants are quite satisfied with more goods, which 
ensure a really flourishing business, Afghanistan's 
trade -with various v/estern countries has shov/n constantly 
upward trend since 1978, U.S. trade vrith Afghanistan is 
quite active. All these have contributed to the flourish-
ing economy in Kabul. 
EDUCATIONAL ASPSGT 
6, RATiBZAu (Anahita). Unrealistic haste does not help. 
Link 22, 22; 1981, Jan. 11; 11. 
Author describes that Land confiscated from Land owners 
V7as given to the landless in Afghanistan, v/ho did not knov; 
what to do v;ith it and v;ent back to their old ov/ners and 
gave it back. She told that v/e have first to ecucate 
small peasant in modern v;ays v/hich takes time co-operatives 
have been started, :.ov/ we have 2,300 such co-operatives 
and Soviet Union is helping us with tractors, seeds etc. 
She said that Amanites eradicated illiteracy in the short-
est time but v/e observed that not even half a million had 
joined Literacy Courses, She emphasis that 9 0% peoples 
are illiterate with 93/o vromen illiteracy. In Kabul govern-
ment is running 4,000 literacy courses as v/ell as adult 
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education centres with help of UNISGO. She spc-cificilly 
referred to the problem of educating v;omen. 
HISTORY 
7, AFGHi^ uilST.iivi: Another bit blows up. Economist 272^ 7 09 5; 
19 79^ Aug_ 25; 26-27, 
Describes that the Hazaras of Af ghanistavi^  the shia 
minority among the Pushtu and Tadjik tribes who nave tra-
ditionally controlled the country, have taken the first 
step to set up a rival administration to President Taraki'c 
Soviet backed government. The rebel administration does 
not fully control the three provinces - Bamiyan, j'arcak 
and Urusgan, west of Kabul, The Taraki government's 
troops have outposts in all three provinces. But in much 
of the country side the rebel's v/rit is apparently being 
observed. The new events in Hazara - populated central 
Afghanistan may lead atleast to some nominal unity, .-.o 
Pushtu v/ould v/ant to see a rival Hazara - led faction 
seeking recognition from Iran and friendly Arab states. 
8, Brt.KERJEE (Sibnath), Afghanistan in Turmoil, Janata 35, 
6; 1980, Mar. 16; 13-. 
Describes that for nearly 200 years Afghanistan had been 
a buffer state between the Russian bear and the British 
lion. The Czarist Russian imperial bear came up to Bukhara 
and the river Oxus, the frontier of Afghanistan and halted 
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there. They brought the rail line up to the Oxus at 
Termaz in Bokhara, The British imperialist lion also 
reached the Khyber Pass, south of Afghanistan but aia 
not halt there. The British lion v/as not content v/ith 
keepino Afganistan a buffer state but wanted to extend 
the British empire in Afghanistan and staged three Afghan 
invasions, 
9, BHASIisi (Prem) , Russia comes to Punjab, Janata^ 34, 45; 
1930, Jan. 13; 3-4. 
Describes thafftnce a coup alv/ays a coup" is as good a 
maxim as any. The first coup follov;ed the built in logic 
of all coups in as much as some of its leading organicers 
v/ere soon liquidat^id as a result of the unity betv/een the 
Parcham and the Khalq having come unstuck. Comrade i.ur 
Mohammed Taraki of the Khalq v7ho had corae on top, impri-
soned, executed and exiled Parcham leader. The second 
coup, in September 1979 v;as against Taraki. Another un-
disputed fact is the presence of a large number, Soviet 
trooos in Kabul. Pakistan has serious oroblems. But no 
one can at the same time deny that Pakistan's problems 
are mainly internal and not external. The U.S. can best 
help Pakistan by helping her present leaders to change 
the disastrous internal policies. 
10. KABUL: The change over. People's bemocracy 2, 19; 1978; i , 
The peoples democratic party of Afghanistan was founded 
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in 1965. Its leadership included persons like Taraki, 
Babrak Karmal, Amin, Aslam etc. The party split in 1957 
into two factions. The two groups v;ere popularly knov/n 
as Parcham and Khalq V7hen Daoud took over through a mili-
tary coup in 1973, both the groups adopted a position of 
giving selective support to him. It concludes that the 
peoples democratic party of Afghanistan considers the take 
over to be the national democratic revolution and is now 
taking steps to consolidate it. They believe that the 
primary tasks are to educate the people politically and 
also in terms of literacy and carry out land reforras, 
11. MAGi\ITUDE OP Afghan tragedy. Radiance Views Weekly 15, 
15; 1979, Aug. 26; 3-6, 
Discusses that after assuming power on April 27, 1978, 
the President of Afghanistan had in the taegining, taken 
some "Islamic Steps" like banning usury or prohibiting 
sale of daughter at the time of marriage. To please the 
landless, equal share in land had been given to the crop 
sharer. Afghanistan is one of those unfortunate countries 
v/here neither Zahir Shah nor Sardar Daoud ever allov/ed 
any ideological discussion at public level. Russia oro-
vicjed extra ordinary facilities to Zahir Shah ana the 
coterie around him. Then the monarch's preferences for 
every thing western, specially the life style, could not 
be digested by the Modest Afghans. The unrest started 
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shaking his throne, to prevent which the haves and 
have-nots were set against each other, 
12. PiiTROV (Alexei) , Events in Afghanistan. Ceylon ciaily 
nev/s; 1980, Jan. 1. 
Describes that the imoartant events took place in the 
lives of the Afghan people in recent days. The peoples 
democratic party and the govc^rnment of the democratic 
repxiblic of Afghanistan, in the face of iraoerialist inter-
ference made a call to the country's pooulation to take 
a resolute stand to protect the gains of the April revolu-
tion. They are rallying all progressive national forces 
for the sake of consolidating new free and independent 
Afghanistan, The uncalled interference of imperialist 
forces in the internal affairs of Afghanistan constant 
armed intrusions from outside created a great danger for 
the country. 
13. SELBOURNE (David^. Conversation in Kabul. Mainstream 13, 
27; 1980; 7. 
Author describes that the Major, who is an official of 
the present Soviet backed administration v/hich came to 
pov/er last month under president Karmal. The king had 
come to the district where Major's father xiras governer. 
The king v/as overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad Daoud, in 
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his turn, was overthrown in April 1978 by Noor Mohammad 
Taraki, After Taraki came Hafizullah Amin, v/hom Babrak 
Karmal then overthrew. Amin is now called "Hangman of 
the revolution". The Major haS become hardened to death. 
He had spent ten months in jail, tortured by Daoud's men 
in 1977, He says that Imperialism can not win in this 
country. The Russians will be here for one year. 
14. SRIi^ I^VASAN (Kannanj. Afghanistan; Revolution from above 
and Intervention from outside. Economic and political 
Weekly 16, 34; 1981, Aug. 22; 1381-3. 
The history of the Afghan state in the history of failed 
attempts at economic rationalisation and administrative 
control. The attempt at an statist transformation of 
Afghanistan, seen most recently v/ith Daud Khan and Hafiz-
ullah Amin, began with king Amanullah. Inspired by the 
Attaturk, he undertook massive changes in his own country 
immediately after the first world war. The Khalq identi-
fied itself with the great October Socialist Revolution 
and resolved to destroy "the feudal system -which dominates 
Afghan society" with massive land reform. Author points 
out that in the next decade or ^o the Russians may attempt 
to work toward a permanent consolidation of their presence. 
15. TROUBLED Ar^ GHAi.ISTAN. Statesman; 1979, Oct. 17. 
Describes that reports of yet another abortive coup in 
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Afghanistan only confirm the impression of widespread 
and increasingly stiff opposition to President Hafiz-
ullah Amin's regime. The official claim that the latest 
revolt was fomented by the extreme Rightist Sitam-e-Milli 
Party and aided by "alien reactionary aggressors" may 
well be justified in terms of Kabul's present understand-
ing of political terminology. How serious the situation 
is can be gauged from the flight of more than 200,030 
refugees, repeated revolts in the armed forces, the defec-
tion to the guerrillas of large numbers of soldiers and 
policeman and genocide charges against the government. 
It v/ould also appear that forces loyal to Unx Mohammad 
Taraki - \7ho seized power in April 1978, was deposed last 
month and mysteriously died only two weeks later, 
16, TURI40IL IK Afghanistan, Eastern Economist 72, 26; 1979, 
Jun 29; 1372-73, 
Describes that the joint statement signed by the Indian 
Prime Minister, Mr, Morarji Desai and the Soviet President, 
Mr, Leonid Breznev, at the conclusion of the recent visit 
of the Soviet Union, declared their opposition of any 
interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan in 
the context of the present turmoil and conflict between 
various forces within the country. Although the Mohammad 
Daoud government, which came to power after the overthrow 
of the monarchy in 1973, promulgated in August, 1975 
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land reform law, virtually none of the provisions of 
this law was carried out. Against this background, the 
present government has taken bold measures in respect of 
rural indebtedness. Through this measure alone more 
than 75% of the peasents had their debt burden eased, 
li^ IUO - PAK RELATIONS 
17, GAlCiHI (Raj Mohan). Kabul and Indo-Pak relationship, 
Himmat; 1980, Jan. 25; 24. 
Describes that Afghan events disturb us in India. Silence 
on the United Nations' part regarding Soviet action in 
Afghanistan might have contributed to a kind of relexa-
tion of tension. Tension will be reduced not by silence 
in face of this armed intervention but by countries inclu-
ding India unambiguously urging the Kremlin to withdraw 
its forces. The Soviet action in Afghanistan has perhaps 
hurt the image that Pakistani citizens have of us. They 
may feel that a partnership with India could involve 
acceptance of Soviet influence. 
I m E RNAT lONAL DI ME WSI OliS 
18, GiOBAL DIME^JSIONS OP Afghanistan, Radiance views V^ e^ekly 
15, 21; 1979, Oct. 7; 2, 
Describes that Mr. Taraki failed to crush or even contain 
the insurgency, so much so that with the passage of time. 
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its area and volume enveloped major portions of Afghanis-
tan. At individual as v;ell as battalion levels there 
v/ere large scale desertions from the army which swelled the 
ranks of insurgents. He failed to provide safety to 
Russian advisers, pilots and men in plain clothes. Hate 
against them grev/ so intense that they were killed in 
broad day light on throughfares. The Russians he appeared 
to be a soft person/ lacking the shrev/dness necessary to 
quite an Islamic uprising, 
IwTERMATIOi^L POLITICS 
19, CROSS GURREKTS, Patriot 1980, Mar 11, 
There has certainly been some rethinking in the bellige-
rent camp on the question of Afghanistan, Even President 
Carter is not his former bellicose self. But the change 
in Pakistan's posture is more notable. The cry of holy 
war 2ias been switched off and replaced by seemingly reason-
able suggestions about mutually acceptable agreements. 
General Zia-ul-Eaq said that efforts v^ e^re being made to 
improve relations with India and his country v/anted good 
relations with Soviet Union, At present the General is 
trying to reconcile two contradictory position - military 
subservience to the U.S, and independent non-alignment. 
20, VAN PRAAGH (David), Greater game: Implications of the 
Afghan Coup, International Perspectives; 1979, Mar - Apr 
12-16, 
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Describes that after independence and partition of 
India in 1947, the game continued. Rulers of the Soviet 
Union exerted persistent pressure towards the v\rarm waters 
of the Indian ocean, v/hile the United States, later 
joined by Iran in aid programs, blocked Soviet domina-
tion of Afghanistan, which shares a 1,500 mile border 
with the Soviet Union. The bloody overthrow on April 27, 
1978 of the ruling members of the Moharamadzai clan, 
Afghanistan's educated elite, appears to have ushered 
in - or helped to set in motion - a greater game. The 
Russians not only overcame the last barrier to control of 
Afghanistan through previously out lawed local coraraunists, 
The coup also put them in a position to influence decisi-
vely events in both -^ ndia and the oil rich countries of 
the Middle East. 
IRAN-AlGEiAN E-K LATIOUS, POLITICAL 
21 KABUL READY for talks v/ith Iran, Pak. Hindu; 1983, 
Feb. 11. 
Babrak Karmal government has agreed to discuss vjith Iran 
and Pakistan a settlement of the Afghan problem utilising 
the good offices of the U.K. Secretary General's special 
emissary, Mr, Diego Cordovez, but not under the auspices 
of the United Nations which had adopted resolutions 
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condemning Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, The 
Iranian leaders not only refused to deal with any Afghan 
government imposed by the Soviet Union, but insisted 
that the Afghan seat at the Delhi non-aligned summit 
should be kept vacant, following the Kampuchean prece-
dent, as long as Afghanistan was under Soviet military 
occupation. 
MARXISM Al<D ISLAM 
22. Sli^ jGH (JD), Marxist Xarmal is a devout l-iuslim. Tildes 
of India; 1980, Feb. 18. 
Describes that to gain the trust of the deeply religious 
people of Afghanistan, Mr, Babrak Karmal is having to 
prove that, though a Marxist, he is also a devout Muslim, 
Ever since he became President of the Revolutionary 
Council, Prime Minister of Afghanistan and general secre-
tary of the ruling people's democratic party after the 
coup on December 27 last, Mr. Karmal has given repeated 
assurances about profound respect for the secred reli-
gion of Islam and "our national customs and traditions. 
Afghanistan would not be the first country to embrace both 
Marxism and Isiam. Such honour belongs to south Yemen 
which has, since the Communist take over. 
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PAK - AFGHAN REIATIOKS 
23. AFGtlAK OBJraCTION to pak entry. Statesman; 1979,Aug 30. 
Describes that the admission of Pakistan to the fold 
of the non-aligned was objected to by Afghanistan, This 
was v;hen the admission of nev/ entrants came up before 
the officials at their resumed session to draft the 
summit agenda, l-^ ithout naming Pakistan the Afghan 
delegation expressed itfei government's strong reservations 
on the movement. It also said it would reserve its rights 
to intervene at a later stage of the summit, 
24. ANOTHER HOLY war. Economist 270,7073;1979,Mar 24;65-66. 
The problems facing the military rulers of both Pakistan 
and Afghanistan are mounting daily. One of the most 
potentially dangerous in one they share: the guerrilla 
war being fought by moslem rebels against the Russian 
backed regime in Kabul, Thousands of Afghan guerrillas 
are known to be armed and trained across the border in 
Pakistan, Afghan artillery bombarded a refugee camp housing 
several hundred people just inside Pakistani territory, 
though no body v;as injured.Pakistan admits that it has 
allov/ed more than 35,000 Afghan refugees to cross the border, 
purely on humanitarian grounds,But it insists that they hae^e 
been disarmed,and are not permitted to organise themselves 
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against Mr, Taraki - at least not where the Pakistani 
government exercises any control. Mr. Taraki's armed 
forces have cracked down heavily on pockets of resistance. 
25, 'BHATTACHARJEA (Ajit), View from Khyber, Indian Express; 
1981, Nov 7, 
Khyber, stark, rugged hills not a sign of vegetation, 
iNior any geographical variation to indicate the Durand 
line. In the Afghan refugee camps dotted along the border, 
emotions run deep. The vast arid plain between Peshawar 
and the range of hills that is pierced by the Khyber pass 
is littered with tents and mud walled huts. The number 
of Afghan refugees in Pakistan mostly women and children, 
amounts to nearly one quarter of that country's population. 
No political solution is in sight. But to suggest that 
Pakistan government should negotiate v;ith the Babrak Karmal 
regime in Kabul or accept the continued presence of Soviet 
forces in Afghanistan, 
26, UEi^ iMAN (Delia), Afghanistan buffer cisappears. Far 
Eastern Economic Review 107, 2; 1980, Jan 11; 10-12. 
Describes that Pakistani government sees the installation 
of the nev/ Communist regime in Afghanistan, headed by 
Pro-Kremlin hardliner Babrak Karmal, and totally depen-
dent on Mascov/'s military muscle, as a direct threat to 
its own security Neighbouring Afghanistan has traditionally 
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been a buffer betv/een the Soviet Union and the sub-conti-
nent. The Pakistan government sees the Soviet move into 
Afghanistan as the most recent in a chain of planned 
moves to establish Soviet hegemony in the area. Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan began with the April 1978 coup 
which overthrew President Mohammed Baoud, 
27, GOYAL (D R.) , Prospects of Pak - Afghan talk. Mainstream 
21, 42; 1983, Jun 18; 9-10, 
Author describes that there is a good reason today to 
expect the representatives of Afghanistan and Pakistan 
hammer out same modus operandi for direct negotiations bet-
ween two governments at a later stage, in their coming 
talks at Geneva, The April meeting, the representative of 
the U.N, Secretary General proved fruitful in narrowing 
the differences. The optimism has not been contradicted 
by either side. Pakistan is facing a problem of the pre-
sence of a large number of refugees has created social and 
economic tensions. The other fear is with regard to terri-
torial integrity. The border between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan has been unsettled as the various governments 
in Kabul during last half century have persistantly refu§ed 
to recognize Durand Line, Proves that Afghanistan's own 
armed forces are expending pratty fast and they may gra-
dually start relieving some of the Soviet troops. 
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28. KABUL Ari> Islamabad. Tribune; 1979, May 19. 
It says that the Allegations made by the Kabul authori-
ties that Pakistan is aiding and abetting the rebellion 
in Afghanistan cannot be dismissed lightly. As an 
Islamic state, Pakistan v;ill find it difficult to tole-
rate the existence of an atheist republic on its borders. 
It vrauld be natural for it to extend support to movements 
seeking to establish an Islamic republic in Afghanistan. 
The blame for the rebellion in Afghanistan cannot be 
placed entirely on Pakistan. Religion, of course plays 
a part in it but there are other factors also. The Afghans 
have always been allergic to foreign domination. 
29. "iiATIOl^ L RIGHTS" Across a Border, Hindu; 1979, May 28. 
Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan are under visible 
strain. But already there are indications that both sides 
are concious of the need to pull back from the pricipice. 
The Pakistan government has expressed itself categorically 
against any desire to "interfere in the internal affairs 
of Afghanistan". It has decided to move the refugee camps 
further to the interior to ensure against activities that 
might embarrass relations v/ith Afghanistan, Afghanistan 
is seriously perturbed over the presence of politically 
hostile elements in the Pakistan areas alone the border, 
Afghanistan should create conditions conducive to the re-
turn of these persons to their homes has further aggravated 
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the Afghan leader's annoyance, 
30, SAR£EN (Rajendra) , Pindi assures Mascov/ on attitude 
to Kabul. Times of India; 1979/ Jun 2. 
Pakistan has told the Soviet Union that she has no inten-
tion whatsoever of interfering in the internal affairs 
of Afghanistan. It is significant that all these develop-
ments have taken place in the wake of the visit to Kabul 
of President Zia-ul-Haq*s special envoy Mr, Wajmus oaqib, 
v7ho carried a special message to President Taraki seeking 
Afghan support for Pakistan's application for joining the 
non-aligned movement. 
pOLI^ j-^ ICAL AiO ECONOMIC ASPECTS 
31. CHAKJBtAVARTTY CSumit) . Kabul trek to normalcy. Patriot; 
1980, Feb 22. 
Afghanistan today is on the threshold of a major socio -
economic advancement not v;ithstandina all the problems 
and difficulties that have piled up after the 1978 £aur 
revolution, the misrule of former head of state Hafiz-
ullah Amin and the threat of armed external intervention 
from Pakistan, acting for itself, the U.S. and the Chinese, 
Author says that it is obvious that if there is no direct 
external intervention from the side of Pakistan backed by 
the armed might and military expertise of America and 
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China, gradually Afghanistan will be able to achieve 
substantial socio-economic advance. 
POLITICAL SOLUTION 
32. KARi-iAL ICJEN on political settlement. Statesman; 1982, 
May 18. 
Describes that the Afghan President, Mr. Babrak Karmal 
has expressed his country's readiness to enter into nego-
tiations v/ith the concerned parties to find an acceptable 
solution to the Afghan tangle. For this purpose he is 
assigning his Foreign Minister. Shah Mohammad Dost, to 
go to Geneva for talks v/ith U.N. Secretary - General's 
special emissary. Mr. Karmal is believed to have given 
him an assurance that he was interested in an acceptable 
political settlement v;hich rules out foreign interference 
of all types. He also assured that Afghanistan -would be 
a genuinely non-aligned country, once a political settle-
ment was reached. 
33. SHARMA (R C). Groping for a neutral Afghanistan. Janata 
35, 27; 1980, August; 41-47. 
Describes in the context of the present prevailing situa-
tion in Afghanistan. One could think of an immediate 
solution of the Afghan crisis in order to avoid any direct 
and massive confrontation among the powers of the contemporary 
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world. For a lasting and durable solution to the prob-
lem, the answer lies in the geo^jolitical and geostrategic 
consideration of the region in which Afghanistan is loca-
ted as well as in the developments-both economic and 
political - making Afghanistan stronger, modernised and 
eco nomic a 1 ly p ro sp e rou s • 
li-DIA'S. ROLE 
34. AFGHAiilSTAN SOCIAL Democrat Party's proposal. Janata 35, 
36; 1980, Hov 2; 11. 
Describes that for many months the Indian government have 
been talking about reducing tension to find a political 
solution to the Afghanistan crisis. Hov/ever even after 
nine months of continuing crisis it has not been able to 
spell out even a broad outline of such a solution except 
in very vague terms. This is most probably due to the fact 
that the Soviet leaders are unv^illing to have any solution 
other their own. The Soviet solution to the Afghan crisis 
is the crushing of the Afghan resistance. In order to 
bring an end to the tragic conflict causing death and des-
truction and also to evole a just solution to the Afghan 
crisis, the Afghan social democrat party has proposed con-
crete, preliminary steps for the political solution of 
the Afghan crisis. 
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POLITICAL SOLUTION/ POSSIBILITY 
35. l^IHOTRA (Inder). Score in Afghanistan: New offensive 
in key valley. Times of India; 1984, May 17, 
For close to a month now the biggest single military 
operation in Afghanistan since the Soviet intervention in 
December 1979 has been on. The key question thus remains 
whether a political solution of the Afghan problem which 
seemed promisingly close around this last year but has 
since receded into the background, is still feasible, 
Mr, Karmal made a statement the other day entirely on 
his own, inviting Pakistan and Iran to join him in the 
search for a settlement is not c without significance. 
POLITICS 
36, 30&E (Pradip), Afghanistan - A new "Cuba" in Asia, Janata 
34, 22; 1979, Jul 8; 3-4. 
The very fact of the country's class proximity to both 
the Soviet Union and China, which are conducting fierce 
pov/er strucgle against each other on a global sclae and 
the Soviet Union having scored decisively after the April 
revolution of 19 78 in Afghanistan, have made that country 
stand in between Sino-Soviet cross fires. In such circums-
tances the Russian accusation that the Chinese are supplying 
arms and also training "rabid reactionaries" to overthrow 
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the Taraki regime in Kabul might not be untrue. It has 
been reported that 6,000 Afghan troops have been sent to 
the Soviet Union for training in the Guerilla VJarfare. 
The U.S. government has warned Mascow against helping the 
Afghan government for the suppression of the insurgents. 
Afghanistan, which until recently seemed to remote and 
sleepy, has become a major trouble spot of Asia and no 
body can afford to ignore it any longer, 
37. NEW STRrtlrB in Kabul. Statesman; 1980, Jul 24. 
The shake up in Afghanistan's Babrak Karmal regime has 
not come altogether as a surprise, though the drastic 
measures yield evidence of such internal strife as could 
possibly have led to a revolt. That the closest associa-
tes of Hafizullah Amin, the former president, would not 
be reconciled to Mr, Karmal's rule was only to be expec-
ted, and the latter must have concluded that he could not 
afford to take any chance. Though both Taraki and Amin 
belonged to the Khalq faction, there v/ere obviously perso-
nal and presumably some policy differences. But even 
Taraki's followers do not seem to have wholly rallied to 
Mr. Karmal*s side, 
PRE - SQVIiiT imil^lQN 
38. CHAilGE IN Afghanistan. Eastern Economist 73, 12; 1972, 
Sep 21; 596. 
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Analyses that Hafizullah Amin, who has assiimed full 
control of the government in Afghanistan, is considered 
to be a hard line communist, Taraki, who has been ousted, 
came to power in April 1978, following a bloody coup 
which toppled the government of Paoud, The change in the 
interior and Border Affairs ministries indicated that the 
government's fight against rebels was not going well. 
Amin controls the secret police and is reported to have 
an independent network of informers, preempting any moves 
of his opponents to develop independent basis of power. 
Criuism of Amin has centered on his heavy - handed approach 
to reform programmes and his direction to the fight against 
the rightest Muslim insurgency, 
39, FAROOQI (M) , Imperialist - Maoist plot against Afghanistan. 
New Age 27, 14; 1979, Apr 8; 14, 
Author analyses that before the saur revolution Afghanis-
tan was a most backward country, over-whelming majority 
of its population steeped in extreme poverty and illiteracy 
and deprived of all human rights by the despotic feudal 
regime, A very small number of rich people were living 
a life of luxury, as parasites without participating in 
the process of production. The revolutionayy change in 
Afghanistan is a positive factor for peace and stability 
in our subcontinent. Imperialists and Maoists, helped by 
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reactionaries in the countries of this region, are 
working feverishly to change the course of this development. 
PRE - SOVIET IIWASION 
40, GUPTA (Ranjan). Afghan Amnesty proof of political 
Stability. Patriot; 1979, May 17. 
Afghan amnesty for political and other exiler in Pakistan 
and Iran, announced within days of the Khalq governments 
celebration of its first anniversary in office, marks 
the second phase of the leftist revolution, the phase of 
consolidation. It is estimated that more than 2,000 
Afghans have crossed the Pakistan border into Afghanistan 
as a result of the amnesty. This justifies the confidence 
on the part of the government and also shows that the 
rebels operating from bases in Pakistan have failed in 
their objective of toppling the government in Kabul, 
41. HYi-IAw (Anthony), Defect for Taraki in four months. 
Tribune; 1979, Jul 9, 
There are clear signs that the Taraki government is facing 
a severe test of its ability to maintain control of 
Afghanistan with rebellions in many of the 23 provinces 
and a recent outbreak of violence in che capital itself -
the first public demonstration in Kabul against the left -
wing government since the military coup of April 1978, 
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Closely connected with the crisis was the recent visit 
to London of an important Afghan leader in exile in 
Pakistan/ Syed Ahmad Gailani, the latest in a series of 
publicity trips on behalf of rival Afghan opposition 
groups. There is a general feeling that change in the 
air, 
42, MATHUR (S M ) . Crisis in Afghanistan; A perspective, 
aagpur Times; 1980, Jan 19. 
Author says that the Afghanistan Marxist revolution by 
Khalq bringing to an end of Daoud regime' on 27th October 
1978 should be judged. This party founded in 1965 had 
been vigourously working against the entrenched feudal 
forces to bring a change - replace mulla rightist feuda-
lism by Marxist revolutionary government Taraki, Amin and 
Karmal have been fire brand Marxists and have been 
successful in building up a band of zealous and dedicated 
supporters in a position to revolt against the regime. 
43. MUKKRJEE (Hiren) . Hands off Afghanistan, i^ e^w Age 27, 25; 
1979/ Jun 24; 12. 
Author says to the world forces, arrayed against progress 
and for some time now fiendishly activated through accom-
plicer like Deng's China and Sadat's Egypt, the democratic 
Republic of Afghanistan which emerged after the revolution 
of April 27 last year is an eyesore. For months now that 
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old and harried country has been the victim of an 
artificial insurgency fanned by fanaticism and sustained 
and manoeuvred by evil external elements. To such forces 
Afghanistan's advance from medieval bondage to the 
freedom of a new life is anathama. 
44. SOFT SPOKEN Marxist takes over. Times; 1979, Dec 29. 
Mr. Babrak Karmal, a soft spoken Marxist v;ho has replaced 
Hafizullah Amin as President of Afghanistan, is considered 
more pro-Soviet than Amin, His Parcham party was the 
only Afghan Marxist group to support the over throw of 
King Zahir Shah in 1973 by Mohammad Daoud. But when 
Daoud banned political parties in 1977 Mr, Karmal joined 
forces v/ith the Khalq party of Kur Mohammad Taraki: These 
officers led a coup of April, 1978, that overthrew Daoud 
after he ordered the arrest of Mr. Karmal, Taraki and Amin 
who had protested over the killing of a party official. 
After the coup, Taraki, assumed the position of president 
and Prime Minister and Mr, Karmal acted as his deputy. 
45. UPSUBGE IH Afghanistan. Eastern Economist 73, 8; 1979, 
Aug 24; 397-98. 
Describes that the present Afghan government of president 
Nur Mohammad Taraki early this month led to a reshuffle 
of his cabinet. Taraki himself assumed the Defence. 
Portfolio with the induction of Dr. Shah Wall as foreign 
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Affairs minister. This has been done to emphasise the 
determination of the regime to deal with the problem of 
insurgency with an admixture of toughness on the battle-
ground and moderation at the negotiating table, Afghan 
government wants to use Taraki•s charisma in the anti -
insurgency activities of Afghanistan are being steamlined 
and in order to better organise and lead the country. It 
proves that the Afghan administration has blamed "Pakistani 
and Iranian infiltrators for anti-government activities, 
46, RUSSIAW'S DIlxEMI4A. Financial Times; 1979^ Sept 19. 
Dr, Kissinger is fond of quoting Afghanistan as an instance 
of the v/est's failure to stand up against continuing 
Russian encroachment. If the Russians were behind the 
coup that brought President Taraki to power in April/ 1978, 
and Dr. Kissinger's assumption that they were involved 
to hilt has always seemed too simplistic - then they must 
now be bitterly regretting the day. The overthrow of 
President Taraki, is a blow to their prestige. More 
worryingly it 41so faces them with a difficult dilemma in 
how far to go in backing Taraki's former colleague and 
now head of state, Hafizullah Amin, 
PRE-SOVIET iJiVASIOH, Hlt-TORY 
47. BERI (H M L) . Coup in Kabul again, t^ agpur Times; 1979, 
Sept 26, 
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Describes that President Nur Moharnmad Taraki who came 
to power in April 1978 following a bloody coup VNrhich 
toppled the government of Mohammad Daoud has now been 
replaced by Mr. Hafizullah Amin, The possibility of a 
further coup cannot be ruled out because Mr, Amin is 
known as a ruthless political strategist to remove deputy 
Prime Minister Babrak Karmal, chief of the Pajctiham 
faction. In brief the author says that the situation in 
Kabul is still too fluid for coming to any firm conclusion, 
48, CHANGE lisi Afghanistan, Magour Times; 1979, Sept 20, 
Deals with v;hat by all accounts was a peaceful shakeutj 
in Afghanistan has turned out to be a violent coup, 
resulting in the death of President Nur Mohammad Taraki, 
This follows a pattern, set by Taraki himself but what is 
susrprising is that Taraki offering his resignation to the 
Afghan revolutionary council in view of his bad health 
and nervous weakness and Mr. Hafizullah Amin had taken 
over as President, Afghanistan has suffered such changes, 
the threat of insurgency being always a problem for every 
regime, Mr, Amin will have to be more concerned with the 
internal situation than his relations with the Russian 
neighbour, 
49, HYl"iAH (Anthony), Afghanistan may slip from Soviet orbit. 
Amrit Bazar Patrika; 1979, Sept 27. 
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Discusses that the fatal inability of Afghanistan's 
pro-Soviet rulers to work together is likely to cost 
the Marxist government what remains of its hold over the 
country. Its position is increasingly challanged by 
by tribal revolts and desertion and mutiny in the army. 
The eclipse of President Taraki in a shoot out has 
brought into the open the strongmen of the revolution. 
Prime minister Hafizullah Amin, v.7ho had been steadily 
gathering the reins of power since the military coup 17 
months ago. But Amin has no tribal base of loyalty to 
throw against the guerrillas, and is totally reliant on 
his army and airforce and the Soviet Union, 
SlUO^SOVl^T RiiLATIONS, POLITICAL, Ai^ A^LYSIS 
50, BOKAVIA (David), First stop on the way to the Gulf, 
Far Eastern Economic review, 107, 2; 1980, Jan llj 12, 
Describes that Afghan crisis also casts a shadow over the 
political talks between China and the Soviet Union which 
were begun in Mascow in October 1979, The Soviet take 
over in Afghanistan v/ill strengthen the arguments of any 
Politburo hard-liners who may have been hostile to the 
concept of the Mascow talks. These were probably never 
intended by the Chinese to be much more than a uime saving 
device to lull the Soviet's into thoughts of regaining 
some of their orevious influence in China, i/hatever 
62 
progress - if any - had been hinted at in Mascow, the 
Afghan coup v/ill inevitably set back even the smallest 
agreements about a winding down of border tension. 
SOVIET - AFGHAN REIATIONS 
51. AiPGHAl'-ISTAW: Clinging on tightly. India today. 1, 2; 
1982, Jan 31; 67. 
There is mounting evidence that the Russians in Afghanis-
tan are running into foul weather in the wake of more 
determined attacks from the Mujahideen. Diplomats reports 
that the Russian journalists were captured in the vicinity 
of Karga lake, some 10 km, ftom. the city centre and 
perhaps no more than five hundred yards from the garrison 
heat quarters of the Soviet 15th motor rifle division. 
Kabul believe that the Afghan government and its Soviet 
advisers are attempting negotiations with the major 
mujahideen groups operating in the Kabul region. Both 
President and prime Minister have Russians as their perso-
nal bodyguards. The Russians have accepted the hard logic 
imposed upon them and they are now in Afghanistan to stay. 
The life blood of the Afghan nation has alv;ays been in the 
control of its cities, and that with a few aberrations, 
the Soviet have. The rest never aid matter. And it still 
does not. 
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52. BOSE (Pradip), Afghanistan and the Muslim republics 
of the USSR. Janata 35, 11; 1980, Apr 20; 15-16. 
Describes that the republics main contribution to Soviet 
economy lies in rav; material - cotton. Jute, silk, wood 
and also food. They are rich in mineral resources. It 
would not be farfetched if the Soviet leaders thought 
that Overthrow of the Soviet supported Communist 
regime of Afghanistan might have had a long term adverse 
political and psychological impact on the Asian republics 
of the Soviet Union creating a feeling of uncertainty 
about their political future. Therefore, a premptive 
military action in Afgh^haistan could have been one of the 
factors in the strategic thinking of the Kremlin for the 
Security of the soft underbelly of the Soviet Union. 
53. 30SE (Pradip} , Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. Janata 
35, 27; 1980 Aug; 17-23, 
Describes that the basis of intei-vention was the Soviet -
Afghan Treaty of friendship. Mascow claimed that the 
treaty put Afghanistan - Soviet relations on a qualita-
tively higher level. The Soviet Union has tried to use 
the treaty to justify its role in the coup against Hafiz-
uliah Amin. It is unlikely that Amin agreed on measures 
for a coup against him. At the save time, Babrak Karmal 
was in no position to agree, under the treaty, to entry 
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of Soviet troops until after the coup. The Soviet 
military action in Afghanistan caused world wide 
revulsion and criticism, 
54, FULliiRTON (John). Afghanistan: Too much at stake to 
quit. Far Eastern Economic review 118, 52; 1982, Dec 24; 
18-19. 
Describes that the death of Soviet President Leonid 
Brezhnev and the rise of the former KGB boss, Yuri 
Andropor, as his successor have unleashed a wave of specu-
lation that a resolution of the three year old crisis in 
Afghanistan might at last be some thing the Soviets would 
consider seriously, Soviets are anxious to improve rela-
tions with Pakistan and Iran. For Pakistan, the presence 
of nearly 3 million Afghan refugees is an increasing 
political and economic burden and Mascow is obviously 
anxious to limit the new relationship between Islamabad 
and Washington, The early months of the new Soviet adminis-
trationwill certainly be marked by continued diplomatic 
activity on the Afghan front, but the war, it seems, must 
go on, 
55. SHARMA (p). Afghanistan and .the Brezhnev doctrine. Janata 
35, 10; 1980, Apr 13; 7-8. 
Describes that Afghanistan is now the centre of world -
politics and its problem has gained ideological dimensions 
65 
on the question of peaceful co-existence and international 
friendship. Brezhnev doctrine claims special treatment 
for Soviet politics during the post-Vietnam period. For 
example, its main prop is that its military advance is 
based on the friendly request of the revolutionary govern-
ment of Afghanistan and in pursuance of the cultural 
mission to save the Afghan society from disintegration 
under the military thrust of American imperialism. The 
Soviet ideologists further claim that as advance guards 
of the international peace, prosperity and freedom they 
could locate the urgency of the local situations. 
SOVIET - AFGPiAN RELATIONS. AtlALYSIS 
56. GUPTA (Ranjan). Contrast between Vietnam, Afghanistan. 
National Herald; 1982, Nov 27. 
The author describes that the death of Mr. Brezhnev may 
mean an increase in Soviet troop deployment in Afghanis-
tan a reduction of that deployment or singly, the status 
quo. But one thing does appear clear, the character of 
the moderate non-aligned government of Babrak Karmal v/hich 
has pushed Afghanistan out of the feudal age without 
tampering with traditions will not change. Karmal govern-
ment has gaining acceptance (^ ven from its foes. But there 
is also some hypocrisy in the western countries claim 
that they do not have diplomatic relations with the Xarmal 
government. 
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57. MUKSRJSE (Hiren) . Hands off Afghanistan. Nev/ Age 21, 
25;1979,June 24;12. 
Describes that India/the uSSR and Afghanistan are 
neighbour countries,i/ith close and cordial ties of 
friendship and intent on co-operation in the struggle 
for the happiness of our peoples,for peace and for world 
security. Afghanistan has experienced a peoples revolu~ 
tion;its traditional good neighbourly relations v/ith the 
USSR have been fortified and further by a friendship 
treaty. The Indo-Soviet declaration has underlined the 
special urgency and significance in this task Hands off 
Afghanistan should be today a raining cry every v/here and 
especially in our subcontinent its stability and integrity 
and potentiality for world advance are threatened that 
the Desai-Brezhnev Statement has rightfully announced, 
58, SELBOURl^ E (David) , Afghanistan needs cool heads. 
Mainstream 18,27; 1980,Mar l;5-7, 
Aui^or discusses that these are difficult days for the 
socialist movement, A new and international Mc Garthyism, 
unleashed by events in Afghanistan is complemented and 
echoed in Britain by synthetic paranoia about the militant 
tendency in Labour Party, All Socialists share the anger 
at the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It is not merely 
that socialists find themselves in the unsavoury and 
hysterical company of unreconstructed and revived cold 
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v/arriors in their denunciations of Soviet Union, These 
are difficult and dangerous days for Socialist movement, 
59, SUBRAMAI^ YAI'i ( K ) . Afghan Situation and Russia's national 
interest. Janata 35, 30; 1980, Sept 14; 9-13, 
Describes that Afghanistan has had a special relation-
ship with the U.S.S.R, since the Bolshevik revolution. 
The historic Russian interest in this area was recognized 
in the forties by the British Strategists v/ho v/anted the 
v/ells of power to be safeguarded. He then contends that 
the Soviet attitude and reactions to events in this area 
should be viewed against the developments in the strategic 
relationship between the two super powers over the last 
three years. There were distinct signs that detente v/as 
breaking up, with the U,S,S,R, reaching military parity 
with the U.S., which felt that the former v/as throwing 
its weight around the v/orld. The Soviets feared a new 
encirclement, as a tacit understanding between the U.S. 
and China was being built up. 
ARMY rflTHDRAWL - PROBLEMS A^ ID PROSPECTS 
60. AFC OF Islam. Times; 1980, Feb 8. 
Emphasises that Soviet troops should withdraw from Afgha-
nistan, That is the absolute condition of progress in 
international affairs. But few of us have any clear 
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ideas about hov/ to get them out. These three non-Arab 
Muslim countries - Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran -
wedged betv/een the Soviet Union and the Indian ocean/ 
must be allowed to choose for themselves. They must be 
free to go the v;ay that the great majority of their 
people evidently want to go: to work out their own forms 
of government/ based on Islamic principles/ in non-align-
ment and in peace. The arc of crisis should be made an 
arc of independent Islam, 
61, PHILIP (Vernon). De-fusing the Afghan crisis: A pallia-
tive, Ceylon daily news; 1980/ Feb 18, 
Author says that How much will partial Soviet v/ithdrawal 
achieve in de-fusing the crisis in Afghanistan? India 
places considerable importance on such a partial Soviet 
v/ithdrawal/ because it reduces the need to re-arm Pakistan 
against the prospect of a Soviet intervention in Pakistan. 
To this extent/ India is relieved that Pakistan will not 
be re-armed because it is-India's ceaseless subconscious 
fear that a rearmed Pakistan is a threat to the Security 
of India, Political purists will dismiss de-fusinc the 
crisis as a palliative/ and embrace total v^iuhdrawal as 
a remedy, 
ARI-iY V/ITHDRAVIAL, INUIA'S STAiiD 
62, liwIA's RATIONAL Approach, Link 22/ 26; 1980, i'eb 3; 10. 
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Analyses that v/hen former Prime Minister Charan Singh 
siimmoned the Soviet Ambassador in New Delhi and told 
him that his country must withdaaw its troops from 
Afghanistan as soon as possible. This stand did not 
take into account the cause and effects of developments 
in Afghanistan since Daoud regime v/as over thrown by 
Wur Mohammad Taraki, He was soon overthrown by Amin. 
The cycle of revolution brought Parcham leader Babrak 
Karmal to force once again and he sought Soviet military 
help to quell the trouble. It was left to Mrs, Indira 
Gandhi. India's representatives pointed out that the 
Soviet Union had assured India that it would withdrav; its 
troops v/hen asked by the Kabul government. It proves 
that under the circumstances for India to take hostile 
stance the Soviet Union would have meant to under cut 
the long existing friendly ties between the two countries, 
AFGHAN REL4ATIONS, CIVIL v'TAR 
63, ANOTHER COUP in Afghanistan, Haqpur times; 1979^ Dec 30. 
Describes that Afghanistan has once again become an area 
of revolutionary turbulence, political turiaoil and insur-
gency. The reported coup the other day is a sequel to 
previous one in which Hafizullah Amin had exterminated. 
lioor Mohammad Taraki in August last, who had taken the 
place of President Daoud in April last year. There is no 
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doubt that the super-powers are Jockeying for influence 
in Afghanistan, It is known that the Soviet Union was 
extending all out support to the Amin regime in Kabul 
while the U.S.A. had discontinued its aid prograrame 
to that country. 
64. AUERBACH (Stuart). Kabul troops divided but press on, 
Indian Express; 1919, iiov 12. 
Describes that the battle started with curses in Pushtoo 
imputing unnatural sex lives to the women in the faiaily 
of Afghan President Hafizullah Amin followed by the 
crackle of rifle fire from rebel tribesmen against the 
government garrison of Gardez, a Afghan town six days 
from here by camel. The battle is typical of the fighting 
throughout Afghanistan. These battles keep the govern-
ment troops bottled up in their out posts, supplied only 
by Soviet made helicopters. The roads are unsafe, ';^hen 
the rebel groups are not fighting government troops they 
are battling each other - some times over ideological 
differences. The differences prevent a unified push 
against the government, 
65, BIICJER (David), U.S, Aides see stalemate in Afghanistan 
civil v;ar. International Herald Tribune; 1919, Oct 30. 
The civil v/ar in Afghanistan has reached a stalemate, 
U,£. government analysts say, in which the army of President 
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Amin controls Kabul and a few other cities, while 
insurgent forces operate with impunity in about half 
the nation. The U.S. officials view Mr. Amin who assumed 
the presidency and command of the ruling Marxist People's 
democratic party after a coup last month as a liability 
for his Soviet backers. He is seen as increasingly 
unpopular among his ot^ n people, yet it is believed that 
he often ignores the advise of the many Soviet advisers 
in Afghanistan. 
COMMUNISM 
66. MEHLiATI (Suleman) . Hypocrisy about Afghanistan. Link 
2 2, 34; 1980, Mar 30; 26-27. 
Discusses that Soviet combat troops into Afghanistan has 
afforded the west the opportunity it has been waiting 
for to demonstrate its moral superiority over 'Communism* 
and its resolve to defend "freedom" any where in the 
world. The fundamental fact to understand about the 
Afghan crisis is that the conflict started not because 
there was a growing Soviet influence but because a regime 
committed to uprooting feudalism and tribalism tried to 
distribute land abolish usury, prohibit the trading of 
women and bring about mass literacy, liithin months of 
the April Revolution, numerous counter-revolutionary 
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g r o u p s sprmng up i n P a k i s t a n w h e r e t h e y were armed and 
t r a i n e d i n s a n o t a g e o p e r a t i o n s by P a k i s t a n Army. 
ECONOMIC 
67. ROBIN and POULTffiN (Michelle). Prospects for Afghanistan's 
economy. Vjorld Today 37, 5; 1981, May; 132-87. 
The declared economic intentions of the government are 
moderate, seeking political unity and economic independence 
for Afghanistan. Internal strife, allied to the need for 
Soviet economic assistance, has nevertheless greatly 
restricted the government's freedom of action. In the 
south, the economy is paralysed by fighting. In the north, 
a Soviet style programme of development seems to have 
begun which may well lead to the partial integration of 
the economy with those of the neighbouring Soviet republics. 
Authors points out that Afghanistan was consolidated in 
the nineteenth century as a buffer state between the 
British and Russian Enpires. 
HISTORY 
68. BOKHARI (Imtiaz H}. The war in Afghanistan: A stuay of 
insurgency and counter insurgency. Strategic studies 
5, 3; 1982; 19-47. 
Two and a half years of high technology war, nearly a 
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100,000 strong Soviet army, an exodus of 4 million 
Afghans and thousands of dead and wounded have not 
brought the Russians anywhere near victoiry. isleither are 
the Mujahideen any nearer to it. Only the future holds 
the answer, to the question; viho will win the war? 
Whether Soviet Russia would succeed in repeating her 
historic experience of Gzarist Russia or whether the 
Afghans would be able to repeat thair historic experience 
of freeing Afghanistan from the British as in the three 
Afghan wars of 1839-42, 1878 and 1919, remains to be seen. 
69. IFiPERlALIbT' s MANOEUVRES. Link 22, 49; 1980, Jul 13; 
13-15. 
Discusses that Afghanistan which occupies a strategic 
position in tentral Asia has always been a target of aggre-
ssion by colonial and imperialist powers of the west. In 
the early 20th century Afghanistan became a serai-colony 
of Britain. After the October revolution in Russia in 
1917 another, abortive attempt was made by British to 
invade Afghanistan, However in 1919 Amanullah Khan pro-
claimed complete independence for Afghanistan and v.'ith this 
the situation changed, Afghanistan signed the treaty of 
friendship with the Soviet Union. Imperialism, together 
v/ith its accomplices, are thus carrying on an undeclared 
war against Afghanistan. 
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IlOIA's ROLE 
70. SHIFT OW Afghanistan, Economic Times; 1980, Jan 18; 
5: 1-2. 
Most recent statement of Smt. Indira Gandhi on Afghanis-
tan, to the effect that she did not think that India had 
Eurpported that Soviet action in that country, was inten-
ded no doubt to allay the disquiet on her earlier state-
ments on the same subject. It is a measure of the shift 
in India's position under the new government that it rests 
on assumptions of fact namely that the Soviet troops 
entered Afghanistan at the invitation of president Amin 
and that President Karmal is the legitimate head of the 
Afghan government. 
MI LITARY IWTiilRVEiSfTION 
71. A?GHAi;iSTAW: Implications for peace and security. 
World Affairs 144, 3; 1981/82; 242-48. 
Describes that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, laun-
ched on Christmas Eve nearly two years, v/as a momentous 
event that altered the climate and, indeed, the course of 
world politics. The invasion was a grave violation of 
the United Nations Charter, which enjoins all members to 
"refrain in their international relations from the threat. 
AS such, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan shook the very 
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foundations of world order. There are only two reali-
ties in Afghanistan today: the Soviet occupation and the 
Afghan nation. The Soviet Union can conquer Afghanis-
tan only by eliminating the Afghan nation. The draft 
resolution now before us, like its predecessors, seeks an 
end to the occupation of Afghanistan. It calls for -
Immediate withdrawl, of all foreign troops; Restoration 
of the Sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-align-
ment of Afghanistan; Return of the refugees to their 
homeland, 
72. AFGHANISTAN: The super power syndrome. Radical Humanist 
44, 11; 1980, February; 11-12 . 
Describes that Kremlin has sought to justify its military 
occupation of Afghanistan by pleading that its help v/as 
sought by Kabul under Soviet Afghan treaty of friendship, 
which said the two sides should consult each other and 
take agreed and appropriate measures to ensure security, 
independence and territorial integrity. Strangely the Russians 
have not been able to produce credJile evidence so far in 
support of either of these assumptions, that Mascow's help 
was asked for by a legitimate Afghan authority. The 
Russian intervention can thus be seen as a desperate attempt 
to resurrect. The April revolution from its ashes. It 
is but natural that popular Afghan protest against what for 
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all intents and puarposes ia direct Kremlin rule in 
Kabul will fceke devious forms. 
73. AFGHAN SOCIALISTS dig in - Russians meet with stiff 
resistance, Janata 35, 32; 1980, Sep 28; 12. 
Describes that renewed fighting against the Russian 
aggressors in Afghanistan before the onset of winter and 
the closure of the passes in the Hindukush range has 
focussed international attention on the Afghan social 
democrate party. The Afghan Social Democrat Party was 
founded on March 8, 1966 by a group of national and pro-
gressive people under the leadership of Ghulam i4ahamood 
Farhad. He was arrested along v/ith 250 other party acti-
vists on October 12, 1979 by the previous Arain regime for 
allegedly conspiring to attempt a military couo. However 
some of the party leaders have been released after direct 
Soviet military intervention on Dec. 27, 1979. Afghan 
social Democrat Party is a significiint political force in 
Afghanistan, 
74, AUiRBAGH (Stuart). Russia said to boost Afghanistan arras 
aid. International Herald Tribune; 1979, Mar 29, 
Analyses that the Soviet Union has intensified its arms 
build up in Afghanistan in the last three days, including 
the landing of 25 large helicopters for dropping Afghan 
troops into remote areas where rebel tribesmen are fighting 
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for control^ It was unlikely that the Afghan pilots 
had the ability to fly sophisticated Soviet helicopters. 
It follov>red that Russians would have to fly Afghan troops 
to the fighting. 
75, DESAI (Mahesh), Russian presence in Afghanistan. Janata 
35, 27; 1980, August; 31-32. 
Describes that the presence of Russian forces in Afghanis-
tan is a very valid ground for anxiety in Islamabad and 
Peking, Delhi is, should be ready to alleviate their 
anxiety by turning our long and embattled borders from 
Burma to the Arabian sea into an unbroken peace frontier 
between India and Pakistan. But that is an objective 
which transcends our different perceptions of the Russian 
presence in Afghanistan. Hoy., should its realisation be 
made contingent on their withdrav/1. Much as our hearts 
go out to the people of Afghanistan, we in India have to 
consider more than sentiment alone in setting oujf course 
in matters international, be it defence or non-alignment 
or the extension of good neighbourliness to Pakistan and 
China, 
76. GOYAL (D R ) , Spring in the air. Mainstream 21, 27-28; 
19 83, Mar 5; 85-87. 
Describes that Kabul air in the mid-Peb, wispers intima-
tions of Spring. He spent one week in ^^^B^^IT^rT^mBM&s 
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mentally prepared to see Soviet troops occupying at least 
key points, markets and squares as guards against rebel 
stories into the town, v^ lestern media had given the 
impression that the hold of Karmal govetnment is tenuous 
and administration there is, irun by Soviet soldiers and 
advisers. Unfortunately the U.S. and China have succeeded 
in creating an impression through high powered propaganda, 
that the problem in Afghanistan is the presence of Soviet 
troops. He pointed out that the new government of Afgha-
nistan is on the move to get out of the dark recesses of 
dehiimanising poverty and ignorance. 
77. JAIN (Giri Lai). Soviet takeover in Kabul: Grim implica-
tions for India. Times of India; 1980, Jan 1. 
Describes that the Soviet takeover in Kabul is a unprinci-
pled and brutal as its invasion of Hungary in 19 56 and of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the American bombing of north 
Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos. The new Afghan president flew 
into Kabul is one of the planes that brought Soviet troops 
last week and some of the new ministers had been under 
Soviet protection since September 14 when Mr. Hafizullah 
Amin had managed to overthrow Mr. Taraki. The Kremlin 
has wilfully overthrown the Amin regime anait has used its 
own troops for the purpose. 
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78. KAUFMAN (Michael T), Larger Soviet role in Afghanistan. 
Times of India; 1979, Sept 12. 
The Soviet Union has been unable to find a political 
solution to the fighting here. And there are signs that 
Mascow is moving towards direct, broad military interven-
tion to quell the dozen of fierce local uprisings. He 
says that the Afghan government forces have failed to stem 
the rebellion with limited Soviet support. One approach 
of Soviet policy was to argue for great restraint on the 
promise that any new government in Afghanistan would have 
to maintain close relations with Mascow. But set against 
considerations favouring a Soviet policy of caution are 
the dictates of geography and culture, 
79. MLNKZES (S L). Afghanistan and Soviet Union. Hindustan 
Times; 1983, Dec 22. 
Author says that when the Soviets moved into Afghanistan 
in December, 1979, the surmise was that they had rushed 
into a quagmire and would have to induct increasing numbers 
of troops and weapons to combat the Afghan Mujahideen, 
the 'natural* mountain fighters, who for centuries had 
apparently been successfully resisting invaders. The 
Soviet Union v/ill admittedly have learnt that it v/as for 
easier to send troops into Afghanistan than to get them 
totaiy out. 
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80. MOAZZAM (Anwar). Afghanistan: Revolution and Revivalism. , 
Illustrated Weekly of India 101, 3; 1980 Jan 20; 30-33. 
Author describes that one ideology, one revolution, one 
counter revolutionary movement and three dead bodies, 
against the back drop of Russian array movements. That 
almost sums up the breath taking developments in the three 
act play staged in Afghanistan in the last twenty months. 
In the context of Islamic resurgence hov/ do we fit these 
revolutionary changes, which backed by the Soviet military 
•support' veer towards Russian Marxism? VJhile almost all 
Muslim states have been converted to Islam, Afghanistan 
one of the most backward Muslim countries of the world. 
Most countries looked upon the revolution in Afghanistan 
as an internal development. 
81. MOHAN RAi-'i. Causes of a Coup, Far Eastern Economic revievi? 
107, 2; 1980, Jan 11; 11-13. 
Describes that '^ oviet military intervention in Afghanis-
tan extends the sinister Mascow doctrine of limited sover-
eignity outside eastern Europe. Hovj'ever there are worries 
in New Delhi that the United States, because of the boviet 
presence in Afghanistan, may resume military assistance 
to Pakistan. This could mean a renev/ed Pakistan-India 
arms race, ending the short detente between the two coun-
tries, and bringing about a nev/ Indian dependence on Soviet 
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arms. Author points out that the coup the third since 
1978, was backed by Soviet arms. But the second one, last 
September when Amin ousted Woor Mohammad Taraki, aid not 
have Soviet approval, 
82. NO EASY Victory. Times; 1980; " , ."-eb 25. 
Points out that the ^oviet Union is not winning in Afgha-
nistan. It is not winning the hearts and minds of the 
people and it is not v/inning the military battle against 
the guerrillas. This does not mean it can never win. If 
it puts in enough troops and allov;s them to kill enough 
people it might achieve an uneasy stability. And if it 
draws on its postrevolutionary experience of slaughtering 
and deporting v/hole nations it might over a period of 
years being Afghanistan into the Soviet Union. But the 
situation at the moment must be considerably v;orse than 
the Soviet leaders expected, 
83, PURI (Rakshat), Soviet move in Kabul planned 'in advance*. 
Hindustan times; 1980, Jun 20, 
Discusses that the Soviet Union's military intervention in 
Afghanistan last December "must have been planned at least 
four months in advance. The survey warns that the Soviet 
intervention will continue increasingly to have profound 
effects on international security as a v/hole. The survey 
observes that the two events of the year, the fall of the 
8 9 
Shah of Iran and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 
have linked instability in the developing world to Last 
rfest Security, issues, increasing the threat of a major 
confrontation. The industrialised world's dependence of 
secure oil supplies has turned threats to the stability 
of the Persian Gulf region into threats to international 
security as a whole, 
84, SHORISH (M Mobin), Future of Soviets in Afghanistan. 
E^diance view weekly 17, 1; 1981, May 17; 5, 
The tragedy in Afghanistan is an example of the Soviet 
Union's attempt to establish a pov/er base in that parti-
cular geographical location, to establish a bulv/ark against 
Islamic revolutionary stirrings v/ithin Soviet Central 
Asia and to thrust a wedge between Iran and Pakistan and 
to inpost its ov/n brand of modernization upon a poor coun-
try. The Russ&an move into Afghanistan has already made 
revolutionaries out of the Afghan peasants, I'here are 
many among the freedom fighters and refugees who have 
nothing in mind except to go back as free men and vromen 
to their homes. They, their Muslim brothers and sisters 
and other committed to the creation of a decent v/orld will 
keep the pressure on the aggressors as we have noticed in 
the United Nations and Islamic contries resolution asking 
the Russian to v/ithdraw from Afghanistan, 
83 
85. TAJUL HOSSAIK. Kremlin Conquers Kabul, Radical Humanist 
44^12;1980,Mar; 3-4. 
Describes that the appearance of massive Soviet tropps i 
and tanks in Kabul streets started a few days earlier 
like Trojan Horses, Mascow has accomplished the task 
with utmost precision. It was reported that Soviet troops 
and tanks were collecting for quice a few days before 
Amin was murdered, Mascow has claimed that the tropps 
v/ere sent only after repeated requests by the Kabul 
government. The allegation is that the Russian tropps 
took him in a safe place to kill him there because they 
did not like to spill blood in the Presidential palace. 
It could be that he was cheated and his murder was 
arranged beyond sight. If that is so,then Kremlin is 
guilty of double crossing, Kremlin was called by Amin 
for help, 
86, TEST OF Wisdom. National ^ erald; 1983,May 9. 
The reported deal under which Soviet tropps will pull 
back from Afghanistan's border areas in exchange for 
the dispersal of Afghan refugees in Pakistan's border 
areas ia a welcome first step towards an overall settle-
ment of the dispute between India's two north western 
neichbours. The insurgents in these refugees camps v/ere 
known to be getting Soviet made weapons discarded by the 
aiyptiaii army \^en President Anwar Sadat broke with Russia to sign 
•the Camp David agreements,Within Pakistan itself there may 
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be attempts to torpedo the deal. If the S.oviet troops 
v/ithdraw to a safe distance much of the reason for the 
aid package will vanish, and if the insurgency tapers off 
and the Russians leave /Afghanistan altogether the aid 
v;ill become redundant. It v/ill be a test of General 
Zia-ul-Haq's v/isdora v/hether he allows these vested inter-
ests to torpedo the deal or v/hether he insists on the 
deal's implementation to aefuse a dangerous situation, 
AMALYSIS 
37, BOSE (Pradip), Russian Intervention in Afghanistan. 
Janata 34, 45; 1980, Jan 13; 11-12, 
Describes that the Russians say that they are in Afghanis-
tan in response to the appeal made by the Afghan leader-
ship to defend itself against internal and external aggre-
ssion. The Soviet troops played an active role in the 
removal of the Amin regime. Then who made the appeal? 
Mo body did. The Russians acted in their own interest. 
It has been proved in Afghanistan that the Russians ca 
act in a reckless way if they feel that they have -che 
necessary strength and can get away v/ith it. It is to be 
hoped that the nev; government which will take over by the 
second v/eek of January v/ill have a big foreign policy 
to tackle v/ith at the begining of its tenure. 
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88. PALL OUT FROM Afghanistan. Himmat; 1980, Jan 25; 20-21, 
describes that the Soviet troops who moved in Afghanistan 
to replace the government of Hafizullah Amin on December 
27 v;ith that of Babrak Karmal/ have deciaed to dig in for 
the v/inter. The number of Red army personnel has increa-
sed over the last v;eeks as fighting between them and the 
Afghan army on the one side and Islamic Afghan rebels on 
the other countries. The Soviet attempted to reduce 
Amin's power in September by trying to induct men loyal 
to them like Babrak Karmal into the government. Ahother 
reason for the Soviet move could be the increasing influ-
ence of the hardliners in the Soviet Politburo. It points 
oat that Soviets are no doubt preparing for a time v/hen 
they may have to v/ithdraw. They are already working full -
stream at integrating the Afghan army v/ith their ov/n in 
such a way that there will be no need for actual Russian 
presence in the country at the future date. 
89, FISHLOCK (Trever). Russians dig in Afghanistan. Statesman; 
1982, Jan 11. 
Describes that the Russians are now spending their third 
winter in Afghanistan. They will spend many more when 
they occupied the country tv/o years ago, they called their 
operation limited and temporary; but it nov/ has the appear-
ance of being permanent and total. While there is sometimes 
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talk of a political solution to the Afghan question, 
it is doubtful there could be one. The Russians want 
to settle the matter on their ov7ii terms and it is hard 
to see that Afghanistan v/ill ever again be independent. 
The Russians moved in because they v/antad a s-cable state 
v/ith a com^^ant government on their southern border. 
There is no going back. Afghanistan is being built into 
the Soviet system and the concrete is setting. 
90. MOHAK Ri-iM. Afghanistan: The holding operation. Far 
eastern economic review 113/ 32; 1981, Jul 31; 36-37. 
Author describes that this is the second summer of Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan. The Soviet objective is not 
to make Afghanistan another of its central Asian republics 
All Mascow v;ants is an Afghanistan under its sphere of 
influence and it will not pull out untill this is secured. 
The problem essentially is one of propping a revolution 
from above, some thing that defies all known methodologies 
of a Communist revolution. 
91. RUSSlAi.-S MISJUDGE the Afghans. Times; 1980, Jun 21. 
Describes that the Russians now recognize that they have 
bitten off some thing much harder to chew than they had 
foreseen in their occupation of Afghanistan. Both mili-
tarily and in the internal politics of the country 
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they are finding it harder than they had imagined 
to overcome resilient and slippery opponents. In ^ h^e 
begining the Russian array had thought it could beatdown 
resistance quite quickly. Troops ruthlessly sv/ept through 
villages, laying them to waste and leaving many people 
cowed. On both the political and military fronts, any 
Russian hopes that their involvement in Afghanistan would 
be a short term one appear to have receded, ,iith Afghans 
now being taken to the ^oviet Union for up to five years 
of military training, the Russians are taking the long 
view, 
92, ££TH (a. P) . rJo end to Afghan insurgency: U.S, - Pakistani 
stake in continuance. Times of India; 1980, Oct 10, 
Discusses that the Afghan crisis seems no v/here near a 
solution, Mr. Brezhnev's new formulation was important 
in that it indicated Mascov;'s willingness to entertain a 
piecemeal solution to the Afghan question. It differed 
from the previous Soviet position in v/hich regional and 
global factors, such as the question of vastly enhanced 
U.S. military i^ resence in the Gulf and Indian Ocean, were 
inextricably linked. But surprisingly, there v/as no 
response to x-ir, Brezhnev's call from either Pakistan or 
other interested parties. Apparently they do not wish to 
accept Karma1 regime. But it is equally possible that 
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Pakistan and its supporters in the anti-Soviet crusade 
on Afghanistan are just not interested at this stage in 
a political settlement. 
93. SUBRAHMni^YAM (iC), Strategic Dimension: Cold war ilanoeu-
vres.; . Viorld yocus, 5, 4; 1984, Apr; 7-9. 
Describes that among the v/estern strategic community the 
Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan is generally 
regarded as the initiator of the new cold v/ar. Author 
points out that Afghanistan is not an issue of major 
strategic confrontation between the tv/o blocs. It is a 
costly mistake for the Soviet Union and a convenient stick 
for the U.S. to beat the former v;ith. It is a great 
tragedy for the Afghan people and an immense burdon on 
Pakistan, for v/hich a significant share of responsibility 
should be apportioned to the military regime headed by 
General 2ia-ul-Haq. 
94, TASK^R (Rodney). Mascow moves into a southern satellite. 
Far Eastern Economic reviev/ 107, 2; 1980, Jan 11, 10. 
Describes that the Soviet Union's Ghristraas blitzkrieg 
iftto its troubled southern neighbour, Afghanistan, has 
plunged the strategic central Asian region, into a nev; 
era of uncertainty. The move in v;hich Mascow swept out 
the three months old regime of Amin and replaced it v/ith 
one headed by the more amenable Babrak Karmal, aroused 
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world wide condemnation* particularly from western 
powers and from Islamic states v/orried about repression 
of their i'iuslim brothers by a Marxist regime in Kabul. 
Afghanistan's Muslim neighbours, Pakistan and Iran 
denounced the Soviets and called for a withdrawl of their 
troops, 
95. Tli/ARI (J G ) . Deepenijag Afghan crisis. Magpur Times; 
1930, Jul 11. 
Describes that it is clear by now, half a year since 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan that the control of 
this large mountaneous country is proving as elusive for 
the Russians as for the early invaders for example the 
British in the 19th century. The pov/er of Babrak Karmal, 
the latest Soviet stooge, is even more dependent on the 
presence of Soviet troops than the previous Presiaents, 
Taraki and Amin. The announcement of the Russians of 
their decision for a partial pull out of -cheir army from 
Afghanistan promises no mitigation of the Afghan crisis. 
Another aspect of the deepening Afghan crisis is the dis-
unity betv/een America and its allies. 
KRI-IY WITHDRAV^L 
96. INDERJIT, Afghanistan; Test for non-aligned. Economic' 
Times 7, 6; 19 80, Apr 1; 5; 7-3. 
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Describes that Afghanistan and its occupation by the 
Soviet Union continues to weigh heavily on Eew Delhi, 
not withstanding its pre-occupation with domestic issues. 
The bilateral talks held by India with its neighbours. 
The U.S.A., Britain and other western powers and other 
Arab countries have not been without their usefulness. 
All are agreed that Mascov/ must withdrav/ its troops from 
Afghanistan and that Afghans must restored their indepen-
dance. The Non-aligned movement has so far discussed 
peaceful settlement of disputes. The Afghan crisis offers 
India a unique opportunity to provide purposeful leader-
ship and the non-aligned movements its first real test of 
effective co-operation. 
97. SEilGUPTA (Bhabani.) . Quest for freedom. India today 7, 
6; 1982, i-iar 31; 153. 
This article is concerned with the affairs of the sub-
continent and south-v;estern Asia. The Baluch have never 
really submitted to the rule of Pakistan. There have 
been frequent military interventions. The result was the 
armed Baluch insurrection of 1974-77, in v/hich both sides 
suffered heavy casualties. The insurrection v/as put 
down v/ith telling military help from the Shah of Iran, who 
armed himself v;ith a doctrine of military intervention in 
Pakistan to prevent its Balkanisation. At the same time. 
91 
the vulnerability of Buluchistan underlines the desira-
bility of finding a solution to the Afghan crisis that 
vrould bring about the v/ithdrawl of Soviet forces, 
93. SOVIET WITHDRAWL. Patriot; 1980 Jun 25. 
Describes that lihe Vienna Summit of v/estern pov/ers called 
for a permanent and complete withdrawl and Peking joined 
in with a long distance cynical remark about a 'sleight 
of hand', The Soviet Union never suggested that the 
present vrithdrav;l was the begining of total evacution of 
troops. The withdrawl was made in response to the impro-
ved situation in Afghanistan as a result of the successive 
failures of che insurgents forays from across the boraer 
and the interventionist's attempts to create disorder in 
the country. But Kabul still needs Soviet military help 
and troops will continue to stay till the foreign inter-
vention ceases to pose any threat to Afohanistan's security 
and independance. It will be for Kabul to say v/hen the 
troops should completely -withdraw. 
99. KQTRU (H L,) . Russian pull out; A political manoenvre. 
Statesman; 1980/ Jun 25. 
Author says that every one is hoping that there is subs-
tance in the Russian claim that they have begun witharawl 
of their troops from Afghanistan, If true, Indians may 
claim that they had been urging the Soviet Union to ao so. 
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And the Indians could turn round and say "look", vie 
had told you so". But military experts are not so sure 
they had to believe that the withdrav/l of a division 
of Soviet troops accompanied by a handful of armour may 
just be that the first elements of the Soviet troops to 
come into Afghanistan in December have finished tn;ir 
tour of duty and are returning their heme bases to be 
replaced by others, 
100. PART IS Jot v/hole. Amrit Bazar Patrika; 1980, Jun 26. 
Analyses that the Soviet Union is understandably making 
much of V7hat is at most partial withdrav/l of Russian 
troops from Afghanistan, According to the western esti-
mates, nine Soviet divisions had poured into Afghanis-
tan in the past seven months, and granted that Mascov/'s 
announcement about the number of troops withdrawn does 
not err on the high side, eight divisions of Soviet troops 
still remain in Afghanistan to save the revolution. It 
is no secret that the western alliance is divided on 
the issue of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Not 
that it supported by any of them or any one v/ants the 
Soviets to remain in Afghanistan for any length of time. 
101. RUSSIAK IriTiiNTIOl^ S. Indian Express; 1980, Jun 25. 
Describes that the Russians have gone to town in a big 
wav to Dublicise the v/ithdrav/l of a division of their 
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troops and 108 tanks from Afghanistan. But nothing -chat 
has been said by Mr, Brezhnev to a closed meeting of 
the Soviet Gornmuaist Party's central committee v;ould 
warrant the assumption that this is the first stet) in a 
phased programme to end Soviet armed intervention in 
Afghanistan, Indeed, the central committee plenum has 
reiterated the demand of "a reliable guarantee against 
subversive acts from outside,' Kascov/ v/ell knows that 
such a guarantee is not forthcoming and indeed v/ould be 
impossible for any one to give. If that is the kind of 
political settlement Mascov/ seeks as the price for calling 
off its aggression in Afghanistan, it v/ould amount to 
serving notice that it is in no hurry to change its poli-
cies in the face of almost universal condemnation of its 
action outside the Soviet bloc. 
CRITICISM 
102. Describes tnat it has taken the Soviet Union six months 
to respond to widespread criticism in the world of tne 
virtual occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet troops. The 
brief announcement of a partial pull out was as unexpected 
as it v/as encouraging. An Indian official spokesman 
described the move as pleasant for obvious reasons, and 
also because India had been pressing for at least a gesture 
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by the Soviet LTnion to show that its forces were not 
permanantly on Afghan Soil, 
103. ILL-CONCEIVED REFORt'lS from Kabul alienate population. 
Times; 1980, Jul 15. 
The Russians are unlikely to withdraw. They would not 
have gone in the first place if they had intended to pull 
out later without guaranteeing the survival of the 
regime. The strength of the Soviet policy is that it 
is based on the very assumption that others oercieve 
Soviet strength as invincible. That is v/hy a withdrawl 
at this stage is unthinkable. The new Afghan war will 
be a protracted one. To believe that is possible to 
return to the former status quo, namely, a neutral 
Afghanistan, is probabiy no more than v/ishful thinking, 
104. PULL-OUT or Ploy. Hindustan times; 1930, Jun 25. 
Discusses that the Soviet announcement of partial withdrawl 
of 'some army units* cannot be seriously taken as a 
pointer of the Kremlin's intention of de-escalating the 
the crisis in Afghanistan, It is suspect for a number 
of reasons. For one it is not clear how many of the 
estimated one lakh Soviet troops inducted into Afghanistan 
during the past six months, are being v/ithdrawn. For 
another, even if it is only a token v/ithdrawl designed 
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to earn the Soviet Union support among the non-aligned 
countries/ the Kremlin has not indicated v;hen and how 
long it will take to make these withdrav/als, 
105. SOVIET MOVE, Times of India; 1980, Jun 20. 
Discusses that a good case can be made for dismiseing 
the Soviet announcement that "some army units" are being 
withdrav/n from Afghanistan as a v;ell timed gimmick 
designed to extract some badly needed political mileage 
at a minimal political price. Some time ago, the Russians, 
through the Karmal regime they have installed and are 
propping up in Kabul, came out v-;ith a peace plan that 
sought to effect the cessation of all insurgent activity 
against the Karmal regime and to have that under v/ritten 
by both super -powers before the withdrawl of Soviet troops 
could be considered. This move made on the eve of the 
Islamic conference in Pakistan, v/as widely interpreted as 
being tay»tamount to asking those opposed to the Soviet 
intervention to help the Russians to consolidate their 
gains in return for virtually nothing. 
PROPOSAL 
106. DOGS GO home. Times; 1980, Jun 24. 
Describes that the political results of the venice 
summit cannot be judged immediately. The crude Soviet 
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attempts to sow new divisions among western leaders by-
announcing a partial withdrawl of troops fx-om Afghanis-
tan just as they were assembling, and by giving only 
the French President advance warning of this, was 
successfully thwarted, while the door was left open for 
serious negotiations ona a full withdrawl should it turn-
out, by any happy chance, that the Soviet leaders are 
ready for them. 
107. IQBAL SINGH. Crisis rediscovered. Link 22, 49/ 1980, 
Jul 13; 17-18. 
If a crisis over Afghanistan did not exist, it v/ould have 
had to be invented. The Soviet intention in deciding on 
the v/ithdrawl of part of therr contingent, the inspired 
media oracles of the west intoned with almost one voice, 
vxas clearly to sow confusion accentuate discords, and upset 
all the calculations of the heads of the state and 
government of the seven countries gathered in venice and 
indeed, as one banner headline put it, "to torpedo the 
summit". But, so we were assured, the seven were not 
going to allow the Soviets to undermine their resolve to 
fight the last Afghan. The partial withdrav/l of the 
Soviet forces from Afghanistan made no difference. 
108. POSITIONS HARDEN. Times of India; 1980, Jul 3. 
The articles says that it is not at all surprisinc that 
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President Brezhnev has flatly turned down the west 
German chancellor, Herr Schmidt's plea for a gradual 
withdrawl of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. This was 
a foregone conclusion even before Herr 5chmidt reached 
Mascow, In view of the continuing fragility of the 
Karmal regime in Kabul on the one hand and intensification 
of the guerrlla activities on the other, the Soviet Union 
is just not in a position to pull its farces out of Afgha-
nistan. AS such the Soviet leadership may even feel that 
it has made a mistake in allov/ing itself to be dragged 
into. Afghanistan in strength and may even v/ish to get 
out. But it can do so only if it is willing to abdandon 
the desire to have a pro-Soviet regime in Kabul and suffer 
a loss of face, 
l09. PURI (RaKshat). Bog in Afghanistan. Hindustan Times; 
1980, Jul 2. 
Discusses that the Soviet Union's announcement of a 
limited troop withdrawl from Afghanistan has not seemed 
convincing to any body in the west ivith the possible 
exception of President Giscard d_^staing. The French 
President believes that the Soviet Union's limited with-
drawl is "a significant development in the right path", 
towards a political solution, and that a reversal of the 
tffend would be embrassing for Mascov/, Author says uhat 
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it remains to be seen what the out come of the Soviet 
intervention might be, and whether the Russians will 
indeed get bogged down in Afghanistan as the Americans 
were in Vietnam. 
110, VfARIAVWALLA (Bharat). Soviet presence in Kabul. Times 
of India; 1980, Jul 5. 
Author says that it is somewhat surprising that Mascow 
chose to first inform Paris and not isiew Delhi of its 
decision to withdraw one division from Afghanistan. 
India is a treaty partner of the Soviet Union and v/hat 
the latter does in Afghanistan vitally affects this 
country's security interests. New i^ elhi has not publicly 
condemned the Soviets for the armed take over of a 
friendly non-aligned country in the region, nor seen the 
event from the American and Chinese perspectives. What-
ever its differences with Mascow, it has conveyed them 
quietly. Despite all this, the Kremlin does not accord 
New Delhi the importance'the latter deserves, 
Ai^LYSIS 
111. MOVES ON Afghanistan, Statesman; 1980, Jun 27, 
Says that the Soviet announcement of withdrawal of some 
troops and tanks from Afghanistan has generally been seen 
for what it is a rather feeble attempt to mollify and 
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mislead. But it seems to have served as a signal for 
new feelers to break the political stalemate, Mascow 
could hardly expect its announcement to be taken at face 
value. There had being nothing to suggest that 4ts 
military mission was close to a successful end and an 
it could therefore begin to pull out its forces or that 
it had developed a new respect for international opinion 
and had decided to withdraw regardless of what happened 
to the regime it had installed in Kabul, 
WORLD REACTIONS 
112, SOVIET PULL out, Indian Nation; 1980, Jun 27. 
Analysis that the Soviet Union surprised the world by 
suddenly announcing withdrawl of troops from Afghanistan 
and perhaps took the wind out of the sail of the Venice 
Summit of the major non-Communist developed nations. Not 
less surprising was the style in which the Soviet media 
treated this unexpected and voluntary move. It says some 
military units whose presence in Afghanistan is not 
essential at present are currently being withdrawn to the 
territory of the U,S.S.R, by agreement with the Afghan 
government. It shows that the limited, tentative pull 
out is a tactical initiative for a break through in the 
Afghan crisis despite the unselenting demand of the U.S, 
and Pakistan for total withdrawl. 
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PROSPECTS 
113. BONNART (Frederick). Doubts about Soviet troop withdrawl. 
Statesman; 1980, Aug 28. 
Describes that it was probably no accident that the 
recent much publicized withdrawl of 20,000 Soviet troops 
and 1,000 tanks from East Germany coincided with the end 
of the twenty-first round of talks in the mutnal balanced 
force reductions negotiations which have been going on 
in Vienna for more than seven years. The Warsaw Pact 
delegation had produced a counter proposal in which they 
reduced their previous offer from 30,000 troops to 20,000 
claiming that their withdrawal made the offer in effect 
40,000. 
114. WATER FROM Stones. Tribune; 1980, Jul 28. 
It says "when Moses struck the Horeb rock water gushed 
out to slake the thurst of the Jews crossing the Sinai 
desert, says the Bible. It is hardly surprising therefore 
that some descendants of moses should be looking for 
water which might be concealed under rocks and stones. 
The Russians, at any rate, are. ;^::corGing to the report, 
Soviet geophysicists hope to discover water under stones. 
They evidently have not heard of our v;ater diviners. 
Otherwise, for all one knows, the Russians might well have 
agreed to withdraw from Afghanistan in return not for a 
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guarantee of the cessation of sniping by the rebels 
but to welcome our water-diviners. 
CHINA'S ROLE 
115. CHINA'S AFGHAN Card. Link 22, 49; 1980, Jul 13; 15-16. 
The Chinese Journal said "Territorial expansion is no 
agression. Action by a strong nation or a state aimed 
at enlarging its territory accord with the laws of Social 
development of the time. Pacts reveal that the necessity 
to pursue such laws appears to have prompted China to 
carry out subversive activities in Afghanistan. Infact, 
anti-Afghan conspiracy has remained no secret. It could 
be said that such activities began only after the Babrak 
Karmal government took over, China has begun paying spe-
cial attention to the region. However, Peking's aim is 
not just confined to making the Afghan situation unstable. 
It has a political dimension too. It is clear from 
Sino - y.S. diplomatic activities, 
116, NARAKARAYAN DAS, Afghanistan-China's anxiety or oppor-
tunity? Janata 35, 27; 1980, August; 25-28. 
In a fast-altering international ambience 'faits accomplis' 
no doubt, are few. One of the few such is Afghanistan 
and will remain an area of Soviet influence for a long 
time to come. The weight of world opinion may impel Russia 
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to withdraw its army from Afghan soil but the rulers 
of the territory, in the foreseeable future, will act 
according to Kremlin's instructions on all important 
issues-internal as well external. The prevailing unrest 
in Afghanistan is perceived by China and many other 
peoples as resulting from an encroachment by the Soviet 
super pov:er upon the sovereignity of a small neighbour. 
The same super power, on the contrary, supports its 
action of stationing troops on an alien soil on the 
strength of an appeal for military assistance, said to 
have been made by the Afghan government to safeguard its 
sovereignty, 
117, RAMAGHAMDRAN (K N ) . China and the Afghan Crisis. 
Nagpur Times; 1980, Feb 27, 
Author says that it is an apportunity for Beijing to 
interfere in the Affairs of south As±a, Soviet military 
intervention by invitation in Afghanistan is obvious. 
What is perhaps more significant is an assessment of 
Beijing's evolving role by an examination of its percep-
tions, responses and motives. At the outset it may be 
noted that Beijing has a reason to regret the overthrow 
of the regime of Hafizullah Amin and the installation of 
'the one headed by Babrak Karmal, Amin's overthrov; and 
the emergence of Mascov/ as the decisive orbiter in Kabul 
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closed all major options for Beijing in the sphere of 
gaining influence in the Afghan power structure, 
CRITICISM 
118. MUiOHi^A (Govind Das) . Coup in Afghan, Nagpur Times; 
1980, Jan 14, 
Describes that an absolutely unjustifiable agression by 
Russia on Afghanistan, on 27th Decennber 1979 is a glaring 
example of international mafia-ism or overbearing arrog-
ance. It is claimed by Russia that it intervened in 
Afghanistan on the invitation of Afghan government, but 
the excuse is totally unconvincing. Now 40,000 Soviet 
troops, combing the various troubled spots, in Afghanis-
tan have brought it under its iron control. All resistance 
is v/iped out and there is calm every v/here - the calm of 
the grave. 
119, WOORAWI (A G ) . Lessons of Afghanistan, Indian Express; 
1980, Jan 10, 
Russia's invasion of Afghanistan and installation of a 
regime of its own choice there destroys at one fell blow 
a whole set of illusions about Soviet foreign policy in 
fundamental respects. He says that Soviet military inter-
vention was confined to its own sphere of influence in 
Eastern Europe. It has now chosen to repeat its perform-
ance in an a Asian country v/hose government has accepted 
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the Soviet concept of non-alignment, subscribed to 
the Communist ideology but differed on the composition 
of its own government, 
120. NO VENUE For appeasement, Magpur Times; 1980, Jan 9. 
The intervention in Afghanistan by the Soviet Union has 
taught the whole world a lesson. But it must be learnt 
seriously by the countries in Asia. It is a danger 
signal to India and to all non-aligned countries who as 
a group can do little to vacate the aggression or bring 
pressure on Russia to withdraw the troops. Afghanistan, 
itself a non-aligned country, has overnight been conver-
ted into a satellite of the Soviet Union, and no voice 
can be heard from that country for the leaders of the 
non-aligned movement to plead the case of Afghanistan. 
Indeed it is a plight in which every one except Soviet 
Russia is caught. 
CUBA'S ROLE 
121. CUBAN INITIATIVE. Janata 35, 9; 1980, Apr 6; 1-2. 
Describes that the Cuban initiative to resolve the crisis 
arising out of Soviet Russia's armed intervention in 
Afghanistan is significant from many point of viev/. The 
initiative has come nearly three months after the fate-
ful events of late December 1979, It has come at the 
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time when almost everyone, including the Americans and 
the Pakistanis/ have been convinced by the Russians 
that they would not opt from Afghanistan unless there 
were credible guarantees from all concerned about the 
safety and security of the regimeta they have established 
in that country. The Cuban initiative has many advantages, 
The Chairman of the non-aligned in thus the fittest 
person for easing the tensions and claiming the ruffled 
feelings of the non-aligned, 
HISTORY 
122. Li YUNFEI, Afghanistan : Soviet occupation of the 
wakhan area. Beijing Review 24, 7; 1931, Feb 16; 10. 
Describes that Soviet troops have taken over the strategic 
wakhan corridor of Afghanistan. Other sources claim the 
Soviets have built ground to ground missile sites, under-
ground bunkers and permanent barracks and widened the 
north south road running along the border with Pakistan. 
Passes leading to China and Pakistan are now parrolled 
by Soviet troops. In the second half of the last year 
the Soviet Union moved decisively and quickly to annex 
the wakhan corridor of Afghanistan. More than 4,000 
Soviet troops are now in the v/akhan area. The Soviet 
occupation of the wakhan carridor nov; separates China from 
Afghanistan and makes the Soviet Union share a common 
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border with Pakistan, The immediate significance of 
this is apparently to ensure the permanent stationing 
of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, 
IINDIA'S ROLE 
123. BATTAGKARJEE (Arun). Painful spin off in De lh i , Ceylon 
da i ly news; 1980, Mar 6, 
The Soviet Union's m i l i t a r y adventure in Afghanistan has 
c rea ted a pa in fu l p o l i t i c a l sp in off in Ind ia tha t 
iNiew Delhi n e i t h e r des i red nor foresaw. On the one hand 
P a k i s t a n ' s emergence as a s t ronger nation m i l i t a r i l y 
through the help of the United S t a t e s has ra i sed ser ious 
concern in Ind ia t h a t a s t ronger Pakis tan poses a t h r e a t 
t o the coun t ry ' s s e c u r i t y . On the other hand, I n d i a ' s 
s t a t ed publ ic po l i cy of c a s t i g a t i n g a l l "foreign i n t e r -
ference" in Afghanistan i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s i s viewed by 
i t s middle Eastern Arab o i l s u p p l i e r s , sympathetic ' 
to the Afghan Moslems are inadequate . 
124. BOSE (P rad ip ) , Afghan c r i s i s and I n d i a ' s r o l e . Janata 
35, 3; 1980, Feb 24; 7-9. 
Describes the tv/o basic weaknesses of the new Afghan 
regime v/ere t h a t the "April Revolution" was pr imar i ly 
a m i l i t a r y putsch and not a popular r evo lu t ion . Secondly, 
the ru l ing peoples Democratic Par ty v/as b a s i c a l l y an 
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urban phenomenon, mainly consisting of urban intellec-
tuals, with very little roots in the country side. 
There is no doubt that the Russians find themselves in 
a real mers in Afghanistan. They possess only one 
great advantage - a frightful military power at their 
command with a strong logistical support for it being 
a neighbouring country. Otheini^ ise every thing is against 
them. India can play an iiiportant and constructive role 
in the new situation created by the Soviet intervention 
in Afghanistan. 
125. BOSE (Pradip). Afghan crisis and India's role - II, 
Janata 35, 4; 1980, Mar 2; 13-16. 
Describes that it is the Afghan crisis which has opened 
up this superb opportunity for regional co-operation in 
which India has to play the single biggest role. Since 
independence had never had such diplomatic opportunity 
as now. It must seize it v/ith imagination and drive. 
The external affairs ministry has already taken some 
initiative by having consultation with these countries. 
It would need extreme fact, persistent effort and an 
ennobling vision to be able to achieve success. And India 
must succeed. 
126. CHOPRA (Pran). Crisis in search of a mediator. Kagpur 
Times; 1980, Jun 19. 
I Q S 
Author describes that Afghan crisis continues to generate 
great bursts of diplomatic activity. Mr, Narasimha 
Rao's visit to Mascow on the other hand had a four fold 
aim. The first v/as to pursue bilateral issues, and the 
second to ensure that disagreement over Kabul did not 
sour Indo-Soviet relations on other issues. In both 
these aims the visit was successful. But Mr, Rao was 
disappointed in his th±ird aim, which waS to see v/hether 
the Soviet Union was willing to soften its conditions 
for v/ithdrawing its troops. It was pointed out to him 
in Mascow that the Soviet Union had already come down 
from its previous position vjhich was that Soviet forces 
had gone to Afghanistan at the request of Kabul govern-
ment, 
127. Ci£AR SHIFT of Emphasis. Tribune; 1980, Jan 14, 
It says that India's stand over the Soviet intervention 
in Afghanistan has clearly undergone a change of emphasis 
since Mrs, Indira Gandhi established her claim to leader-
ship of a new government in Delhi, A fortnight earlier 
the external Affairs ministry had made it known that, 
consistent v;ith the sovereign right to the Afghan people 
to determine their destiny without foreign interference, 
it was India •'XB hope that no country or external power 
would take steps v/hich might aggravate the situation. 
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This was taken at the time to mean disapproval of the 
entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan and of over 
all control which the Soviet Union seemed to be exer-
cising over Afghan affairs v/ithin the country. 
128. II^IAK Initiative. Economic Times 1, 2; 1980, Mar 28; 
5: 1-2. 
Reports that India is considering the idea of proposing 
a conference on Afghanistan question. The best course, 
therefore, is to link the withdrawl of Soviet troops 
with the cessation of raids on Afghanistan territory. 
The important thing is to secure in the bargain some 
assurance from the Karmal regime of freedom of political 
activitjr, if not indeed the holding of free elections. 
129. KIl© OF Neutrality. Tribune; 1980 Jan 17. 
India's abstention during the vote in the special session 
of the U.M. General Assembly over the Soviet interven-
tion in Afghanistan carries a plain meaning. It may 
appear to signify a kind of neutrality between the tv;o 
opposing sides but could also be interpreted as implying 
that, for v/hatever reasons, India is unable to express 
a firm opinion or is unwilling to do so. The resolution 
on which the voting took place called for the immediate, 
unconditional and total withdrawl of Soviet troops from 
no 
Afghanistan to enable the people to decide their ovin 
future v/ithout outside intervention, 
130, KRIPAI4A.NI (J B ) . India's response to Afghan events. 
Indian Express; 1980, Feb 1. 
Emphasises that it is necessary for our country to 
examine properly the situation created by the Russian 
invasion of Afghanistan, It will create painful problems 
for India, Russia has said its forces will leave Afgha-
nistan as soon as a government installed by it there 
wants it to do so. To this India's response has been 
that when a friendly country says something, it ought to 
be believed. But world knows hov7 such promises are kept 
by governments. The author points out that Russian 
forces should immediately leave Afghanistan in the inter-
est of v/orld peace, 
131, PAiCtlT (C S) . India: Growing Relations, 14 or Id Focus 
5, 4; 1984, April; 30^32, 
Country like India which has been able to successfully 
implement its policy of self-reliance, could help Afgha-
nistan, provided its strategic importance to the tv/o 
super pov/ers is not so immediate and urgent as to stake 
even direct military confrontation, Afghanistan -coday 
has become a major flash point in South Asia and yet the 
leader of non-aligned movement, India finds itself 
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helpless to do any thing to defuse the situation. 
132, SETHI (J D). Fumbling over Afghanistan. Tribune; 
1983, Oct 21. 
points out that India has paid a heavy price for its 
Afghanistan policy. Kow here has the failure of the 
ministry of external affairs diplomatic skill been so 
pronounced as in this case, Mrs. Gandhi has been doing 
quite a bit of tightrope walking to stay at a more 
neutral position taut the charge of defending the Soviet 
occupation of a non-aligned country remains unrebutted. 
Correction of a mistake is not possible by simply taking 
one's words back. Before vje analyse the possible steps. 
We need to have a serious look at the situation after 
four years of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. 
INTERKATIOKAL REACTION 
133. ANNEXATION 0? Afghanistan. Times; 1980, Jan 2. 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has rung alarm bells in 
the capitals of NATO, Pakistan, India, China, Iran and 
many other countries. It has been widely condemned as 
an act of unprovoked naked aggression against a sovereign 
state outside the Warsaw Pact. It has caused President 
Carter to revise his opinion of Soviet motives. There 
is no need to be specific at this stage. What matters 
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is the realization that if the Soviet Union continues 
to get away with direct or indirect military interven-
tions as it has in Africa Cambodia and Afghanistan the 
world will become a more dangerous place, 
134. KEVJALL (Richard S), International responses to the 
Afghanistan crisis. World Today 37, 5; 1981, May; 172-81. 
Discusses that Soviet military intervention in Afghanis-
tan has ushered in a new era of confrontation and un-
certainty in International relations. For United States, 
the invasion of Afghanistan was a humiliating demonstra-
tion of its political and militairy impotence in the 
Middle East and South Asia. The invasion suddenly made 
it obvious that the Soviet presence in Afghanistan presen-
ted a grave and unchecked threat to the security of the 
Persian Gulf states v;ith their irreplaceable oil resources. 
The problem in Afghanistan for the Russians in December 
1979 was not the level of outside interference nor even 
the growing strength of the rural insurgents. The resul-
ting conflict was likely to create chaos in the cities 
and loss of control over communications. It was necessory, 
therefore, to follow up the change of government. neither 
the super pov/ers nor Afghanistan's neighbours have found 
a formula for defusing the crisis created by Soviet 
invasion. 
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PAKISTAN'S ROLE 
135, Alil (Salamat) . Afghanistan: Diplomats in dead lock. 
Far Eastern Economic review 111, 3; 1981, Feh 13; 20-21. 
Author discusses that the non-aligned foreign ministers 
conference here this v/eek has underscored the complex 
nature of the Afghanistan problem and has do used hopes 
of early talks between Islamabad and Kabul on the issue. 
Pakistan strongly advocating a settlement v/ith the 
Karmal regime believe the Soviets are steadily tighten-
ing their grip over Afghanistan and that the rebels will 
be effectively neutralised by the end of the year Pakis-
tan faces a serious dilemma. If it decides to choke off 
the Afghan rebel's clandestive supply line, it risks 
losing powerful friends but if it continues to serve as 
a cond\iit for arms and supplies, there is the threat of 
Soviet retaliation across the border, 
136. GfLSiKR/WARTTY CSumit) , Kabul fears foreign intervention. 
Patriot; 1980, Feb 8. 
Authors analyses that Afghanistan's Minister of frontier 
affairs Faiz Mohammad told that the situation in the 
border areas was generally peaceful. However, rebels in 
the border areas of Mingrahar province v/ere still active, 
But the local authorities v/ere tackling the situation 
effectively. He rediculed the western propaganda that 
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Soviet troops v/ere fighting the Afghans and said that 
Soviet soldiers were limited in nximber and their main 
aim was to give a fitting rebuff to the forces of 
external intervention in Afghanistan, He said that 
the threat of such an intervention had increased v;ith 
the pumping of arms into Pakistan by the U.S. and China. 
137, JAIN (Girilal), Soviets, in Afghanistan, Times of 
India; 1982, December 2. 
President Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan is a very shrewd 
individual and he is very ably assisted. He has secured 
substantial U,£, military-cum-economic assistance v/ithout 
alienating the Soviet Union too much. He has allowed 
some amount of arms to reach the Afghan Mojahedin but 
within a limit which the Soviets apparently find toler-
able. Indeed he is sure that the Babrak Karmal set up 
in Kabul will, v;ith Soviet support or even under Soviet 
pressuare, recognise the Durand line which no Afghan 
government has ever accepted. 
138, NEW 0PEi:ai:«3S Of Afghanistan. Mainstream 19, 20; 1981, 
Jan 17; 11-12. 
Discusses that Pakistan's foreign minister has formally 
requested the U.N, Secretary General to appoint a special 
representative in accordance with last General Assembly 
resolution on Afghanistan, peoples democratic party of 
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Afghanistan, v/ith a view to bring about a political 
solution of Afghan crisis. There can be no disagree-
ment vrith Pakistan foreign minister's assessment that a 
settlement of Afghan despute v/ould help to lower tensions 
all over the v/orld. Pakistan must necessarily view the 
situation of its own national intsrests. The present 
Afghan government has hinted at its v/illingness to reach 
agreements on all disputed issues, 
139. SELF KiADS Dilemma. Hindustan Times; 19 80, Oct 21. 
president Leonid Brezhnev and president Babrak Karnal 
have reiterated in the joint communique issued at the 
end of their talks in Mascov/ the v^ ish that conditions be 
created so as to enable the pull back of Russian troops 
from Afghanistan, One of the most important fVictors 
involved in creating such a situation is the active 
co-operation of Pakistan in solving the problem of Afghan 
refugees in that country. The Soviets and the Afghans 
believe that it is Pakistan that is keeping an insurgency 
movement alive by allov/ing the airming of Afghan refugees 
and giving them training. 
RiCBELS' ROLE 
140. APGHAKIST/-.:.' TODAY "Keeping the rebels at bay'T Forcing 
the pace of progress. Illustrated rjeekly of India 
102, 36; 1981, Dec 13; 40-41. 
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Analyses that consolidation of the pov;er of Karmal 
regime is probably the only chance that Afghanistan 
has of regaining peace and political stability even 
the hav7ksin the Pentagon now admit that 85,000 Russian 
troops in Afghanistan can indefinitely hold the ring 
for President Kainmal, and that half a dozen motley 
groups of Afghan insurgents operating from safe sanct-
uaries in Pakistan do not have remotest hope of winning, 
Karmal government has bad some success in last tv/o years 
in gaining popularity and extending its pov/er base at 
home. Many more developments has taken place. But 
Afghan's love for independence is legendary and the 
insurgents will always command considerable support among 
the people so long as Karmal is seen as a puppet of 
Russians. To shed that image he must get the Soviet 
troops out, 
l4l. AFGI-IAI.'ISTAK: Why Russia worries, Sconomist 270, 7099; 
1979, Jul 21; 57-8, 
Describes that there are signs that Afghanistan's Marxist 
rulers may be backpedalling on some of their more un-
popular policies in an apparent attempt to win more 
support and perhaps to reach a compromise with the insur-
gents v/ho now control most of the country. It is not 
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clear whbther this new approach has been imposed by the 
Russians, But they are undoubtedly worried about the 
widespred dislike of the regime and the consequent threat 
to their ov;n influence. The only Russians now allov/ed to 
keep their families in Afghanistan are diplomates living 
in a guarded conpounded in Kabul, The rest have been sent 
home. Although there is no sign yet of Russia distancing 
itself from President Mur Mohammad Taraki and his 
Prime Minister it seems to be searching for possible 
alternative rulers who micht be more aCGe;;)table to the 
rebels, 
142, BHATIA(ShYam), View of Afghan disquidt. Tribune; 1983, 
Dec 14. 
Author describes that last April at a crossroads outside 
Kabul four Afghan guerrillas had the shock of their lives. 
The four young Mujahideen,or soldiers of God,rounded a 
corner and sav; ahead of them the silhouette of a Russian 
tank. The only unifying factor among the mujahideen is 
their common resolve that the Russians must leave;MasGow 
so far,shows no sign of obliging them. The Russians have 
a lot at stake in Afghanistan, They are obsessed v;ith 
keeping their southern borders secure and stable. If one 
day,miraculously they should decide to go,it will be a 
client state they will insist on leaving behind. 
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143. BLEAK ANNIVERSARY. Times; 1983, Apr 25, 
Soviet plans to enforce "celebration parades in Kabul 
to mark the revolution five years ago vfhich installed 
a pro-Soviet Marxist regime are threatened by Afghan 
insurgents. The occupation forces in Afghanistan have 
again been reinforced and are now striking at insurgent 
positions in regions around Herat in the north-\i;-est. 
The governments of the vjest and the non-aligned coun-
tries must redouble their efforts to persuade the 
Soviet leaders that much more is to be gained by v/ith-
drawing their forces then by reinforcing them. 
144. GREAT GAI-IE in Kabul. Statesfaan; 1980, Mar 4. 
Describes that more and more it looks as if the Soviet 
Union might be drav/n into a Vietnam like situation in 
Afghanistan. This is not necessarily to suggest that 
the insurrection v/hich nov/ engulfs even the capitals, 
represents a national rising. Rebel forces are too 
fragmented and divided among themselves to be forged 
into a single army inspired by a comimon desire for libera 
tion. It v/ould also probabi^I^e accurate to suggest 
that each group is fighting as much to defend comraunity 
privileges as to resist changes in Muslim orthodoxy and 
the tribal structure. 
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145, LI YUKFiil. Afghanistan: Fantary and fact, Beijlng 
Review 24, 13; 1981, Mar 30; 11-12. 
Describes that the situation is Afghanistan was becoming 
normal, Afghan^, resistance against Soviet aggression 
is in its second year. Guerrillas are active in more 
than 20 of the country's 28 provinces, Vlith the active 
backing of the populace, the guerrillas know every move 
the Soviet invaders make and they are waging a better 
fight all the time, "The Afghan people are really 
resisting. They have plenty of guts and grip. They 
will be able to keep the Soviets busy in Afghanistan for 
a good many years", 
146. L0i-*3ER (V), Afghan rebel groups. National Herald; 
1981, Apr 8, 
The Afghan rebels, indulging in hit and run raids, breach-
ing roads and breaking up communication systems^ attack-
ing government establishments and seizing arms, suffer 
badly from lack of assault and defensive weapons. The 
Soviet made helicopter, gunships and small tanks, opera-
ting in strength, play Havoc v/ith the rebels. The rebels 
have been asking for surface to air missiles and effective 
anti-tank guns and missiles Pakistan is ready to serv;-e 
as a conduit for these arms to the Afghan insurgents, 
but for a price. The price is that Pakistan must be armed-
he avily. 
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147. NAYAR (Kuldip). Will Russians pull out? Indian 
Express; 1980, Oct 9. 
Describes that the real pressure on Afghanistan is 
from the rebels v/ho are far from subdued. They have 
casualities on the Soviets. No doubt the rebels get 
arms from sympathetic Afghan soldiers or buy them from 
the Russians for Harshish and rugs. But these sources 
have a limit. If by continuing resistance for another 
year or two, the rebels could win freedom, they have 
the weapons to do so. It is not that they will lay dov;n 
arms after that; the question is how long they v/ill 
continue to have them. 
148. PEACE MOVES. Indian Express; 1980, Feb 23. 
Even if the v/estern reports of guer±ll6 activities in 
Afghanistan are highly exaggerated, the general strike 
in Kabul is an unmistakable portent of serious trouble 
ahead. Soviet military might v/ill prevail in any pitched 
battle v.'ith the insurgents, but the guerilla strategy 
is precisely to deny such opportunities to the bigger 
force, while keeping up the fight. The Afghan rebels 
have not only the advantage of terrain but also of a 
long tradition of resistance to foreivgn forces in the 
Afghan homeland. Islamic favour is another potent force. 
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.149. PLOY OR Prel\ide? Hagpur Times; 1980, Jun 26. 
Discusses that comparisons are odious but one may be 
tempted to drav/ a parallel between American troops in 
Vietnam and Russian troops in Afghanistan, In Afghanis-
tan indigenous rebels alone are fighting the Soviet 
might. But as v/e know v/hat a guerilla v/ar means, judging 
from the happenings in Vietnam, Rhodesia, Middle-east 
and some other regions, it eventually exasperates and 
tries out a mighty army, Quite a few peoples have won 
their independence by resorting to this mode of mass 
resistance. Nearly 85,000 Soviet troops are in Afghanis-
tan for six months now and even though the red army is 
known for its ruthlessness, it has not been able to douse 
the flames of Afghan rebellion. It is significant that 
some army units vrere being withdrawn from Afghanistan, 
150, REAPPRAISAL IK Mascow. Statesman; 1980, Jun 20, 
Discusses that evidence is daily mounting up that the 
Russians are finding it much tougher going in Afghanis-
tan than they had bargained for. Resistance to Soviet 
control has become stronger and more widespread, result-
ing in a series of major encounters. Soviet forces were 
reported to have devastated villages around Kabul in an 
all-rOut bombardment to repel an attack by Afghan rebels, 
many were killed and v/ouiided. The accuracy may be 
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questioned but there is no doubt about increasingly 
fierce fighting or about the rebel's determination des-
pite heavy losses, Soviet forces appear to percieve 
a growing threat from a continuing build up of guerilla 
forces near Kabul. 
151. TAKSAL (Vinod) . Afghan rebels use chemical weapons. 
Patrior; 1980, Aug 22. 
Describes, that the U.S. and China have stepped up supp-
lies of chemical weapons to anti-Afghanistan bandits 
operating from basis in Pakistan and Iran. The o-jvern-
ment of Afghanistan has strongly protested against this 
escalation of 'undeclared war' to both Pakistan and Iran, 
from whose territories the war is being conducted, and 
has termed the use of chemical v;eapons as both illegal 
and inhuman. The Afghan government has demanded an 
expert examination of the U.S. made chemical weapons and 
an international inquiry into their use by the rebels. 
152. VJARKII-X3 FROM ICAbul. Indian Express; 1980, Feb 25. 
Describes that the week-end's massive demonstrations in 
Kabul and elsewhere in Afghanistan may not add up to 
nation v/ide revolt against the puppet regime of Babrak 
Karmal propped up by an alien occupation force. But 
there can be little doubt that they are an authentic 
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indication of the feelings of the Afghan people to 
events in their country following the Russian armed 
intrusion in their affairs. It is futile to speculate 
on the extent of outside responsibility in the cause of 
the Afghan rebels. So long as the Afghan will to resist 
does not falter outside support v/ill be available in 
good measure, 
U.K.'s ROLE 
153, iJOSHI (3 K), Mrs, Thatcher against dialogue with Karmal, 
Times of India; 1981, Feb 12, 
Discusses that the Prime Minister Mrs, Margaret Thatcher/ 
has turned dov/n a suggestion by a labour M,P. that talks 
should be held v/ith Mr, Babrak Karmal in London on v/ays 
of finding a solution to the Afghan problem, "The 
regime in Afghanistan was installed as a result of the 
Soviet invasion and being kept in power of some 85,000 
Soviet troops". She said in reply to Mr, Ron Brown, 
one of the three labour M,P,£, v;ho visited Afghanistan on 
a fact finding mission recently, 
U.S.A's ROLE 
154, CHAKi\RVARTTY (Sumit), Kevr evidence of U,S. meddling in 
Afghanistan. Patrior; 1982, Oct 28. 
Describes that a group of counter revolutionaries captured 
from different parts of Afghanistan have provided fresh 
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evidence of outside powers direct interference in 
the affairs of this country. This group testified 
that foreigners including Americans, were not only 
training rebels but also accompanying them on their 
anti-government, subversive and terroristic missions 
inside Afghanistan, The author says that the tv;o 
Americans and four Frenchmen guided the rebels in 
Panjsher, 
155, RAJ (Christopher S), Afghan crisis and U,S, response. 
Janata 35, 27; 1980, August; 33-9. 
Describes that the rapid change in the strategic think-
ing in the U,S, v/as certainly an over reaction to the 
Afghan crisis which v/as until then triggered by purely 
local causes. After the coup in Afghanistan changes in 
U,S, policy v;ere registered. The developments in Afgha-
nistan cannot be imagined to have any bearing, direct or 
indirect, on the security of U.S.A, Yet at every stage 
of Afghan crisis the U,S, over-reacted. The various 
economic, diplomatic and military measures decided uoon 
by the Garter administration could only be explained 
from the point of view of global strategic perceptions 
of a super pov/er. Indeed, the Carter administration had 
made the Soviet involvement and intervention in Afghanis-
tan looS like a threat to v/orld peace. 
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156, RIGHTEOUS ANGER and non-intervention. Economic and 
political weekly; 1980, Jan 26; 145. 
Describes that the Soviet have begun their longinings 
in Afghanistan on a safe note. Problems upper most 
in the Soviet mind must have been the Americail and the 
Chinese respass to their liberation-adventure. The 
American respose thus has amounted to righteous anger 
and not intervention. The American anger against inter-
vention has to be naturally bordering on the hypocrisy. 
Their record has not been exactly free of inter\''Gritions 
and things like that. In any case as the situation 
stands he has begun his innings in Afghanistan on a safe 
note. The international situation docs not seem to be 
too perilous. 
157. SSiJGUPTA (Bhabani). United States: Stance sans policy 
World Focus 5, 4; 1984, April; 18-21. 
Author says that the United States has not had a -oolicy 
with regard to Afghanistan since the April revolution 
of 1978 and particularly, since the Soviet military 
intervention in the last v/eek of December 1979. Jimmy 
Garter started v/ith a stance on Afghanistan, which the 
Reagan administration exalted to the level of a rigid 
ideological position. Policy must always be some thing 
distinctly differnt from a stance and a position. The 
United States would like to free Afghanistan from the 
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Soviet military presence. It is an objective beyond 
the reach of American military means and political v/111. 
The United States enormous military power cannot 'i^e uf-ecl 
to fight the Soviets out of Afghanistan, The Unit;.d 
Citates has reached a dead end in dealing v/ith the Afghan 
problem, 
158, SETK (S P), Afghanistan in the pov/er game: '.'inds of 
change. Illustrated v/eekly of India 102, 36; 19S1, 
Dec 13; 42-45. 
Author describes that Af^Jianistan has become are impor-
tant iSFue in the new cold war between tv;o suo-^ r pov;ers 
and their allies. Indeed President Jimmy Carter described 
the Soviet military intervention in Afchanistan in 
Decei"nber 1979 -.-s the greatest threat to v;orld ocace after 
the Second Vvforld VJar. The U.t., end its regional a rr.j-
gatas are not really intersted in a peaceful solution 
of the oroblem. The tragedy of the v/hole situation is 
that i-.fghan people, about whom the v/est, Pakistan, --hina 
and some Islamic countries are making so much fuss, are 
proverbial mincemeant in their unscrupuleus pov/er ga:ae. 
The revolution in Afghanistan has for the first time 
created real opportunities for social change. 
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POLITICAL 
159, FRANKIAND (Mark), Kremlin seeks a way out of Afgha-
nistan, Amrit Bazar Patrika 1981, Mar 11, 
Author discusses that Soviet foreign policy continues 
to be haunted by the problem of Afghanistan, President 
Brezhnev's speech at the Soviet Communist Party Congress 
contained the following some what rather rueful refer-
ence to Afghanistan. 'Imperialism launched a real 
undeclared war against the Afghan revolution. This also 
created a direct threat to the seifiurity of our southern 
frontier. In the circumstances, we were compelled to 
regriiCler the military aid asked for by that friendly 
country', 
160, SARSEN (Rajendra), Afghan coup and after. Tribune; 
1979, Dec 31, 
Describes that the boid and dramatic move by the Soviet 
Union to install in Afghanistan a more "sensible and 
rational". The Soviet Union, to be sure had been having 
problems with the deposed President Hafizullah Amin, 
The diplomatic grapevine during the last three months 
had indicated that the Soviet Union was looking for an 
opportunity to get rid of Mr, Amin who had thwarted major 
Soviet irii-tiatives for some sort of political relaxation 
in Afghanistan on at least tv/o occasions. 
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POi-ITICAL SOLUTION 
161. CLOSE To a settlement. Tribune; 1983, Jun 16. 
Describes that Barring a last minute hitch, a compre-
hensive settlement on the more than three-year old 
Afghan problem seems to be well within the realm of 
possibility at the Geneva talks. Hopeful noises have 
been heard from Mr. Diego ^ ordovez, the U.M, Assistant 
Secretary General, who tirelessly negotiated the settle-
ment, and the foreign ministers of the three involved 
countries - Sahibzada Yaqxib Khan of Pakistan, Mr. Shcih 
Mohammad Dost of Afghanistan and Mr. Andrei Gromyko of 
the Soviet Union, A clear indication that Islamabad and 
Kabul have moved very closed to an agreement came from 
Mascow, where Mr. Yaqxib Khan had gone for discussions 
with Mr. Gromyko. During two hours of talks without aides 
the two leaders filled in the few last details about the 
vexations question of the time frame for the withdrav/al 
of Soviet troops and weapons. 
162. DUA (H K). Afghanistan: Geneva and after. Indian 
)ress; 1983, Jul 13. 
Author descirbes that ever since his appointment as U.lxi. 
Secretary General's personal representative on Afghanis-
tan, Mr, Gordovez has been raising hopes of a settlement. 
Mr. Gordovez has made a number of trips to Kabul, 
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Islamabad and Tehran. He has organised three rounds 
of indirect talks in Geneva between the foreign minis-
ters of Afghanistan and Pakistan and kept the Iranian 
representative in Geneva informed. Whatever Mr. Gordovez's 
statements, a year's search has not brought a comprehen-
sive political settlement of the Aghanistan question 
any nearer. At the end of the' last round of Geneva 
talks he tempered his earlier optimism by saying there is 
no "quick fix" solution of the problem, 
163. HALLIDAY (Fred). Russian Gamble may succeed. Times of 
India; 1983, May 20. 
The fifth anniversary of the advent of the local Commu-
nist party to pov/er in Afghanistan has coincided ;-;ith 
the end of another round of negotiations under U.N. aus-
pices in Geneva on findings a solution to that country's 
problem. The U.N. envoy, Mr. Diego Cordobez, has talked 
of sxibstantial progress" in these discussions and they 
villi resume again on 16 Jiiine. But on the available 
evidence a solution to the crisis in Afghanistan is years, 
not months, away and suggestions that a quick end to the 
fighting can be found must be treated v/ith caution. 
164, PEACE OFFENSIVE. Times of India; 1980, May 16. 
Discusses that the Soviet government has launched a peace 
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offensive on Afghanistan. That is the plain implica-
tion of the proposals the Karmal regime has made to 
Pakistan and Iran, It could not possibly have acted on 
so sensitive an issue without the Kremlin's consent. 
Since President Zia-ul-Haq has not disclosed the contents 
of the letter Mr, Brezhnev has written to him, it is not 
possible to say v/ith certainty whether its contents are 
more or less identical with the proposals Kabul has made. 
But it will be surprising if they are not. 
165. SITAKSHU DAS. "Neutral" or Sovereign Kabul. Tribune; 
1980, Mar 5. 
Author says that if the big powers now embroiled in 
Afghanistan are seeking a way out of the impasse, and 
not merely propaganda advantages in a prolonged war of 
attrition, then: both groups of pov/ers v/ill have to fur-
ther amplify the conciliatory signals they have emitted 
in the past two weeks. Neither the carrington formala 
nor the affirmation of the Soviet desire to vrithdraw 
troops offers hope of an early end to the sufferings in 
Afghanistan. The Soviet Union has no such fire fighting 
role to perform in Afghanistan. 
166. USSR Al-JD AFGHANISTAN: The firm foundation of friendship 
and Co-operation. International affairs; 1981, Jan 1, 
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Analyses that a milestone event in Soviet Afghan rela-
tions v;as recorded last October when top-level talks 
v/ere held in Mascov; during the visit to the USSR of 
General Secretary of the central committee of the peoples 
democratic party of Afghanistan/ Chairman of the Revolu-
tionary Council and Prime Minister of the Democratic 
Repi±)lic of Afghanistan Babrak Karmal,. Discussed during 
Soviet Afghan negotiations were questions pertaining to 
the development of multifarious co-operation between the 
two countries and topical issues in world affairs. This 
was the first foreign visit of a high level Afghan Party 
and governmental delegation after the start of the Second 
stage of the April revolution, 
ROtE OP NON - ALIGNED COUNTRIES 
157, PHADHIS {Umashanker). Misgivings on Cuba's Afghanistan 
moves, Hindustan Times; 1980, Apr 4, 
Information on the proceedings of the co-ordinating 
committee of the non-aligned countries, v;hich has been 
in continuous session in New York, indicate that pressure 
is mounting on Cuba that a plenary meeting should be 
convened of the non-aligned representatives and a resolu-
tion adopted by majority vote on their stand on the 
Afghan issue. An even more delicate task, requiring 
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considerable diplomatic finesse would be to spell out 
remedial measures to ease tensions because this would 
necessarily involve urging the Soviet Union to pull its 
troops out of Afghanistan which most non-aligned coun-
tries regard as a condition precedent for the return of 
status quo anti-Soviet military action in Afghanistan. 
POLITICS 
168. AFGHANISTAN: Mutiny on the batterments. Economist. 
272, 7093; 1979, Aug 11; 53. 
Describes that the growth of a personality cult around 
President Taraki as the father of the revolution and a 
man above politics has allowed him to distance himself 
from the government's more unpopular politics and escape 
the blame which has fallen on his Prime Minister, who 
handles all government business. By taking the defence 
portfolio, Amin consolidated the power over the army which 
he began cultivating in 1967 and 1968 when he was recruit-
ing agents for the Khalq party. But the Russians also 
have their men at all levels in the armed forces; and both 
sides are playing a cat and mouse game. 
ROLE OF KHALQ PARTY 
169. MORE DISCORD in Kabul. Hindu; 1980, Jul 26. 
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There are reports of a mutiny by an armoured division 
which seemed to have demanded a greater role for a 
minister from the Khalq faction. Mr. Taraki was able 
to take over in April 1978 because the armed forces 
acted to remove the Daoud regime and then quickly made 
way for the leftist ideologists. The position of the 
Afghan army is now different because of the presence of 
a large number of Soviet troops. The Soviet policy 
makers are probably working overtime to steem the further 
growth of domestic dissent. The rebels, who are partly 
inspired by Islamic revivalist ideas and an anti-Commu-
nist stance, cannot make common cause with Khalq or 
other disgrunted elements within the ruling party. 
SOVIET INTERVEINTION 
170. AFGiiANlSTAN: Internal Convulsions. Link 22, 22; 1980, 
Jan 6; 25-27. 
Describes that Afghan revolution continues to pass through 
certain internal convulsions* It faced attacks from 
religious fanatics, tribal chiefs, vested landed interest 
and the Monied, who were aided by outside forces. On 
September 1979 the revolution went through a violent 
internal twist when after a gun fight, first Minister 
Hafizullah Amin took over aower and became President of 
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Revolutionary Council and General Secretary of peoples 
Democratic Party in place of Taraki. On December 27 
Karmal came to power through another clash of arms, 
Amin was arrested and executed, A lot of up roar is 
being made by USA and other western powers over the 
presence of Soviet troops. The USSR announced that it 
will withdraw its troops when asked by Afghan government. 
SOVIET lOTERVENTION 
171. AFGHANISTAN: Rules of the fight. Economist 274, 7120; 
1980, Feb 16; 38-43. 
Describes that in the grip of an Afghan winter, the 
Russian invaders have concentrated on keeping open Afgha-
nistan's main circular road andi its two strategic off 
shoots, the supply route between Russia and Kabul through 
the salang pars and the road leading to Pakistan through 
the Khyber pass. The Afghan insurgents have restricted 
themselves to hit and run attacks on Russian lines of 
communication. The Russian may themselves want to replace 
the faithful, friendless Mr, Karmal with somebody capable 
of winning broader support. But they are unlikely to 
risk a political crisis before the spring offensive against 
the guerrillas. Meanwhile they are slowly winning out 
of Afghanistan the western journalists who might report 
the war. 
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172. AMERICA GONE Soft. Ecpnomlst 274, 7114; 1980, Jan 5; 
7-8. 
Foreign policy is not made of such convenient, indivi-
dual arguments to suit the merits of each special case 
as it arises. Russia may indeed become bogged down in 
Afghanistan - if it is sufficiently unnejrved by the 
western allies* strategic actions outside Afghanistan, 
and if, inside the country, the Afghans fighting it are 
given heart, money and arms by the west. The Moslem 
world may indeed recoil from Russia provided it is not 
so terrified by the contrast between America's 1970s 
paralysis and Russia's 1970s conquests that it bolts into 
the arms of Mr. Brezhnev's men out of sheer firight* 
173. ANTIA (S U). Afghanistan and Neutrality. Mainstream 18, 
29; 1980, Mar 15; 6-7, 
Author points out that when Afghanistan erupted in 
December, Last year, subsequent events created an 
ominous impression that two super powers were heading on 
a collision course. This was apparent from the panicky 
over reaction by the west, spearheaded by the USA. 
Foreign Secretary Carrington has put forward a proposal 
before the ECC foreign minister's meeting in Rome for a 
neutral Afghanistan. The Soviet Union, not withstanding 
the proposed concept of neutral Afghanistan. It is willing 
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to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan,v/hen it is fully 
satisfied that American,Chinese and Pakistani inter-
ference is no longer considered imminent, Afghanistan 
must also create necessary conditions for the early 
return of refugees from Pakistan with honour and dignity, 
174. BaiHIBD THE Events in Afghanistan, Patriot; 1980,Jan 2. 
Events in Afghanistan have caused considerable concern 
in India and other parts of the subcontinent. Apprehen-
sion has been voiced over the danger of "Foreign inter-
vention in Afghanistan and a process of destablisation 
gaining further mementum following the recent coup. Some 
of the apprehensions seem to be well founded. The 
situation in the gulf as well as in Iran being what it 
is,the events in Afghanistan would undoubtedly add to 
the uncertainties of the south v/est Asian scene. It v/omld 
be appropriate to view the situation calmly in the 
perspective of India's national interest and not get 
swayed by sudden moral indignation over the induction of 
foreign troops in a neighbouring countiry, 
175. POUR YEARS after. Times of India; 1983,Dec 29, 
Pour years ago the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 
order to replace the Hafizullah Amin regime and push back 
resistance forces who seemed than to be gaining the 
upper hand. If this v;as the operational motive,- the 
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declared aim uas to preserve the social and economic 
gains of the progressive 1978 saur revolution. The 
Soviets are, militarily speaking, on top. If in the 
early period they had to pour in over 100,000 troops 
to pacify the country, they are now using less than 
one-fifth the number - between 12,000 and 15,000 to 
fight the Afghan insurgents. 
176. JOSHI (B K), Invasion of Kabul marks end of East-West 
detente. Times of India; 1980, Jun 20, 
The motivation for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
was complex. Among the reasons, it listed deep Soviet 
concern at the borders, the growing domestic oppositions 
to a regime to which the Soviet were giving ideological, 
economic and military support and the threat of unrest 
spreading to their territory from Iran, The survey 
said that the' invasion of Afghanistan, thus seemed to 
mark the end of the east west detente that had begun a 
decade earlier, 
177, MI-TRA (Samar), Curtain Unveiled: An Insight into 
Afghanistan, Radical Htimanist 46, 12; 1982, March; 35-36, 
Describes that the recent happenings in Afghanistan and 
Kampuchea as they have unfolded themselves through con-
temporary events. The major focus on Afghanistan is in 
connection with the Russian occupation which took place 
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in recent times. The author believes that After the 
occupation of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has stolen 
a March in its bold bid for the global strategy. It 
will be easy for Soviet Russia to advance towards Iran 
on the west and Pakistan on the east, Accordingto the 
author, the Soviet Union will thus be able to encircle 
Saudi Arabia, the main nerve centre of the oil supply 
to western countries. 
178. TOWARDS A Disaster. Times of India; 1980, Feb 28. 
Describes that the bloody upheaval in Kabul has settled 
several debatable points. It has proved that the Afghan 
people hate the Soviet occupation forces almost to a 
man, that thousands of them are prepared to make the 
ultimate sacrifice in their desperate bid to regain 
their freedom, that the Russians have failed to cow them 
down with the massive display of their military prowess 
and that Mr. Karmal has failed to make himself and his 
Soviet allies even faintly acceptable to his countrymen, 
179. WOO.LLACOTT (Martin). Afghans find national identity. 
Indian Express 1980, Aug 8, 
Describes that the great irony of the Russian occupation 
of Afghanistan is that it has consolidated the identity 
of a nation which hardly existed in any full sense before 
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December 21, 1979. In the 100 years or so since 
British manipulation created an Afghan state, the un-
easy conglomeration of peoples within its artificial 
boundaries has never attained any degree of unity. It 
has taken Russian intervention to give them that. As 
Babrak Karmal tries to bear down on his own rivals 
within the ruling peoples democratic party he is runn-
ing head on into the new facts of Afghan nationalism, 
SOVIET INTERVEIOTION, AFGHAN RESISTANCE 
180, AFGHAN CRISIS. National Herald 1980, Jun 20, 
Analyses that the situation in Afghanistan seems to 
have deteriorated further with the Babrak Karmal regime 
facing increased rebel activity. The rebels are, armed 
with modern weapons and these could only have been pro-
cured from foreign suppliers. The refugee groups based 
in Pakistan are said to constitute the hard core of the 
guerrilla force. Apparently there is already consider-
able foreign intervention in Afghanistan, The Soviet 
Union has repeatedly affirmed its v/illingness to v/ith-
draw troops once a political settlement is reached. 
The author says thus the need to find a political solu-
tion to the Afghan problems has acquired added urgency. 
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181, AFGHAN LIBERATION Struggle is one of the world's 
v/eakest. Times; 1980, Jul 12. 
A close look at the Afghan resistance movement leads 
to two broad conclusions. The first is that it is 
an extremely popular movement supported by the mass of 
the population. It is not manpower that they lack, 
it is weapons. The second conclusion is that as far as 
leadership organization and co-ordination is concerned, 
the Afghan movement is one of the weakest liberation 
struggles of the contemporary world. For a specialist 
of movements of national liberation and armed struggles 
of the third world, Afghanistan stands out as an excep-
tion. 
182, CHOPRA (Ashok), Russians v/ill stay on in Afghanistan, 
Hindustan Times; 1980 Jul 4. 
Inspite of the world wide condemnation and a small 
withdrawal of troops, a blow hot, blow cold civilian 
resistance from the Afghan rebels coupled with the repor-
ted heavy losses to its troops, the Soviet Union is 
fully entrenched in Afghanistan, famous for its dare -
devil and violent sport of Buzkashi, Whether Afghanis-
tan has become a Vietnam for Russia, as is now being 
widely felt in diplomatic circles in New Delhi, is I 
think a question open to debate and to v/hich only time 
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can provide an answer, Russians have stuck on and now 
they have to stick on despite all pressures, both 
internal and external. There is no other way out, 
183. DEEPENING CRISIS. Naqpur Times; 1980, Aug 26, 
Describes that inspite of stiff reprisals against them 
by the Soviet troops, the Afghan guerrillas have stepped 
up their resistance to the puppet Karmal government to 
such an alarming extent that it may not be possible for 
Russia to puti out of Afghanistan its 80,000 strong army. 
Most of the foreign diplomats in Kabul believe that the 
Russian intervention may last long as ten years and the 
Soviet force in Afghanistan may rise upto 4,00000 troops 
in time to came. It is not possible for Russia any 
more to get out of Afghanistan with good grace. It must 
stay there waiting for some misraculous solution to the 
impasse, 
184, FUIiiERTON (John), Afghanistan? A redoubtable redoubt. 
Far Eastern Economic Review 117, 27; 1982, Jul 2; 38. 
Analyses that the details are emerging of the battle for 
the Panjsher Valley, v;hich may well turn out to have 
been the most significant military development so far 
in Afghanistan's four year old war and some thing of a 
turning point in the struggle between guerrillas opposing 
President Babrak Karmal's government in Kabul and the 
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Soviet and Afghan security forces. Panjsher is a 
neutral redoubt about 100 kms, north of Kabul, a 
steep, narrow valley with a gorge which provides 
access at its southern most end. It has become a 
symbol for the Afghan resi§t§hce because it threatens 
Kabul itself, 
185. HOW EFPSCTIVE is Afghan Resistance? Hindu; 1980, Jul 12. 
Describes that with the Soviet occupation of Afghanis-
tan now six months old, it has become increasingly 
difficult to piece together a reliable picture of poli-
tical events from the deluge of eyewitness accounts, 
rumours and unconfirmed reports that emerge from this 
war wracked desert nation. It says that to quell the 
demonstrations, troops, tanks and helicopters were 
called in more than 100 persons, mainly school children 
and students have been killed. Hundreds had to be 
hospitalised urban resistance operations appears to have 
pron5>ted serious worry among the Soviets about their 
hold on the towns, 
AID TO REBELS 
186. SHEN YUQIANG and CHEN MOUHUA, Afghan resistance groups 
on political solution. Beijing Review 24, 9; 1981, 
Mar 2; 23-24, 
Describes that Afghan resistance groups lead us to believe 
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that, minor differences exist in their attitude towards 
a political settlement. All the resistance groups 
stress the need to beware of Soviet attempts to induce 
countries concerned into recognizing the Babrak Karmal 
through a Soviet inspired political solution. They 
also stress that the Soviet Union must pull all its 
troops out of Afghanistan, Representatives of the resis-
tance groups points out that as the Afghan issue is the 
result of Soviet military intervention/ the best, and 
infact, the only solution is for the Soviet troops to 
quit Afghanistan. Soviet withdrawl is a primary condi-
tion for a political settlement. At the same time they 
v/ant the v/orld to apply pressure on the Soviet Union to 
get it to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and 
leave the Afghan people free to solve their problems, 
AID TO REBELS 
187. STUCK IN Afghanistan. Economist 275, 7131; 1980, Jun 14; 
13-14. 
Discusses that the Russians are in v/idening and deepen-
ing trouble in Afghanistan. Widening, as the rebels 
take their hit and run v/ar against the invaders from 
the Iranian border to the Pakistani one, and into the 
capital, Kabul. There are dangers in increasing arms 
aid to the rebels much beyond the present admirable 
144 
bound of discretion. It could turn Afghanistan 
into v/hat has already in accurately, been described 
as a proxy war between the super powers, and thus 
diminish support for an anti-Soviet stand among 
non-aligned and Moslem countries. The Russians and 
their clients are not the only parties to the Afghan 
dispute unready for serious negotiations. The rebels 
too need reminding that, unless they can provide a 
political alternative, they will lose the war, 
AMERICAN REACTION 
188. SENGUPTA (Bhabani) , Red star over Kabul: US gdiobalism, 
India's regionalism. Amrit Bazar Patrika; 1980, Feb 9. 
The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan is 
something new in Mascow's relations with the outside 
world; for the first time since world war II, Soviet 
troops have been sent outside the frontiers of the 
socialist bloc. But the American response to the Soviet 
action has had little new about it so far. By and large, 
it is the same old military response of the cold war. 
President Garter has pitted American globalism against 
what he perceives, rightly or wrongly as the emerging 
globalism of the USSR. The Yawning gap between the US 
response and the Indian reaction to the Afghan crisis 
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stems from the wide divide between American globa-
lism and India's regionalism, 
AMIN's REGIME 
189. TASKER (Rodney). Hard line Amin treads softly. 
Far Eastern Economic Review 106, 40; 1979, Oct 5; 
10-12. 
Describes that the Soviets had sponsored Taraki's 
regime from the start, and Leonid Brezhn'ev had warmly 
assured him of continued support when he passed through 
MasGow on his way back to Kabul from the non-aligned 
summit in Havana. Many informed observers in Kabul 
believe that the Soviets were caught as much on the 
hop as any one else by Amin's takeover. Whatever the 
threat to Amin's survival as President, he does apparen-
tly command the loyalty of the Kabul garrison, even 
though the army officer-corps has been some what demo-
ralised by successive purges and some defections to 
the insurgents, About one third to half of the army is 
based in and around Kabul, 
ANALYSIS 
190, ALI (Salamat). Accepting the limits of aid. Far 
Eastern Economic review 105, 35; 1979, Aug 31; 27-28, 
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Describes that any Afghan who ignores Russian support 
to his country cannot be a patriot. The analyst, 
however, differ slightly on how far the Soviets would 
go to perpetuate the status quo. Some have no doubt 
that Soviet forces will come rolling across the 
border if necessary. Others believe that the Soviets 
care more for the salt-2 spirit of detente and do not 
want to prejudice their chances east and south of 
Afghanistan, where the situation is delicately balanced. 
Whatever Mascow's response to a given situation in the 
foreseeable future, every one agrees that it will 
retain its dominant role in Kabul and, some add, it 
will sustain leftist rule even if it is not of the 
Taraki-Amin variety, 
191. BERINDRANATH (Dewan). Afghanistan: Issues and non 
issues. Mainstream 18, 20; 1980, Jan 12; 7-8 .' 
Author analysis that interference by one country in the 
affairs of another is to be regretted and condemned. 
Par more regrettable and reprehensible would be direct 
military intervention by a neighbouring super pov/er in 
a smaller and v/eaker country. Socialism can not be 
built in any country on the basis of the military might 
of a foreign power, India owes it to its own needs of 
defence and territorial integrity to demand complete 
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guarantee for peace, non-alignment and non-interfer-
ence in the south Asian region from all the foreign 
countries. Only through this regional approach we hope 
to provide a firm basis for security, peace and terri-
torial integrity for all the countries of the world. 
192. BOSE (Pradip). Political turmoil in Afghanistan. 
Janata 34, 32; 1979, Sept 30; 7-8. 
Author describes that in Afghanistan every thing is 
kept in such tight secrecy that no body knows v/hat is 
actually happening and why,. There are only whispers 
among the diplomatic circles in Kabul. But one thing 
is quite clear there are major convulsions in the ruling 
Khalq party of Afghanistan, There has been a lot of 
speculation about the Russian attitude towards the coop. 
Even more dangerous have been the desertions from and 
mutinies in the armed forces. The one in Kabul itself 
sometime ago attracted world wide attention. Popular 
hatred against the Russians is being aroused and already 
about 100 Russians have been killed. Political insta-
bility in the Kabul regime has started. The rebels and 
thttr backers must be happy that they have been able to 
make the first dent in the ruling Khalq Party by waging 
the guerrilla v/arfare for nearly a year. 
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193. CHOPRA (Pran). Russian Compulsions in Kabul, 
Illustrated Weekly of India lOl, 21; 1980, May 25; 
19-21. 
Author describes that Babur, a great grandson of 
Tiraur, Babur's life span delineates a historical, 
cultural, religions and geographical bridge which 
linlcs the Islamic Soviet central Asia with Afghanis-
tan and beyond that with Pakistan and the Indo Gangetic 
plain. At the root of current history is the thorny 
questions what will travel over this bridge in which 
direction and who will control the traffic? Will 
Russians influence the power travel southwards. Both 
Russia and America and aware of this questions each 
also knows as Babur knew - that the key to the trafic 
on this bridge lies in gaining influence among the 
niimerous ethnic, cultural and warring groups which are , 
strung out along it. The author argues that this is 
the single most compelling reason for the fundan^ntal 
insistence that it will not allow a regime hostile to 
it to be set up in Kabul. 
194. RAO (R H K). Afghan issues Its cause and effect. 
National Herald 1983, Jul 30. 
Author indicates that For at least three years now 
Afghanistan has been the focal point of concern in the 
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Asian region for reasons not far to seek. The 
problem here as in some other parts of the world is 
one of foreign interference and intervention and of 
aiding and abetting those working against the estab-
lished regimes there. Such undue interest shown by 
some in the affairs of another country is the root of 
troiibles afflicting the region the manifestation of 
which is for any one to see in Afghanistan. What is 
behind the trouble, it has been aptly put by the 
Afghan Prime Minister when he recently observed that 
the presence of limited Soviet troops in Afghanistan 
is the result of outside intervention and not the cause. 
195, SHETH (V £ ) , Persian gulf and the Soviet intervention 
in Afghanistan, Janata 35, 27; 1980 August; 29-30. 
Describes that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan 
has upset the balance of power in the Persian Gulf 
which was nitherto maintained by the conservative influ-
ence of Saudi Arabia and Iran. This has happened at 
at the time when the competition between local and 
western oil interests has touched a new height. The 
gulf countries are incapable of defending their oil 
interests alone against the combined political and mili-
tary threat posed by the presence of a super power such 
as the Soviet Union. The Soviet interests in the 
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Persian Gulf region are strategic and political 
rather than economic largely. 
196. SOVIET OCCUPATION Of Afghanistan. Commerce 1980, 
Jan 12; 5, 
The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan marks a qualita-
tive change in the power equilibri-um in Asia* and with 
the US decision to arm Pakistan by v/ay of relation 
against the Soviet Union, brings the cold war on the 
door step in India. The action of Soviet government 
is far from easy to understand. The Soviet Union has 
an interest in maintaining friendly relations with 
that country. The Soviet troops had entered Afghanis-
tan in response to an appeal from the government of 
Afghanistan would not hold water. The shift in the 
position of the government of India to the Soviet occu-
pation of Afghanistan is some thing which is not easily 
understood. 
CRITieiSM 
197, FERCSEY (Juan), Afghanistan - A Soviet Vietnam. 
Radiance views weekly 15, 19; 1979, Sept 23; 4. 
Describes that Afghanistan in perhaps the vrorst failure 
of the Soviet strategy planners. Last year when the 
•Arc of crisis began to slide, the Russian decided to 
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seize Afghanistan, On April 27, 1978, President 
Sardar Mohammad Daoud was murdered and Nur Mohammad 
Taraki established a Marxist regime. The Soviet 
Union sent 4,000 military and civil advisers to Afgha-
nistan, Modern tanks. Jet fighters and helicopter 
gunships and last December, signed a treaty of friend-
ship and co-operation with t Taraki, The Soviet lea-
ders have not studied carefully enough the story of the 
Khybar pass and the British military experiences in 
this country where time seems to have stopped in the 
middle ages, 
198, TIDES TURN in Afghanistan. Radiance views weekly 
15 15, 7; 1979, Jul 1; 1. 
Describes that the President strife in Afghanistan, 
on second thoughts is therefore a blessing in disguise 
for the Muslim neighbours. Which ever government will 
emerge out of the civil war it will put an end to the 
communist game in Baluchistan, The next Afghanistan 
will turn the south west Asia into a zone of peace which 
"Soviet East" will also very much like to import. And 
with that the Russian will lose every thing they have 
strived for in the area. The injuries the Russian have 
to sustain in Afghanistan war may in the long run prove 
quite fatal for them as a colonial power. They know 
this and they are afraid of it. 
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E.E.G. PROPOSAL 
199, NOORANI (AG). Neutralising Afghanistan. Indian 
Express 1980, Mar 13. 
with the formal presentation to the Soviet Ambassador 
in London on Feb, 28 of the outlines of a proposal for 
a "neutral and non-aligned" Afghanistan,:: adopted 
nine days earlier by E.E.C's foreign ministers, an 
important initiative has been taken for a solution of 
the problem. It bids fair to be the central point of 
of diplomatic activity on the issue in the corning days. 
The proposal envisages the neutr'alization -of Afghanis-
tan under international guarantees in return for the 
withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the country, 
HISTORY 
200. GUJRfiL {I K), Soviet Union: Securing the Flank. 
World Focus 5, 4; 1984, April; 13-17, 
At the close of 18th century and the begining of 19th 
century, Afghanistan witnessed a series of coups and 
civil wars. In the remaining part of the 19th century 
till the second Afghan war in 1899, the entire geopoli-
tical reality of the region under went major changes. 
During the same period important events were taking 
place. The Russian diplomacy in Kabul was never inactive, 
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According to him the first great war had changed 
every thing. The Soviet stay in Afghanistan cannot 
be viewed in isolation. Unless the major powers 
conclude an agreement for withdrawal from the entire 
Indian ocean region, the Soviets have to continue the 
process of their consolidation in Afghanistan. 
201, MANZAR (Abdul Moiz). Soviet Predicament in Afghanis-
tan. Radiance views weekly 17, 11-12; 1981, Aug 2; 
21-2. 
Describes that Afghanistan was thetr latest target in • 
in the east after World War II, Now only Pakistan and 
Iran stand in the way of Soviet ambitions in the region 
should try to release the seriousness of the peril and 
pool their energies and resources, forgetting their 
petty squabbles to face the lurking danger from outside 
and inside. War of freedom, of individual liberty of 
traditionally cherished values of historic cultures, of 
freedom and non-aligned, of Islam and communism has to 
be fought as close to the Soviet borders as possible. 
If Afghans are sxobdued for how long will other Muslim 
or Asian or African countries retain their freedom. 
202, MOHAN RAM, Anatomy of the Afghan stalemate. Indian 
Express 1982, Jan 28, 
Author says that the Soviet predicament in Afghanistan 
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resulting from the military stalemate reflecting a 
political stalemate, has its origin in the character 
of the sour revolution 1978, as the Communist take 
over is called. The Soviet-backed coup on December 
27, 1979 which installed the Babrak Karmal government 
is described as the begining of the new phase of the 
saur revolution. The author points out that the April 
1978 revolution was no more than a coup, the culmina-
tion of a series of accidents rather than the result 
of any known method of Communist revolution. 
203. SETHI (Anita). Russian loot of Afghanistan. Organiser 
33, 8; 1981, Jul 12; 9. 
Describes that on April 27, 1981 the third Communist 
President of Afghanistan celebrated the third anniver-
sary of Communist takeover. Thus the revolution devours 
Taraki, the man who led the bloody caup was overthrown 
and murdered. The same thing happened to his successor, 
Hafizullah ^min on December 1979, when the Soviet invasion 
troops entered Kabul, Babrak Karmal claimed that the 
great mass of Muslim the world over support the Afghan 
revolution, Afghanistan has become even more isolated 
from the rest of the Arab world recently, Saudi Arabia 
broke off diplomatic relations with Kabul, In Afghan 
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provinces villages are being destroyed, wells pollu-
ted animals killed, Soviet troops burned down the 
mosque with valuable copies of Koran and other reli-
gions text, 
204, UNQUIET KABUL. Amrit Bazar Patrika 1979, Apr 1. 
All is not well inside Afghanistan. The extent of the 
anti-government movement may be gauged by the fact that 
in early January, when troops tried to crush a revolt 
in Afghanistan central province of Urozgan, 700 soldiers 
and 160 people opposed to the government were killed. 
This was followed by another spate of severe clashes 
between government forces and 8,000 Muslim rebels about 
45 kms, north of Kabul, Reports also claim that the 
Taraki government has sent out as many as 6,000 soldiers 
to the Soviet Union for guerrilla training. While these 
reports cannot be properly verified it can atleast be 
said that Mr, Taraki has failed to consolidate his poli-
tical power, 
INDIA'S ROLE 
205, ANTIA (S N ) . Afghanistan crisis and India's stakes. 
Mainstream 18, 24; 1980, Feb 9; 5-7, 
Describes that the Soviet Union's political and military 
intervention in Afghanistan has caused turmoil and 
anxiety in the west. India's initial reaction to Soviet 
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intervention was made known in the United nations -
that India accepted the Soviet assurance that Soviet 
troops were in Afghanistan only at the request of 
Karmal government. He points out that we must face 
the present crisis in Afghanistan and the proposal to 
massively reason Pakistan with equanimity as a mature 
nation, yet we must act with speed resolution and fore-
sightedness keeping in view the future political and 
military perspectives, 
INDO-PAK DISCUSSION 
206. NO COMMON Approach, Times of India 1980, Feb 8, 
The first official level talks between India and Pakis-
tan in the wake of the Soviet takeover in AfghaniiJtan 
have gone off reasonably well. These have enabled the 
two governments to appreciate each other's anxieties 
and perspectives and possible ways for further discussions, 
But the talks have not produced a common approach to 
the problems arising out of the Soviet action in Afgha-
nistan, Indeed they were not even expected to. 
KARMAL REGIME 
207. BABRAK»S NEW Thrust. Link 22, 49; 1980, Jul 13; 11-12. 
Describes that Karmal regime is not only engaged in 
rectifying these mistakes but is also trying to erase 
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the impression from the minds of the people that the 
era of Amin's dictatorial methods of running the adminis-* 
tration had come to an end. One of the most important 
facets of the new effort for consolidating and widening 
the base of the regime is that Karmal is trying to v/in 
over a section of religious heads of various tribes, who 
have no vested interests in land. There is no doubt that 
the Afghan revolution did not have a strong and stable 
organisation and the progressive forces in this country 
too were divided till recently. Afghan revolution v/hich 
has struck a mortal fear not only among the ruling circles 
of the U,S,A,, China and Pakistan but also among all the 
conservative regimes of this region, 
208. CHAKRAVARTTY (Sumit), Afghan Reality. Mainstream 21, 
35; 1983, Apr 30; 33-34. 
Points out that Karmal government's improved position in 
the military field is.best revealed from the fact that 
out of 295 district headquarters, Afghan and Soviet 
soldiers are currently in effective control over 211 of 
them, while in rest a see-saw battle is raging, Without 
entry of Soviet troops this development v^ ould not have 
been possible, A major task in a country suffering 
from back-breaking poverty and ignorance is to launch a 
crusade against illiteracy. UK^SGO and Ul-.'ICEF are still 
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providing financial aid to Afghanistan, Author 
concludes that the present government is conducting 
negotiations with several groups in different areas. 
209, CHAKRAVARTTY (Sumit). Social Reforms: Praise worthy 
performance. World Focus 5, 4; 1984, April; 22-25. 
Author says that the face of Afghanistan is undergoing 
a radical change through the efforts of its enlight-
ened revolutionary leaders. The large scale and extra 
ordinary interference in Afghanistan's affairs has not 
been able to thwart the change. Indeed a new Afghanis-
tan is emerging out of the .trails and tribulations the 
country is passing through. The Karmal government 
deserves praise for successfully carrying out such a 
transformation, of course with the generous aid and 
unstinted support of Afghanistan's northern neighbour -
the USSR - whose own breath taking progress from one of 
the most backward countries of the world has become a 
legend of the 20th century, 
210, FUIjiERTON (John). Afghanistan: The blood feud goes 
on. Far Eastern Economic Review 115, 13; 1982, Mar 26; 
40, 
Last week's national conference of Afghanistan's ruling 
People's Democratic Party has failed to produce an 
instant solution to the quarrel between the rival Parcham 
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and Khalq factions which has often sparked violent 
u 
fending. The Parchamite group is smaller of the two, 
but it dominates the Soviet backed government headed 
by President Babrak Karmal, leader of the Parchamites, 
A unified guerrilla movement could certainly have been 
justified in making greater play of the divisions 
within the People's Democratic Party, From time to 
time local guerrilla commanders have exploited Khalq 
disenchantment with Karmal's revolution/ but the resis-
tance remains as divided as the pov/er it opposes, 
211, GROWING RESISTANCE, Economic and political Weekly 16 
15, 31; 1980, Aug 2? 1289-90. 
The succession of recent events in Afghanistan has once 
again belied the claims that the Karmal regime in Kabul 
enjoys popular support. In the face of this mounting 
popular resistance, the ruling party has become embroit-ed 
in an internal factional struggle for power, with the 
Khalq faction coming under attack by the Karmalites. 
Consequently it is difficult to believe that the Russians 
can afford to withdraw their troops, which would mean 
that Karmal regime will not be able to remain in power. 
The solution of the Afghan crisis must incorporate 
Russian interests is to legitimise intervention by super 
powers or big states in the Affairs of small countries 
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like Afghanistan. In the mean-time the tragic loss 
of Afghan lives continues. 
212. PACIFIC KABUL. Patriot; 1980, Jul 1, 
Eve». since the adventurist regime of Hafizullah Amin 
was overthrown President Babrak Karmal has been trying 
to promote reconciliation of all national democratic 
sections. The process could have been accelerated with 
good result but-for the concerted interference by the 
U.S. and China with active support from Pakistan. 
However, Mr. Karmal has registered considerable progress 
in his efforts to win over many suspicious and reluctant 
sections of influential people in the country. The 
withdrawal of a division of Soviet troops from Afghanis-
tan showed that there was a notable improvement inside 
the country. 
213. SINGH C J D ) . Karmal»s steps to woo the faithful. 
Times of India 1980, Feb 1. 
The anxiety of Mr. Babrak Karmal's government to acquire 
a popular base is reflected in a series of measures it 
has taken since it came to power in a coup of December 
27. Besides the in born hatred of Afghanistan's over-
whelmingly Muslim population against communism which 
they regard as an enemy of Islam, the catapulating of 
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of Mr, Karmal into the office of president and 
Prime Minister at Soviet behest has gravely prejudiced 
them against the new government in Kabul. Mr. Karmal 
has devised a strategy to win over the alienated Muslim 
masses to his side by such measures as his willingness 
to change the colour and form of the national flag. 
KARMAL REGIME, REFORMS 
214. STABILISATION THEME. Link 23, 22; 1981, Jan 11; 8-10. 
Kabul and other cities in Afghanistan indicate that the 
markets are full of goods and business is as usual. It 
is largely to weather conditions that Afghans owe good 
fruit, vegetable and agricultural crops this years. 
But Karmal government also deserves credit for making 
it possible for harvesting and marketing. Steps have 
been taken since the April revolution to organise the 
conpet weaver's c-operatives and inprove the quality of 
their products. The government is paying special atten-
tion to agricultural development. Industrial programme 
has helped the government to stablise. There are efforts 
to build up unity among youth and woraens organisations. 
MILITARY ACTION 
215. NAYAR { Kuldip). Will Soviet troops withdraw? Indian 
Express 1980, Feb 13. 
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Did the Russian troops come only to remove Amin? 
There is no doxibt that the he was not a popular presi-
dent. But then popularity in this part of the world 
has seldom weighed the scales in any one's favour, just 
as the lack of it has not done so against him. There 
are elements in the ruling pro-Soviet Parcham who want 
the Soviets to fix a dead line for withdrawal. Some 
non-Parcham ministers in the cabinet, aiso support this 
line but Mr, Karmal is opposed to it; they do not 
feel safe, internally and externally without Soviet 
presence, 
MliilTARY PROBLEM 
216. OWEN (Richard). Increasing privation of Russians in 
Afghanistan. Statesman 1984, Mar 20, 
Author says that life for Soviet soldiers in Afghanis-
tan has never been easy, but resentments are now begininc 
to simmer after more than four years of occupation. 
The 105,000 strong "limited contingent" which went into 
Afghanistan in 1979 has suffered hardship and privation. 
The struggle against counter revolutionaries and in5)eria-
list bandits. Troops are rotated but even so-conditions 
in Afghanistan come as a shock to Russia's young sol-
diers, many of them no more than raw recruits. 
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MILITARY STRATEGY 
217. SOVIET DESIGNS, Times of India 1980, Jan 1. 
Describes that it is clear from the nature of the 
Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan that the 
Russians are determined to tighten their hoid ^ 
on that country in order to bring it firmly within the 
Soviet orbit of influence. The Russians appear to 
have two choices. They can launch a full-scale offen-
sive against the rebels in an attempt to crush them 
once and for all, or they can through the local leaders 
they have put into office, seek an accommodation of 
some kind with the dissidents. The former could lead 
them straight into a Vietaam type quagwire, the later 
they seem most unlikely to accomplish, even if they 
attenpt it. Either way Afghanistan is still some way 
from becoming a captive Soviet satellite. 
WITHDRAWAL 
218. WITHDRAWAL AT a price. Times of Hidia 1984, Jan 13. 
Pakistani officials have confirmed that early last year 
the Soviets dropped a hint that they would be willing to 
withdraw their troops from Afghanistan in 18 months 
provided Islamabad in turn closed its border and stopped 
the infiltration of arms and men into that neighbouring 
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country. It only raises questions; it does not settle 
anything. To bedfin with, if the Soviets were really 
serious, why they did not purpue the hint and table it 
as a proposal in the sxxbsequent talks with Pakistan 
under XJ,N, auspices? Also, how could the Soviets possi-
bly convince themselves the Pakistan could effectively 
seal the border even if it so desired, 
PIAN 
219. KOTRU (ML), E.E,G, Plan offers a way out in Afghan 
crisis. Statesman; 1981, Jul 2, 
Describes the extent of severe losses inflicted on the 
Russians by the freedom fighters in recent months may 
make the British leader's t.ask slightly less difficult 
in so far as the E,E.C proposals do.have in them an 
element which could help Russians to devise a face -
saving formula. This is not to suggest that the Russians 
are going to accept the formula. Nor that the other 
concerned parties would accept any thing that falls short 
of unconditional Russian withdrawal accompanied, of 
course there v/ould be no external interference by any 
other power or country in the internal affairs of 
Afghanistan after the Russian exit. As it is, world wide 
pressure on the Russians to vacate their aggression in 
Afghanistan, 
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MII.ITARY WITHDRAWAL. POSSIBIKLTY 
220. SOVIET HINTS. Times of India 1980, Feb 13. 
Describes that the Soviet Union has dropped hints that 
it may be willing to withdraw its troops from Afghanis-
tan in the near future in case the United States and 
China are prepared to take steps to reduce tensions in 
the area. The present situation can end in the near 
future unless the twocountries try to escalate it. U.S. 
officials have not attached much significance to these 
hints. They are said to believe that the Soviet Union 
has moved troops far in excess of its requirements in 
Afghanistan, that it can afford to withdraw some of 
these without in any way adversely effecting its effec-
tive strength in that country and that it will perhaps 
do so in order to meet international criticism, 
OLYMPIC BOYCOTT 
221. SPIRIT OP Rebellion. Magpur Times 1980, Jul 11. 
Describes that how strong is the Afghan people's resent-
ment against the Russian occupation of their country 
is reflected in the defection of Afghanistan's Olympic 
V 
team members to Pakistan, Several members of as many 
as four Afghanistan's Olympic contingents should sacri-
fice a prestigious free trip to Mascow is an occurrence 
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that speaks for itself. Of course Afghanistan is far 
low in C '• Olympic rating but that the spirit of 
rebellion against repression triumphs over all hurdles 
ia illustrated by the action of Afghanistan's top 
sportsmen, who, going through a perilous course of 
defection have saved their conscience and won personal 
liberty, 
POLITICAL DEVELOPFiENT 
222. INSIDE AFGHANISTAiNf. Illustrated Weekly of India 102, 
28; 1981, Sept 13; 27. 
Describes that in 1973 Mohammad Daoud overdraw his 
cousin Afghanistan's king Zahir Shah, and proclaimed a 
republic. He nationalised banks, initiated land reforms 
and imposed direct taxation. He also invited Russians 
to train and arm the Afghan armed forces, Daoud tried 
to counter balance Soviet aid with Arab and Western 
assistance. The death of a pro-Soviet Afghan intellec-
tual on April 17, 1978, sparked communist riots in 
Kabul. Daoud ordered the communist leaders placed under 
house arrest. These leaders, fearing a purgo, initiated 
a coup. On December 27 Karmal reported that Amin was 
dead and that, on the basis of friendship treaty, he had 
invited Soviet troops to assist the government against 
foreign interventionists. 
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POLITIGAI. SOLUTION 
223, ABRAHAM (A S). Moves on Afghanistan: Devising a 
realistic initiative. Times of India 1980, Jul 4, 
Author analyses that the Soviets have so far made two 
attappts of sorts to give themselves some room for 
political manoe%«vre. One, routed through the Karmal 
regime which owes its birth and survival to their 
support, called on Iran and Pakistan to talk to Kabul, 
agree to lay off assisting the Afghan insurgents and 
get both super powers to under write such restraint. 
After that the Russians would pull out. The second more 
recent attenpt was a little more substantial in that it 
entailed the withdrawal of several thousand Soviet 
troops and some equipment, 
224. AFGHANISTAN FIGHTING Destablisation, Link 25, 38; 1983, 
May 8; 30-31. 
Describes that the area of Afghanistan makes 655,000 
square km. It has population of 16 million. Mountains 
make 80% with 87% of population living in rural areas 
of which of 22% are nomads. It is inhibited by three 
dozen nationalities and tribes, 85% are illiterate. 
Afghanistan is 31s poorest nation of the world. Since 
1978 April the new Afghan leadership is involved in three 
So«io-econoiaic projects. 
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The first project deals with land reform. The second 
project deals with combating illiteracy. The third 
project deals with that the liberating women does not 
mean banning bride money and ensuring women's right 
to appear in public. While coping with the»e tasks, 
Afghanistan had to face malicious compaigns of slander, 
bitter opposition and terrorism launched by American 
in^erialists and their allies, when Karmal came to 
lead Afghan government. In December 1979 Afghan govern-
ment seized the opportunity to^sk U.S.S.R. for military 
aid. Problem of tension demands a political solution 
and peace. 
225, AFGHANISTAN: Keeping the issue alive. Economic and 
political Weekly 16, 28; 1981 Nov 28; 1927-28. 
Describes that Iran's Deputy Minister, Ahmad Azizi, has 
released the details of Iranian plan for Afghanistan. 
The main points of the plan are: Formation of Islamic 
peace force, withdrawal of Soviet troops repatriation of 
Afghan refugees who have flad to Iran and Pakistan, 
formation of a 30 member Islamic Council and the setting 
up of a constituent assembly. Iran has emphasised that 
withdrawal of Soviet troops is a precondition for any 
solution of the Afghan problem. 
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POLITICS 
226. RAO CChalapati M ) , How far is Kabul. Link 22, 49; 
1980, Jul 13; 10. 
For any problem to be tackled, the basic facts must 
be understood; for any solution, there facts must be 
recognised. The facts about Afghanistan are that her 
securing is vital for Soviet Security, that her indepen-
dence is vital for the whole area, that she must not 
become an anti-Soviet base, that fehe is on the Soviet 
border and not near a U.S. border anywhere, Afghanis-
tan was enveloped by a cold war atmorphere, the Soviet 
Union had to intervene. The present U,^. - Soviet: i 
conflict over Afghanistan is a sequal to the Anglo -
Russian rivalry over Afghanistan in 19th century scram-
ble of powers. Author says that the Soviet case at 
present is that the Karmal regime should be recognised. 
And foreign intervention must be ended, 
PR0BLEI4S 
227. BETTER MANOEUVRING. Magpur Times 1980, Feb 28. 
The impositiosition of martial law and curfew in Kabul 
only heightens the tensions that prevail in parts of 
Afghanistan with vast quantities of Soviet equipment. 
Wow it is to certain that the Soviet presence is not 
limited to a contingent or two, and also that it is 
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paying a high price for maintaining its commitment 
with a friendly government. The' withdrawal will come 
only when other powers assure withdrawal from Afgha-
nistan of their imperialist game. One can only look 
at such a condition, which makes it clear that the 
Soviet Union has been a better manouvrer in playing 
diplomatic and strategic moves. 
REBEL'S MOVEMENT 
228. ROTHSTEIN (Andrew). Afghanistan. Labout Monthly 61; 
1979, January; 299-303. 
The great rebel movement* in Afghanistan. "Thousands 
of fierce tribesmen in revolt grew rapidly to fifty 
thousands of course the Soviet Union has helped in all 
these undertakings, and has warned aggressive neighbours 
not to play with fire. The imperalists and their 
Afghanistan friends and mercenaries have a tougher Job 
today; but they are still trying hard. The struggle is 
taxing the energies of the young Afghan revolution. 
Severely, and Washington obviously hopes that c, it too 
can'do* an Amanulla". 
RETROSPECT 
229. BREAK THE Stalemate. Indian Express 1984, Jan 8. 
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The year ending has ushered in the fifth year of the 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The resistance 
continues with reports of periodic clashes and repri-
sals. Meanwhile, nearly three million refugees conti-
nue to live in Pakistan and another estimated million 
in Iran, India can play a positive role by promoting 
better relations with Pakistan and serving as a bridge 
between that country and both Kabul and Mascow. The 
Afghan question should not be allowed to remain a fac-
tor in the on-going super power confrontation, A stale-
mate is not in Indiia's interest, 
SAUR REVOLUTION 
230. ABRAHAM (A S ) , Afghanistan in turmoil: perils of 
imposing Soviet change. Times of India; 1979, Nov 2 
Afghanistan is a fine kettle of Malodorous fish. The 
great saur revolution of 1978 has todate, accomplished 
little but anarchy and bloodshed. There is a moral 
here for the third world. Social change can come gradua-
ally through the pressure of an increasingly aware 
populace. In Afghanistan, the Khalq's have ruled out 
gradualism, but they cannot wield the force that the 
brutal imposition of Social change necessitates. So, 
for the foreseeable future, Afghanistan must continue 
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its bloody and directionless course, 
231. AFGHANISTAN'S REVOLUTIONARY Success. Link 22, 5; 
1979, Sep 9; 31-33. 
Discusses that the first phase of land reforms has 
been completed with 1.5 million acres of land distri-
buted to over 250,000 peasents. Active steps have 
been taken to eradicate illiteracy. Afghan revolution 
and its Architects have won unstinted support of the 
overwhelming majority of population. USSR is supplying 
military hardware and experts to enable them to repulse 
external militgiry intervention is being delibrately 
missed. Afghan leaders are also trying to eliminate 
existing tension. Thus they have sent invitations to 
Pakistani and Iranian leaders to come for discussions 
to settle the current conflict, sour revolution have 
indeed achieved major successes, 
232. CHAKKAVARTTY (Sumit). Spirit of Afghan revolution. 
Mainstream 18, 1-6; 1979, 163-64. 
The author says that the revolution today has a pure and 
sin5)le meaning for the Afghan woman, the significance 
of which is more striking then all the theoritical 
treatises and ideological explanations. The western 
media experts speak different. Author proves that the 
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saur revolution has provided real emaniipation to the 
to the toilers constituting the overwhelming bulk of 
the populace. And that is why they are totaly united, 
unswervingly resolved to defend the revolution. Author 
says that it is necessary to identify ourselves wholly 
with the spirit of that revolution which holds great 
promise for Asian progress, 
233, CHANGES IN Afghanistan. Link 22, 10; 1979, Oct 14; 26. 
Describes that what ever might have been the intitial 
misgivings about the future course of saur revolution 
following the ouster of Noor Mohammad Taraki as the 
General Secretary of the peoples Democratic Party and 
President of Afghan Revolutionary Council, the unfold-
ing events show that successor Hafizullah Amin is deter-
mined to carry the country forward along the path of 
revolutionary advance with renewed vigour, Amin has 
resolved to ractify all the errors conected with the 
violation of the norms of socialist legality under Taraki, 
The new regime create a favourable atmosphere under 
which every body could defend his rights and liberties 
and have equal opportunities before the court of law. 
Amin pointed to the development of Soviet Afghan friend-
ship into the phase of brotherhood. 
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234. EXPLOITING THE Exploiters. Link 25, 48; 1983, Jul 10; 
25. 
Proclaims saur revolution as the restoration of indepen-
dence in Afghanistdn analysis the struggle in its 
economic, political and sociological perspectives prints 
out that the counter revolutionary forces are damaging 
new Afghan society, which is based on Socialist oriented 
economic foundations. Pakistan v/hich claims to be as 
defender and benefactor of refugees, is patronizing the 
Afghans. Fuss is at behest of vested interest who to 
get financial, political and military dividedds out of 
it with the facit consent of Pakistani authorities, 
these leaders delay registration of refugees who, without 
their registration cards are uhable to procure essential 
articles. Congequently, they are forced to theft and 
robbery. Pakistani officials are making huge profits 
by plundering Afghan refugees of their two billion U.S. 
dollors aid. Proves that the misappropriation of large 
part of aid if Pakistan's main aim in using the Afghan 
problem, 
235, MOHAN RAM. Rocky revolution. Economic and Political 
Weekly 1980, Jan 19; 101-2. 
Afghanistan's saur revolution called so after the month 
of its occurrence, is now about 20 months old. The 
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peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan, for all 
purposes founded as recently as in January 1965, 
splintered into four in the next six years or so. But 
two of them which constituted the bulk of the Afghan 
Communist movement are committed to a national democra-
tic revolution which isth the classical Soviet prescrip-
tion for newly free third world countries. Nothing 
efifends the Afghan's pride more than the presence of 
foreign troops. 
236. NEGARAN (Hannah). Pseud. Afghan coup of April 1978: 
Revolution and international security. Drbis 23, 1; 
1979; 93-113. 
Afghanistan's April 27-28 military coup d'etat, which 
overdrew President Daoud and brought two newly united, 
pro-Soviet Marxist - iieninist groups to power, has 
received little attention in America's press and diplo-
matic circles. The case of Afghanistan is important 
both in itself and in the larger context of Soviet 
strategy in the third a world.. Immediately after the 
overthrow of the Daoud regime many government officials, 
including some from Iran, India and the United States, 
expressed puzzlement abott the political predispositions 
of the Afghan coup makers. Taraki regime not only be-
cause of the importance of Afghanistan in itself, but 
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also because the April take over has increased the 
Soviets ability to put pressure on Iran and Pakistan. 
237. SAWHNEY (R G ) , Insurgency: No decisive impact, 
world Focus 5, 4; 1984, April? 10-2. 
Describes that the coup of April 27, 1978 which v/as 
hailed by the Marxists as the "Great saur Revolution", 
brought the peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan 
leader, Nur Mohammad Taraki to pisiwer as president of 
the Revolutionary council and Prime Minister, v-^ hile 
there is no reliable evidence to indicate any Soviet 
involvement in this coup. Afghan problem is no nearer 
solution nor do the Soviets seem any closer to establish-
ing stability in the country. The major handicap of 
the Karmal government has been its Soviet taint. The 
regime has been unable to consolidate itself fully. 
The Soviets are unlikely to get out of Afghanistan either 
under duress of the continuing resistance or international 
pressures. 
238, SlislHA (P B), Afghan revolution and after. Foreign 
Affairs Reports 28, 7; 1979, July; 111-133. 
Describes that the coup of 27 April turned out to be the 
begining of saur revolution. The Revolutionary Council 
took a number of administrative party and economic mea-
sures to strengthen and consolidate the foundations of 
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the revolutionary government. The attempted coup 
by a section of array leaders came to light in August 
1978. The new government is encountering considerable 
difficulties of a social, economic and political nature 
for successfully implementing its policies. The revo-
lutionary government of Afghanistan has not yet stabi-
lized the situation in the country. The Soviet Union 
has high stakes in the success of the revolution in 
Afghanistan, He concludes that the success of progre-
ssive and secular government in Kabul over the forces 
of feudalism, conservatism and religions fanatism is 
one of the latter's strong hold would be a welcome 
development not only for India but for many developing 
and under developed countries of Asia. 
239. SIINIHA ( P - S ) . Afghan Success. Link 21, 38; '1979, Apr 29; 
31. 
Describes that Afghanistan celebrates the first 
anniversary of the saur Revolution, That day a year 
ago,in a successful coup,the government of Daoud was 
overthrown and a new revolutionary government v;as 
established under the leadership of Noor Mohammad 
Taraki,well known Politician, The ruling Khalq Party 
when it took over declared Afghanistan not as an Islamic 
but a democratic Republic, Author points out that the 
Taraki government has introduced radical reforms. 
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240. SUBRAHf-lAtTirAM (K) . Afghan situation and India's 
national interest. Foreign Affairs Reports 29, 8; 
1980, Aug; 143-60. 
Describes that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 
was an inevitable consequence of the saur revolution 
of April 1978. This revolution atten^ted to intro-
duce marxism in a tribal and Islamic society. The 
Khalq party V7hich atSmpted to revolutionize and modern-
ize Afghanistan had neither a large base among the 
industrial v/orkers nor among the peasents. The party 
appears to have derived most of its support from among 
the students, intellectuals, government employees 
and the armed forces. The Khalq party has to implement 
the revolu.tion in a tribal enviornment. India v/ill 
have to take necessary steps. An important step will 
be to keep our armed forces modernized and effective 
to deter any adventurist action against this country 
and insulate our political, social and economic develop-
ment. 
ISLAM REIATIOHSHIP 
241. GOYAL (D R). Islam: Revolution no threat. World 
Focus 5, 4; 1984, Apr; 26-29. 
Describes that the tragic incident represents the com-
plex and contradictory nature of the situation which 
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one is confronted with in the context of the relation-
ship of Islam with the saur revolution. A simplistic 
preposition that has been given currency during the 
last six years is that Islam has come under threat from 
Communism, Against this stand the leaders of the 
revolution assert that the nature of change they seek 
is national democratic which would ensure a bright 
future for religion, 
PROGRESS 
242, MARCH FORWARD. Link 23, 39; 1981, May 10; 29-30. 
Analyses that the third anniversary of saur revolution 
proved a measure of progress in revolution's consoli-
dation in many fields. The counter revolutionaries had 
struck inside the city. Security searches of some areas 
were also carried out. It was the popular participa-
tion evidenced in the national parade. The March pro-
vided a measure of significant, if silent progress in 
the revolution's consolidation. Among the largest groups 
were those of youth and students. The number of v/omen 
participants too came as an inspiring surprise. The 
March was significantly a much bigger affair Karmal him-
self has clearly stated that our first task 1s to combat 
the counter revolution and pointed to the crucial connec-
tion of the solution of problems in the field of land 
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reform in that of economy and education. It also 
indicate thinking on the lines of a change in the 
vgovernment apparatus, 
REFORMS 
243. FAROOQI ( M ) . Imperialist-Maoist Plot-against Afghanis-
tan. Uevr Age 27, 14; 1979, Apr 8; 14. 
Describes that Pakistan is the main base of operations 
of the counter revolutionaries. Armed bands of Afghan 
emigres are being trained to conduct raids across the 
border and to organise sabotage inside Afghanistan, 
Before the saur revolution Afghanistan was a most back-
v/ard country, oveirwhelming majority of its population 
steeped in extreme poverty and illiteracy and deprived 
of all human rights by the despotic feudal regime, 
Duting the last one year after the revolution signifi-
cant changes have taken place in Afghanistan, The 
revolutionary change in Afghanistan is a positive factor 
for peace and stability in our subcontinent. Imperial-
lists and Marxists, helped by reactionaries in the 
countries of this region are working feverishly to change 
the course of this development, 
TRIPARTITE TALKS 
244. LITTLE ROOM for hope. Economic and political V7eeklv 17, 
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28-29; 1982, Jul 10; 1124. 
Describes that the U.N. Secretary General's special 
representative on Afghanistan has said that the talks 
among Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran last month had 
produced "ideas on a structure of a possible compre-
hensive settlement". This must be regarded as an 
unexpectedly hopeful out come considering the wide 
divergence in the positions of the three governments, 
Pakistan had maintained that while it was opposed to 
bilateral talks v/ith Karmal regime. For the Karmal 
regime the author agrues winning legitimacy for itself 
and for the Soviet troop presence in Afghanistan remains 
an important aim. 
TRIPARTITE TAi^ K-A PROPOSAL 
245. U.S., PAKISTAN reject Kabul plan. Hindu. 1981, Aug 27. 
The Afghan proposal for tripartite talks between Afgha-
nistan, Pakistan and Iran on the Afghan crisis was 
denounced by the U.S. state department as a warmed over 
version of a plan Kabul had put forv:ard earlier in 
May 1980. "v?e regret that Kabul continues to ignore 
the U.N. General Assembly resolutions which call for 
an immediate v/ithdrawal of Soviet troops". Vie would 
oppose any arrangement v/hich would lend support to Soviet 
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claims that the Babrak Karma1 regime is the legitimate 
government of Afghanistan, 
UK PACT PII^ IDING MlSSIOiSl 
246. JOSHI (B K). Pact finding UK mission leaves for Kabul 
Times of India 1981, Jan 5. 
Author describes that three labour M.P.s left tonight 
for Afghanistan on a fact finding mission, the first 
of its kind from west Europe, at the invitation of the 
Babrak Karmal government. They have been assured that 
they v/ill be free to meet any body and go any where 
without interference from the Karmal regime. If the 
assurance holds, they plan to meet Afghan personalities 
outside the government as well as leaders of religions 
groups and ethnic minorities. Apart from these contacts, 
they will have wide ranging talks with Mr. Karmal, his 
cabinet ministers and other Parcham and Khalq leaders. 
Their objective will be to find v;hat exactly is happen-
ing in Afghanistan, 
247. JOSHI (B K). Labour MP's call to recognise Karmal 
government. Times of India 1981, Jan 15. 
Author says that the three labour MP's just back from 
fact finding mission in Afghanistan, have projected a 
183 
view of the situation there sharply at variance with 
that held by the foj&eign office here and by much of the 
western press. They said at a press conference that 
the Babrak Karmal regime v/as affectively in control of 
the country,Judging from what they had seen and 
gathered on their five day visit during v;hich they met 
a representative cross section of the people, 
U,K,•s ROLE 
248 , GARRIilGTOM's VISIT. Amri t Bazar P a t r i k a ; 1980 ,Jan 24 . 
D i s c u s s e s t h a t Afghan i s t an v/as the s u b j e c t of Lord 
G o r r i n g t o n ' s t a l k s i n Mev; D e l h i . D i s c u s s i o n s were h e l d 
a t t h e h i g h e s t l e v e l . The B r i t i s h f o r e i g n s e c r e t a r y met 
t h e Prime M i n i s t e r and t h e new e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s m i n i s t e r , 
Mr, P,K,Narasimha Rao and t r i e d t o u n d e r s t a n d I n d i a ' s 
approach t o t h e r e c e n t developments i n A f g h a n i s t a n , He 
s a i d t h a t t h e r e has been f o r e i g n i n t e r f e r e n c e i n 
Afghan i s t an f o r a long t ime f o r h i s t o r i c a l r e a s o n s , a n d 
i n t h e p r e s e n t ca se i t v/as the R e v o l u t i o n a r y counc i l 
which had i n v i t e d t h e S o v i e t Union, 
SOVIET-PAK REiATIONS 
2 4 9 . MALHOTRA(lnder). Afghan i s s u e fou r y e a r s on : Growing 
Russ ian g a i n s . Times of I n d i a ; 1984 ,February 16 , 
Errphasises t h a t t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , t o o , i s fol lov/ ing a 
184 
dual policy in relation to Pakistan, The Waziristan 
bombing and sharp speeches by the Soviet ambassador 
in Islamabad are meant to warn Pakistan to desist from 
crossing the threshold of Russian tolerance. It is 
against this complex and interesting backdrop that 
Mr,Cordovez will resume his mediatory mission over 
Afghanistan in April, Some voices are being raised in 
Pakistan against the folly of allowing the Afghan issue 
:. to be embroiled in the wider conflict betv/een the two 
super powers whether these will be heeded by the 
military rulers,time alone can tell. 
US- AFGHAN REIATIONS 
250. AFGHANISTAN AGAIN, Hindustan Times; 1981,March 17. 
President ^eagan's latest announcement that he was 
unwilling to sit down at the bargaining table with 
the Russians unless the Kremlin changed its attitude on 
various issues including Afghanistan,ill for the 
prospects of negotiated settlement of the crises in 
Kabul, Afghanistan in short appears to symbolise the 
demise of detente with both super powers gearing up 
for a new round of active cold war. As far as the 
Reagan administration is concerned"linkage" is 
deginitely back in vogue. 
185 
251. BETHELL (Nicholas). Afghanistan: Waiting for Mr. Reagan. 
Times 1980, Sept 22. 
Discusses that what is the western world doing about 
the Afghan v/ar? In comparable conflicts - Vietnam, 
Rhodesia - the Soviet Union has been quick to rally vmrld 
opinion against the imperialists and colonialists, then 
to supply armed insurgents with finance, arms and logis-
tic supports. So what are the United States and its 
allies now doing to help those nov; fighting an undoubted 
"war of national liberation" in Afghanistan, 
252. MURDER IN KABUL, Tribune 1979, Feb 16, 
Describes that the death of the U.S. Ambassador in an 
exchange of fire between Afghan troops and his kidnappers 
in Kabul might easily be dismissed as an occupational 
hazard were it not for its likely impact on U.S. Afghan 
relations adversely, the kidnappers - who all died in the 
encounter - will have achieved their objective. Mr. Adol-
ph Dubs was kidnapped by four persons and held captive in 
a hotel. The terrorists demanded the release of the 
Ambassador but would not give enough time for the autho-
rities to weigh their demand. The Afghan troops besieged 
the hotel, and in the encounter that ensued the kidnappers 
v/ere killed and their captive v;ere injured Mr. Dubs later 
• died of the injuries. 
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253. REBDY (G K). US envoy in Kabul shot dead. Hindu 
1979, Feb 15. 
Author says the American en±»assy informed the government 
of India that the U.S. Ambassador in Kabul, v/as kidnapped 
by an unidentified gunman and killed later v/hen Afghan 
police and militarymen stomed the hotel v/here he v/as 
being held in an abortive bid to rescue him. The military 
sharp shooters and armed police v;ho had surrounded the 
Kabul hotel stromed the building after the expiry of the 
one hour ultimatura. 
254. SAREEM (Rajendra), Afghaniminister says US ready to 
attack. Indian Express 1981, Apr 25. 
Describes that the education minister of Afghanistan and 
politburo member of the ruling peoples democratic party 
of Afghanistan, Dr. Anahita Ratebzad has claimed that the 
Afghan government is in possession of documents proving 
a US plot to cut Afghanistan to pieces because with the 
Islamic revolution of Iran and the Afghan revolution. 
It is for the region to see who v/ants to distrub and 
destroy its peaceful life and why. It is well known that 
all of imperialistic forces see the advantages in this 
region that it is full of wealth. The Indian ocean, the 
Gulf. 
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